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ABSTRACT 
 
Construction and Reconstruction of the New Turkey Discourse: Critical Discourse 
Analysis of Newspaper Columns 
(2010-2016) 
 
Yılmaz, Burak. 
MA in Sociology 
Thesis Advisor: Assist. Prof. Alim Arlı 
August 2018, 138 pages 
 
The purpose of this study is to conduct critical discourse analysis of the uses and 
transformation of the “New Turkey” discourse between 2010 and 2016 based on 
mainstream newspaper columns and to make sense of this discursive practice through 
the Bourdieu’s concept of the Symbolic Power. It was first uttered after Justice and 
Development Party (AKP) won the 2007 general elections and manifested as a new 
political vision after 2010 Constitution Referendum. Concerning the research objective, 
182 newspaper columns were scanned and divided into categories, and discursive 
strategies under those categories were coded qualitatively via ATLAS TI program. The 
codified texts were analyzed contextually and diachronically by using Critical Discourse 
Analysis method. In accordance with the premises of the Adaptive Theory, 
methodological framework of the thesis was constructed through the epistemological 
integration of Critical Discourse Analysis and sociology of Bourdieu. According to the 
findings, it was identified that the political crises in 2013 caused a rapture in the use of 
the new Turkey discourse, and therefore radically changed the delineative feature of that 
discourse. It was also revealed that the new Turkey, which had functioned as sort of 
‘normalization’ discourse before 2013, has represented a discourse of powerful state and 
civilization consisting of global claims, in company with a securitization discourse after 
2013. Moreover, it was observed that the journalistic field, the academic field and the 
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think-tank space played a significant role in the reproduction of the new Turkey discourse 
by adapting it to the contradictory contexts.  
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ÖZ 
 
Yeni Türkiye Söyleminin İnşası ve Yeniden İnşası:  
Köşe Yazılarının Eleştirel Söylem Analizi (2010-2016) 
 
Yılmaz, Burak. 
Sosyoloji Yüksek Lisans Programı 
Tez Danışmanı: Dr. Alim Arlı 
Ağustos 2018, 138 sayfa 
 
Bu çalışmanın amacı, ilk olarak 2007 yılındaki genel seçimlerin Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi 
(AKP) lehine sonuçlanmasının ardından dolaşıma sokulan ve 2010 Anayasa Referandumu 
sonrasında AKP tarafından yeni bir politik tahayyül ve vizyon olarak ortaya konulan “Yeni 
Türkiye” söyleminin 2010 ve 2016 yılları arasındaki kullanımlarının ve dönüşümünün, ana 
akım gazetelerde yazılan köşe yazılarından yola çıkarak, eleştirel söylem analizini yapmak 
ve bu söylemsel pratiği Bourdieu’nün Simgesel Güç kavramıyla anlamlandırmaya 
çalışmaktır. Bu amaç doğrultusunda, toplam 182 köşe yazısı taranarak tematik 
kategorilere ayrılmış, bu kategoriler altındaki söylemsel stratejiler ATLAS TI programı 
aracılığıyla niteliksel olarak kodlanmıştır. Kodlanan yazılar Eleştirel Söylem Analizi 
metodu kullanılarak bağlamsal ve diyakronik olarak analiz edilmiştir. Tezin ana 
omurgasını oluşturan metodolojik çerçeve, Uyarlayıcı Teori’nin sunduğu imkanlar 
doğrultusunda Eleştirel Söylem Analizi ve Bourdieu sosyolojisinin epistemolojik 
entegrasyonuyla oluşturulmuştur. Elde edilen bulgulara göre, 2013 yılındaki politik 
krizlerin yeni Türkiye söylemi açısından bir kırılma yarattığı ve bu söylemin tanımlayıcı 
niteliğini radikal bir biçimde değiştirdiği saptanmıştır. 2013 yılı öncesinde bir tür 
‘normalleşme’ söylemi olarak işlev gören yeni Türkiye’nin, 2013 yılından sonra 
güvenlikleştirme söylemi eşliğinde küresel bir iddia içeren medeniyet ve güçlü devlet 
söylemini temsil ettiği tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca, bu söylemin birbirinden çelişkili 
vii 
 
bağlamlara uyarlanarak yeniden üretilmesinde gazetecilik alanı, akademik alan ve think-
tank uzamının önemli bir rolü olduğu gözlenmiştir.      
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yeni Türkiye, Söylem, Pierre Bourdieu, Köşe Yazarları 
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I also thank Assoc. Prof. Güney Çeğin, who helped me to construct my sociological 
imagination from the very beginning of my high school days. He really touched my life 
and fortunately I met him at my early ages, therefore I owe my academic enthusiasm to 
him. 
 
I am particularly grateful for the courage given by my undergraduate lecturer Dr. Irmak 
Karademir Hazır. She was always very supportive even when I got desperate. I wish to 
thank her for being concerned and friendly to me, as it means a lot for an undergraduate 
student. 
 
Finally, I would like to show my great appreciation to Devrim Evci, who was not only my 
English teacher in high school but also a friend for me. I always tread in his footsteps in 
terms of the intellectual profundity. Besides his all contributions, he patiently proofread 
and edited this thesis which was great help for me.  
 
 
 
 
x 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. iv 
Öz…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………vi 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... ix 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... x 
CHAPTERS 
1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 1 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK .......................................................................................... 9 
 2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis ....................................................................................... 9 
 2.1.1. Relational/Dialectical Construction of Discourse .............................. 9 
 2.1.2. Contextuality of Discourse ............................................................... 14 
 2.1.3. Discourse as Legitimate Language and Linguistic Capital ................ 19 
 2.2. Pierre Bourdieu .......................................................................................................22 
 2.2.1. Habitus ............................................................................................. 22 
 2.2.2. Fields ................................................................................................ 27 
 2.2.3. Capital-Symbolic Power-Doxa .......................................................... 33 
3. METHOD ....................................................................................................................... 38 
 3.1. Sampling ...................................................................................................................40 
 3.2. Coding and Analysis ................................................................................................42 
4. CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE COLUMNS ..................................................... 44 
 4.1. Period between 2010 and 2014............................................................................44 
 4.1.1. Democratization and Normalization ................................................ 44 
 4.1.2. Demilitarization of Politics: Liquidation of Military Tutelage .......... 55 
 4.1.3. Discourse of Peace-building: Kurdish Question ............................... 66 
 4.2. Period between 2014 and 2016 ............................................................................80 
 4.2.1. Change of the New Turkey’s Constitutive Other ............................. 83 
 4.2.2. Imperial Claims: Discourse of Restoration of the Republic or Symbolic 
Re-foundation of the Ottoman Empire ............................................................................ 97 
xi 
 
 4.2.3. Discourse of the Leadership and the Presidential System............. 107 
5. INTERPRETATION and CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 114 
 5.1. Contextual Adaptation .........................................................................................115 
 5.2. Categories of Perception, Discursive Construction of the Constitutive Other 
and Self-Representation ..........................................................................................................118 
 5.3. Relations in the Journalistic Field .......................................................................124 
 5.4. Epilogue ..................................................................................................................128 
6. References .................................................................................................................. 130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xii 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In the new Ireland children would be taught a distinctively 
Irish way of walking, sprightly, limber and affirmative as 
against the British slouch or swagger. The Irish style of 
defecation would be regular and efficient, brief in duration 
to avoid anal eroticism; children would be taught to 
regulate their bowels like Gaels, not shit as Sassenachs 
(Eagleton, 1990, p. 51) 
 
Understanding the reproduction of the political and social order was a very basic 
motivation of the emergence of sociology as a discipline. Whereas classical thinkers were 
stuck between the influence of structures and individual actions in the comprehension 
of stability and change, discursive construction of the social has not been at stake. Firstly 
Ferdinand de Saussure, then the linguistic turn in social sciences which was promoted in 
especially the later works of Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein, 1958) broughtlanguage into the 
analysis of the social as a constitutive and reproductive part of social reality. As a result 
of the increasing interest on linguistic structures in the social sciences, discourse studies 
which also encompasses language, emerged as a field. Discourse, as Purvis and Hunt 
define it, “refers to the individual social networks of communication through the 
medium of language or non-verbal sign-systems” (Purvis and Hunt, 1993, p. 485). 
However, discourse functions beyond communication and turns out to be one of the 
influential instruments of power relations, since it necessitates an established consensus 
on written, verbal and non-verbal systems. Everyday life, the political system, the 
economic order, and all other structures which need to be sustained must have their 
own discourse which enables them to be perceived in an intended way. In this sense, 
although discourse provides one with the opportunity to comprehend material 
conditions, it may also lead different people to comprehend those conditions in a totally 
different way. Discourses cannot be constructed without an agency intervention. In 
modern society, as the instruments and modes of power have changed, intellectuals 
2 
 
have taken the role of imposing the dominant ideas. In other words, coercion, which is 
an old, ruthless strategy of rulers, has been transferred into the realm of words. This is 
not to argue that coercion as an instrument of domination has disappeared. Rather, as a 
modern discovery of power, intellectual intervention has become an accomplice in 
violent actions.  
 
In this context, non-material practices of power for the maintenance of the social and 
political order have been discussed among thinkers in an accumulative way. Almost until 
Foucault, the concept of discourse was not in the foreground. The classical Marxist 
tradition mostly used the notion of ideology to identify dominant ideas and the 
established “false reality” in the society. Yet whether the notion itself has a negative or 
a positive meaning is controversial. According to Jorge Larrain (1983), it is ambiguous in 
Marx’s writings, since ideology is both negative, because it implies the distortion of the 
truth, and also positive, because it implies the “totality of forms of social consciousness” 
(p. 4). Within the same tradition, while Lukacs, borrowing the negative conception of 
ideology, regards it as false consciousness, which is the reason for the objectification of 
the working class (Lukacs, 1971), Althusser considers ideology in both a negative way, as 
the ideological state apparatus (ISA), and a positive way, as the interpellation of the 
subject (Althusser, 1971). Gramsci, as a neo-Marxist thinker, has recourse to the notion 
of hegemony to illuminate the consent-production of the ruling class and the role of 
intellectuals in the construction of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971). On the other hand, Michel 
Foucault, who distanced himself from Marxism, operationalized the notion of discourse 
instead of ideology to make sense of the conditions which make social order possible. 
For Foucault, it is important to scrutinize what makes a discourse possible rather than 
what is behind that discourse; therefore, he applied the method of archaeology and 
genealogy to trace different kind of institutionalized discourses (Foucault, 
1972;1977;1980;1981). The post-structuralist tradition removed the distinction between 
discursive and non-discursive realms and came to accept that social reality is discursive 
and that there is nothing outside the text (Derrida, 1976&Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). 
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Bourdieu, on the other hand, employs neither the concept of discourse, nor that of 
ideology. Furthermore, he intentionally rejects the use of the latter because of its 
vagueness (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 266), and therefore sets up his own theoretical tools such 
as symbolic power and doxa, through which he has tried to understand the tacit 
acceptance of the social world by means of categories of perception and principles of 
vision and division. He locates those practices and strategies within a well-designed field 
theory in which agents struggle against each other to impose a legitimate vision and to 
get recognized capital in return. Finally, after the 1980s, linguistic studies paved the way 
for critical discourse analysis. Thinkers in this tradition investigate the role of discourse 
in the reproduction and challenge of dominance (Fairclough, 1992;Van Dijk, 1993;Wodak 
and Meyer, 2001). Critical discourse analysis is envisaged as an eclectic methodology, 
since grasping the complexity of social reality necessitates the articulation of different 
perspectives. Among all these paradigms, I find Bourdieu’s framework best suited to my 
field of study, and in an eclectic way, I make use of critical discourse analysis as a 
combination of method and methodology in the construction of my object of research. 
Before mentioning why these two veins are eligible, I would like to clarify my focus at 
this juncture.   
 
In Turkey, power holders have always used the means of communication functionally to 
reinforce their power and to impose their world-views. Compared to before, factors like 
increasing number of media companies, opportunities on the internet, and the 
emergence of think-tank organizations which link the academic and the political fields 
have multiplied the channels for governments to legitimize their coercive regimes. The 
Justice and Development Party (AKP), the most long-lasting party of Turkey, has used all 
such resources possible to embark on the construction of political hegemony after 2010, 
and therefore came up with a new political claim which was named as the “new Turkey”. 
Although the new Turkey discourse of AKP government was first uttered after the 2007 
general elections, it boomed essentially during the referendum campaign in 2010.  
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However, it should be noted that there is a historical continuity in claiming new order 
for almost 300 years in Turkish political history. Both in the Ottoman period and modern 
Turkey, several reformist movements came up with a self-identification based on being 
new.  According to Niyazi Berkes, the military reforms carried out by the Ottoman Sultan 
Selim was identified as Nizam-I Cedid (The New Order) by İbrahim Müteferrika (Berkes, 
2012, p. 50). Moreover, claims of newness can be traced in the Young Ottomans (New 
Ottomans) which was a reformist society established in 1865 by Ottoman intellectuals. 
As Şerif Mardin points out, “the European belief that the Ottoman Empire was in its 
death throes gave and additional reason to the founders to proclaim, by the inclusion of 
the word “Young” in the name of the society, the vitality of the empire” (Mardin, 2000, 
p. 22). In the beginning of 20th century, inspired from the Young Ottomans, another 
reformist group called themselves as the Young (Jeunes) Turks. Even Mustafa Kemal, the 
founder of the Republic of Turkey, used the word “New Turkey” in his “The Speech” 
[Nutuk] to distinguish the modern Turkey from the old Ottoman rule. 
 
In a similar vein with its historical uses, by tracking its circulation retrospectively in the 
public opinion, one can reach the conclusion that the earlier use of the new Turkey was 
standing for the claims of democratization and demilitarization of politics together with 
the strengthening of the AKP government, whereas the old Turkey was representing the 
military tutelage in association with Kemalist ideology. Yet, as if it were a floating signifier 
(Levi-Strauss, 1987, p.63), in the following years what the new Turkey stands for has 
periodically changed in parallel with political breaks. Interestingly enough, the executives, 
members, and media-engaged actors of the AKP have continued to consecrate and name 
the changed and completely dissimilar conditions as also the new Turkey. Thus, what 
characterizes the old Turkey has at the same time changed in time. What we ultimately 
have is a politically functional but ambiguous naming of the political order. 
 
That ambiguity was the departure point of this study. Aside from AKP members, most 
intellectuals, academics, journalists and think-tank researchers have contributed to the 
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circulation of the new Turkey discourse on media platforms by writing newspaper 
columns, posting on the internet, and “preaching” on TV channels. To put it more 
explicitly, those actors have made great efforts to legitimize contradictory situations with 
discursive power of the new Turkey at the expense of even contradicting themselves. In 
that way, political order has long been discursively produced and reproduced in favor of 
the AKP government. In this context, my research specifically focuses on the construction 
and reconstruction of the new Turkey discourse as a practice of symbolic power between 
2010 and 2016. As I expressed earlier, my intention is to operationalize a Bourdieusian 
framework to capture the ”taken for granted” circulation of the new Turkey and to 
understand how it is imposed upon recipients. I chose newspaper columns as the unit of 
analysis, since such journalistic practice has been used as influentially as TV programs to 
spread the imposition of the new Turkey. Tracing those columns, I want to explore the 
following: a) How is the new Turkey discourse constructed in different contexts and 
adapted to changing political settings? Correspondingly, b) What are the strategies 
(conceptions, categories, dichotomies, naming, representations, perceptions, etc.) of 
actors in the construction of the discourse? Having recourse to a Bourdieusian 
framework, c) Can this construction, reconstruction, and imposition of the new Turkey 
be comprehended with the concepts of symbolic power/violence and doxa? d) What are 
the (journalistic) field dynamics and what does the participation of the actors from 
different fields have to do with the construction and reproduction of the new Turkey 
discourse? In the light of these questions, I aim to carry out a critical discourse analysis 
of the columns written by pro-new Turkey actors and to associate that analysis with a 
Bourdieusian framework. Accordingly, I collected and categorized the columns both 
periodically and topically and read them critically in line with Bourdieu’s theory. 
Furthermore, I tried to comprehend the columns as a sort of discursive field of the 
journalistic field in general in which actors from different fields go in and out. In the 
method chapter, I am going to explain in detail what the methodic parameters of my 
research are. 
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Employing a Bourdieusian perspective in discourse studies is not a frequent trend in 
Turkish academia. Also, the journalistic field does not draw considerable attention in the 
social sciences. Among the limited number of master theses; Bahadır Türk’s thesis, titled 
“Pierre Bourdieu’s Contribution to the Debates Concerning Ideology and Discourse”, 
which also gave an inspiration for my research, aims to make Bourdieu’s concepts useful 
in ideology and discourse studies. Türk’s theoretical study locates Bourdieu in the history 
of discussions of ideology and discourse and proposes to operationalize his concepts of 
symbolic violence/power/capital and doxa together with the notions of ideology and 
discourse (Türk, 2004). In another article, Türk employs these concepts to understand 
the anatomy of Kemalism as the official ideology of Turkey (Türk, 2004a). On the other 
hand, Erman Yüce’s PhD thesis in a journalism department focuses on the columnists of 
the Hürriyet newspaper through a Bourdieusian framework. Yüce investigates symbolic 
capital, symbolic power, and symbolic violence practices in the columns by applying a 
content analysis method (Yüce, 2007). İsmet Parlak and Nigar Değirmenci’s article also 
examines the discursive change of the columnists of Zaman newspaper between 2011 
and 2014 based on Bourdieu’s conceptual tools (Parlak and Değirmenci, 2015). Ali Esgin, 
on the other hand, tries to understand social scientific practices in Turkey by 
operationalizing the concepts of doxa and doxosopher, which are developed by Bourdieu 
(Esgin, 2015). 
 
Concerning the new Turkey, there are some politically biased publications which identify 
with and affirm the premises which new Turkey discourse stands for. In this sense, they 
do not treat the new Turkey objectively, but they take it for granted as the new reality 
of Turkey. On the other side, there are non-academic or semi-academic studies which 
look into the new Turkey critically. Whereas Bahadır Türk (2014), in a chapter in his book 
titled Muktedir [The Competent], briefly analyzes new Turkey discourse especially 
focusing on Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı’s columns, Doğan Gürpınar (2016) tries to understand 
the meaning and change of the new Turkey discourse in his book titled Kültür Savaşları 
[Culturel Struggles]. Undoubtedly, all these studies occupy a significant place in the 
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literature. Each of them provided me an insight that helped me to build my research 
object around a well-constructed theoretical perspective. In return, my research, I 
strongly believe, will have offer some humble contributions of its own. There is a 
remarkable gap in the literature about perhaps the most contradictive discourse of 
Turkish politics. That discourse, in the circulation of which a considerable number of 
actors from different fields have participated, deserves to be scientifically treated. By 
providing a great amount of data and a broad contextual time period, my study first of 
all seeks to fulfil this aim and therefore to lead up following academic studies. Also, as 
Bahadır Türk did, I want to exhibit how the sociology of Bourdieu can functionally be 
employed in the understanding of symbolic reproductions of the political order. 
Furthermore, to read Bourdieu with a critical discourse analysis provides a chance to 
locate Bourdieu within the framework of discourse studies, which is something missing 
in the literature. In this sense, the Bourdieusian perspective allows me to problematize 
the function both of the discourse itself and of actors for power relations. Also, the 
eclectic implementation of the critical discourse analysis provides a relational and 
contextual point of view for my research.   
 
After this introductory chapter, in Chapter 2, I will discuss possibilities of critical 
discourse analysis in the construction of the research object and in the analysis of the 
texts by referring to Normal Fairclough and Teun Van Dijk’s views. Then I will move to 
the Bourdieusian framework, which is composed of critical notions such as habitus, field, 
symbolic power, and doxa. While doing so, I will try to show the applicability of Pierre 
Bourdieu’s sociology to discourse studies by stating the links with the critical discourse 
analysis tradition. In Chapter 3, I will mention how I constructed my object of research 
and how I collected, categorized, and analyzed the newspaper columns in accordance 
with the research objectives by referring to the critical discourse analysis method. 
Chapter 4 consists of the analysis of the refined data. In this chapter, I will first divide the 
newspaper columns as before 2014 and after 2014, and then I will analyze them under 
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the contextual titles in these two periods. Finally, in Chapter 5, by revisiting the theory, I 
will interpret the data analyzed in the previous chapter and will summarize the findings.        
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this part, I will first discuss the possibilities of critical discourse analysis in order to 
provide insight into how discourse is constructed in texts. Critical discourse analysis gives 
clues about the relational construction of discourse, its context-dependent nature, and 
its functional use as a legitimate language. All these premises asserted by critical 
discourse analysis provide a framework for the construction of the object of research. In 
other words, critical discourse analysis indicates the paths of how a discourse should be 
perceived in a text and how it should be analyzed as an object of research. Secondly, I 
will mention Bourdieusian framework, consisting of habitus, field, and symbolic power. 
By means of similarities with critical discourse analysis, I will discuss the possible use of 
the notion of discourse by associating it with Bourdieu’s broad theoretical instruments. 
Since Bourdieu already addresses the symbolic production of the social world, 
interpreting discursive constructions by situating them into his theoretical configuration 
can be productive.             
 
2.1. Critical Discourse Analysis 
2.1.1. Relational/Dialectical Construction of Discourse 
One of the main contributions of critical discourse analysis is its relational and dialectical 
account in the examination of the social. Just as their contemporaries, scholars which 
are positioned in the framework of critical discourse analysis have endeavored to deal 
with the archaic dualism of early modernity. In the social sciences, there is an ongoing 
debate between a structuralist tradition which prioritizes structures over the agency, and 
an interpretivist tradition which focuses on individual motivations. The former has 
influentially manifested itself with the emergence of linguistic studies. Especially 
Saussure’s contribution has intensified structuralist tendencies in social science; 
therefore, socio-linguistic studies have developed in accordance with this axis.  
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Critical discourse analysis, as a recent tradition, has emerged in this condition and its 
prominent scholars have developed a relational view without neglecting the functions of 
the structures. As representatives, Fairclough and Chouliaraki define Critical Discourse 
Analysis’ (CDA) aim as to overcome the tension of modernity between structure and 
agency, as "a way of seeing and researching social life as both constrained by social 
structures, and an active process of production which transforms social structures" 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 1). In this sense, they stand similar to Pierre 
Bourdieu's position, which can be called constructivist structuralism or structuralist 
constructivism, and which is also an attempt to transcend the contradiction between 
agency and structure.  
 
The relation between language and society is not external (Fairclough, 2001, p. 19), but 
dialogical; therefore, this enables one to regard discourse as a form of language which is 
already a social practice. Not only does it constitute social reality but also is constructed 
and shaped by surrounding social structures. While discourse is capable of constituting 
identities, relations, and belief systems, it is also constructed and affected by "class and 
other social relations at a societal level, by the relations specific to particular institutions 
such as law or education, by systems of classification, by various norms and conventions 
of both a discursive and a non-discursive nature, and so forth" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 64). 
Such a dialectical position emancipates analysis from falling into reductionist 
approaches—either methodological individualism or structuralism. Too much emphasis 
on subjective motivation in the production of discourse neglects its socially conditioned 
character, and likewise, too much emphasis on structural determination underestimates 
the impact of individual labor (or choices) on the production, reproduction, and 
transformation of discourse. As a solution to this impasse, similar to Bourdieu, Fairclough 
notes that “the discursive constitution of society does not emanate from a free play of 
ideas in people’s heads but from a social practice which is firmly rooted in and oriented 
to real, material social structures” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 66).  
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2.1.1.1. Discourse as Practice 
So, if discourse is a social practice, then we need to portray what practice is and how it 
works. Practice is basically temporal and spatial investments of material and non-
material resources (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 21). Whether the motivation of 
the practice comes from mental dispositions or not, practice follows a particular interest 
in each situation. The mode of practice may change conditionally and also it can be 
reproduced through cognitive or structural factors. Language here is a crucial arbiter in 
the reproduction of practices, but one must notice that practice and its reproduction 
should not be reduced to mere linguistic patterns. In addition, we need to accept there 
are also non-discursive fields of the social. Discursive practice, says Fairclough, "does not 
contrast with social practice: the former is a particular form of the latter. In some cases, 
the social practice may be wholly constituted by the discursive practice, while in others 
it may involve a mixture of discursive and non-discursive practice” (Fairclough, 1992, 
p.71). Accordingly, the function and mode of discourse change depending on the position 
of its performer and the context in which it is performed. This reveals the “reflexivity” of 
discursive practice, which means that "representations of a practice are generated as 
part of the practice" and those representations have ideological projections; therefore, 
they contribute to the maintenance of relations of domination (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 37).   
 
Discursive practice itself functions as a mediator of ideological and political practices. In 
fact, they are indistinguishable; nevertheless, the formation of political/ideological 
meaning in a text can be traced through discursive practices. Text production is an effort, 
since writing as a process means including preferable messages and excluding 
undesirable contents. As Fairclough remarks, "Analysis of a particular discourse as a 
piece of discursive practice focuses upon processes of text production, distribution, and 
consumption. All of these processes are social and require reference to the particular 
economic, political and institutional setting within which discourse is generated" 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 71). The dialectical and reciprocal generation of discourse may 
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create various different layers of meaning. To put it another way, a discourse which is 
not produced with political concerns may be circulated and consumed in such contexts 
that it comes off as an indisputably political discourse.   
 
The particular discourse which appears in a text is an output of political, social and 
economic forces and also has the power to impinge on them. Discourse intervenes, 
transforms, and reproduces socially constituted structures, and this happens by means 
of strategies of actors who are not independent of those structures. According to 
Fairclough, "One can neither reconstruct the production process nor account for the 
interpretation process purely by reference to texts: they are respectively traces of and 
cues to these processes, and can be neither produced nor interpreted without members’ 
resources” (Fairclough, 1992, p. 72). While actors produce discourses, each involvement 
positions them across the structures and other agencies, since they set profit-seeking 
instruments to work.  
 
2.1.1.2. Cognition 
Up to this point, by discussing critical discourse analysis, I have argued that individuals in 
a society are not totally free in their discursive practical choices, yet I have not explained 
how it is possible. This kind of “dependency” naturally affects the quality of discursive 
practices. In his book Discourse and Social Change, Fairclough mentions the socio-
cognitive dimensions of text production and interpretation (Fairclough, 1992, p. 80), 
arguing that structures are embodied by individuals who reflect those structures in their 
discursive strategies. Likewise, embodied structures or “members’ resources” shape the 
interpretation process and the reception of meaning. Members’ resources are cognitive 
products which people already have, but their existence arises from social relations, and 
they are “socially transmitted and unequally distributed” (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). 
 
The social determination of cognitive resources also affects the way they are used. 
Different cognitive strategies, says Fairclough, "are conventionally expected when 
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someone is reading a poem on the one hand, and a magazine advertisement on the 
other" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). To put it simply, cognition creates socially motivated 
strategies. However, it is not only limited to the interpretation of a text; rather, cognition 
comes into play in the process of writing, and it is reflected as a style which can be word 
preferences, the structure of sentences, or the effective use of the language. These 
cognitive choices are essentially ideological because they imply the unconscious 
internalization of particular value systems. Both the production and the interpretation 
of texts depend on resources which actors gain in their interactions, either intentionally 
or unintentionally. According to Fairclough, production and interpretation are 
constrained in a double sense: 
 
Firstly, they are constrained by the available members' resources, which 
are effectively internalized social structures, norms, and conventions, 
including orders of discourse, and conventions for the production, 
distribution, and consumption of texts of the sort just referred to, and 
which have been constituted through past social practice and struggle. 
Secondly, they are constrained by the specific nature of the social practice 
of which they are parts, which determines what elements of members' 
resources are drawn upon, and how (in normative or creative, acquiescent 
or oppositional ways) they are drawn upon (Fairclough, 1992, p. 80). 
 
Similar to Fairclough, Van Dijk also addresses the relational bond between structures and 
discursive production. He takes social cognition into consideration to provide grounded 
analysis of the question of how using particular discourse ends up with the production 
or reproduction of dominance (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 251). The emphasis on “cognition” is 
much more dominant in Van Dijk’s analysis. His theoretical concern to unveil the exercise 
of power presupposes a “missing link” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 251) between discourse and 
dominance; therefore, social cognition would helps to account for the production, 
interpretation, and effects of discourse (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 257). In order to make sense 
of a particular event, one resorts to cognitive schemata which consists of past 
experiences. They are structured as common sense, and dialectically they structure what 
we perceive of a particular event.  Van Dijk gives the examples of the civil wars in Bosnia 
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and Kosovo in his book Ideology and Discourse, arguing that "reading the newspaper 
about the civil wars in Bosnia or Kosovo, we not only form mental models of the events 
but probably also associate these with negative opinions about the war crimes and 
‘ethnic cleansing’ being perpetrated in these wars" (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 21). One should 
note that reading about the civil war in Bosnia and Kosovo is an act both of cognitive 
production and of consumption. The text or process of writing is as ideological as the 
way we interpret the text itself. In newspapers, for instance, authors appeal to general 
categorizations and common-sense knowledge to manipulate the minds of the masses. 
This ends up with the constitution of representations, and 
 
those social representations are ‘particularized’ in mental models, and it 
is often through mental models that they are expressed in text and talk. 
And conversely, it is through mental models of everyday discourse such as 
conversations, news reports and textbooks that we acquire our 
knowledge of the world, our socially shared attitudes and finally our 
ideologies and fundamental norms and values (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 114). 
 
Similarly, Van Leeuwen argues that “as discourses are social cognitions, socially specific 
ways of knowing social practice, they can be, and are, used as resources for representing 
social practices in the text” (Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, as Van Dijk points out 
in another text, critical discourse analysis concerns “a detailed description, explanation 
and critique of the ways dominant discourses (indirectly) influence such socially shared 
knowledge, attitudes and ideologies, namely through their role in the manufacture of 
concrete models” (Van Dijk, 1993, Pp. 258-259).   
 
2.1.2. Contextuality of Discourse 
Being relational also implies being conjectural and contextual, therefore critical 
discourse analysts focus on conditions of actions or practices and their spatio-temporal 
dependency. Here, what should be mentioned is the necessity of approaching discourse 
as an action or practice. It is that practice which cannot be frozen at a particular time and 
particular place. Rather, discursive practice is so fluid that it is shaped depending on 
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different settings. Fairclough defines three processes of the analysis of discourse: 
production, distribution, and consumption. These stages can be read by reference to the 
particular contexts such as a discourse’s political, economic and institutional settings 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 71).   
 
Either in the production process or in the consumption process (the reception of the 
discourse), the meaning of the discourse circulates between structural and cognitive 
dispositions.  Here, the setting is considered as a transformative and determinant factor 
for the discourse. The construction of a coded meaning necessitates paying attention to 
the settings, since meaning may change from one particular context to another. 
Discourses have no intrinsically political or ideological significations, yet different 
discourses in different contexts may be politically and ideologically invested (Fairclough, 
1992, p. 67). In another book, Norman Fairclough and Isabela Fairclough support this 
argument by referring to Van Dijk’s focus on the context in political discourse analysis, 
saying that “outside political contexts, the discourse of politicians or any other ‘political 
actors’ is not ‘political’” (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012, p. 18). Here, contexts can be 
understood as both macro domains like politics, economics, etc. and also as media like 
newspapers, television programs, particular conversations, etc. 
 
In each condition, context is the limit of discourse and functions as the boundary 
between different discourses. Just as in Bourdieu's “fields”, actors have to fit different 
settings or contexts to construct “legitimate” discourse. As Fairclough claims, "it is 
feasible that boundaries between settings and practices should be so naturalized that 
these subject positions are lived as complementary. Under different social circumstances, 
the same boundaries might become a focus of contestation and struggle, and the subject 
positions and the discursive practices associated with them might be experienced as 
contradictory" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 69). This also corresponds to the Gramscian concept 
of “hegemony”, which Chouliaraki and Fairclough call "struggles for closure" (Chouliaraki 
and Fairclough, 1999, p. 38). Such a struggle is a never-ending process and cannot be 
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achieved completely. Discursive practices contest to dominate each other and to draw 
borders between different contexts. Struggles take place in between macro and micro 
levels (or in conjunctures) and through these struggles structures are mediated. In other 
words, “power is not simply exercised, it is also fought over, and fought over in discourse” 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 62).  
 
Emphasis on “struggles for closure” is a very functional departure point to grasp political 
discursive investments. The former statement implies what Laclau and Mouffe call the 
"discursiveness of the social", and the "impossibility of fixing the social" is a precondition 
of hegemonic articulation (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). Fairclough and Chouliaraki 
combine Laclau and Mouffe’s discursive practices and Gramsci's hegemonic struggles to 
make sense of discursive strategies contesting each other. The struggle for closure or 
identifying what is legitimate is a fight for signification under socially constructed spaces. 
According to Fairclough, "this may be a matter of vocabulary -‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom 
fighter’ are contrasting combinations of signifier and signified, and the contrast between 
them is a socially motivated one- or a matter of grammar, or other dimensions of 
language organization" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 75). Interestingly enough, such 
contradictory discourses may be produced, circulated and defended by the same person 
(or group) in different temporal contexts, which is the very first concern of my study here. 
As Fairclough clarifies, "Analysis of context of condition involves an interplay between 
cues and members' resources, but the members' resources, in this case, is in effect a 
mental map of the social order. Such a mental map is necessarily just one interpretation 
of social realities which are amenable to many interpretations, politically and 
ideologically invested in particular ways" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 82). 
 
Van Dijk addresses the discursive context at the basis of power relations. Different from 
Fairclough, contexts for him are not only stable situations which define the mode of 
discursive activity but also things that are controlled by power elites. Accordingly, 
"participants may have more or less control over the variable properties of the (course 
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of) discourse and its conditions and consequences, such as their planning, setting, the 
presence of other participants, modes of participation, overall organization, turn-taking, 
agenda, topics or style” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 256). Needles to say, the degree of control 
depends upon the positions of the actors. The more politically and economically 
powerful one group is, the greater their ability to change situations on behalf of their 
interests. Yet in each condition, the relationship between discursive practices and 
contextual structures is dialectical. As Van Dijk writes, 
 
[…] discourse and its users have a ‘dialectic’ relation with their context: 
besides being subject to the social constraints of the context, they also 
contribute to, construe or change that context. Flexible negotiations may 
be engaged in as a function of the demands of the present context and 
the more general constraints of culture and society. Group power may be 
obeyed in discourse, but also challenged. Social norms and rules may be 
creatively changed or broken and such violations may give rise to new 
social arrangements (Van Dijk, 1997 p. 20). 
 
This does not mean that individuals do not have to be aware of every single dynamic of 
a particular context to act accordingly, yet “speakers must have beliefs about the beliefs 
of recipients” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 26). Socially shared values allow individuals to think in 
terms of categories and infer what is common with the others. Therefore, ideas, beliefs, 
and values are structured and particularized in the minds of the people. Then we come 
to the point that context in Van Dijk’s approach is also a cognitive notion. Above all, our 
mental structure delimits and defines the situation as context before actualizing 
discursive practice. In other words, contexts or settings consist not only of physical space 
but also of the “occupants” of these spaces and their interactional planes (Van Dijk, 2009, 
p. 50). Occupants located in a defined field constitute the boundaries for the discursive 
play, and this mediation between discourse and cognition is called “context models” by 
Van Dijk (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 26). 
 
These context models are communicative and dialogical and appear in confrontations 
among individuals. They enable us to determine how to construct or use a discourse 
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depending on social settings. “We may be more or less formal, more or less polite, and 
may choose one word rather than another, as a function of where, when and with whom 
we speak, and with what intentions” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 28). This is inevitably ideological 
and subordinate to power relations. For those who are able to control contexts, it is a 
kind of legitimacy, since context presents them the authority to speak more than others. 
The ideological backgrounds of participants influences what they say or produce. Van 
Dijk gives the example of journalists, saying that the “media ideologies of journalists 
similarly control their ways of writing or editing news, background stories or editorials” 
(Van Dijk, 2000, p. 28). Such ideological embeddedness of different contexts is 
crystallized in the concept of “orders of discourse”, which is adopted from Michel 
Foucault. 
 
2.1.2.1. Orders of Discourse 
Although discursive investments, or, with a more structuralist definition, configurations, 
are contextual, this should not mean that every discourse belongs to a particular setting. 
Rather, discourse is referential, and it is explained by French discourse analysists with 
the concept of interdiscourse, as "the complex interdependent configuration of 
discursive formations" (Fairclough, 1992, p. 68). As the concept itself implies, discourses 
flow among other discourses and constitute referential formations. These combinations 
may consist of different modes and forms of discourse coming together. However, 
Fairclough prefers the Foucauldian term, “order of discourse”, since it signals 
configurations explicitly. The word “order” indicates that discourse has its articulatory 
parts, which may be complementary or contradictory (Fairclough, 1992, p. 68). As I 
discussed before, these dialogical parts constitute or displace boundaries between 
different settings. According to Fairclough, "what applies for boundaries between 
subject positions and associated discursive conventions applies generally for elements 
of orders of discourse” (Fairclough, 1992, p.68). These boundaries might be the dividing 
line between the dominating and the dominated one, and the former needs to take 
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control of orders of discourse to perpetuate unequal relations with the latter (Fairclough, 
2001, p. 31).   
 
Sets of discourse may not compromise with their social settings and this results in the 
articulation and rearticulation of orders of discourse. For this study, newspaper articles 
can serve as an example. Several types of discourses are used to support, to legitimize, 
and to defend a particular situation. In this sense, one can apply legal discourse 
combining with literary discourse and also economic discourse relatedly. Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough define orders of discourse in another book, titled Discourse in Late Modernity, 
as “the socially ordered set of genres and discourses associated with a particular social 
field, characterized in terms of the shifting boundaries and flows between them” 
(Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999 p. 58). This definition seems very similar to Bourdieu's 
“fields” and to the types of capital implicit in those fields, which I am going to discuss in 
the course of the text. Now I move to the last point for critical discourse analysis, before 
discussing the possibilities of Bourdieu's contribution to discourse and power relations.  
 
2.1.3. Discourse as Legitimate Language and Linguistic Capital 
Discursive formations or configurations called order of discourse are practically a kind of 
investment which intends also to position its producer or performer. I have already 
stated that these discourses are outcomes of struggles of the individuals who have 
internalized the structures. In this part, I need to elaborate what I mentioned about 
members' resources and their use of those resources as a legitimate language and 
linguistic capital. In effect, one can say that the whole story is about the struggle for 
signification. Fairclough defines the situation briefly, saying that "people make choices 
about the design and structure of their clauses which amount to choices about how to 
signify (and construct) social identities, social relationships, and knowledge and belief” 
(Fairclough, 1992, p. 76). Signification is one of the most penetrative strategies of power 
holders since it enables the proliferation of dominant value systems. Therefore, language, 
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where we host common sense and taken for granted knowledge, should be analyzed as 
a reflection of ideological dispositions. 
 
Signification—as a practice—has the power to distort and reconstruct reality through 
words. The selection of words, or what Fairclough calls “wording”, could be changed 
depending on conflicts in a given setting and “reworded” as the reflection of political and 
ideological strategies (Fairclough, 1992, p. 77). This is what happens in the columns of 
daily newspapers: The parties propound ideologically loaded contradictory words in a 
discussion around a specific topic. In Turkey, for instance, one may call “carrion” what 
the opposite side calls “martyr” or vice versa. Each one is a discursive practice aiming at 
degrading the other and legitimizing its own position. Similarly, there is no agreed-upon 
definitions of words like democracy, liberation, terrorism, etc., and their use changes 
accordingly (Fairclough, 2001, p. 19). Of course, there is nothing more natural than the 
fact that wording is political. In a given context, every single noun, adjective, and verb 
sounds ideologically to produce judgments about interlocutors, and each judgment may 
end up with a double potentiality: On the one hand, wording seems to produce and 
reproduce negativity about the image of the other; on the other hand, while doing so, it 
aims to consolidate one’s position and to make one’s discourse dominant in that setting. 
The ideologies embedded in discursive practices, says Fairclough,  
 
are most effective when they become naturalized, and achieve the status 
of ‘common sense’; but this stable and established property of ideologies 
should not be overstated, because my reference to ‘transformation’ 
points to ideological struggle as a dimension of discursive practice, a 
struggle to reshape discursive practices and the ideologies built into them 
in the contexts of the restructuring or transformation of relations of 
domination (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 87-88). 
 
Construction of common sense through naturalization will become more crystallized 
when discussing Bourdieu’s concepts of symbolic power and doxa. Yet Fairclough’s 
approach derives from the Gramsci and Laclau and Mouffe line. Ideological positioning 
in discursive practice is a hegemonic struggle and is quite open to articulation, 
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rearticulation, and even disarticulation of orders of discourse. Here, Fairclough 
distinguishes political and ideological practices among different modes of discourses. 
Throughout this thesis, the focus is going to be political discourse, which has already 
ideological resonances. If what makes a practice political is its capacity to intervene on 
the state of nature, this also makes it relevant for discursive practices: 
 
Discourse as a political practice establishes, sustains and changes power 
relations, and the collective entities (classes, blocs, communities, groups) 
between which power relations obtain. Discourse as an ideological 
practice constitutes, naturalizes, sustains and changes significations of the 
world from diverse positions in power relations (Fairclough, 1992, p. 67). 
 
These are interwoven categories, and discourse as ideological practice provides a 
reference point for discourse as political practice. For instance, hegemonic political 
discourse needs to naturalize the existing order of unequal relations by resorting to 
stationary ideological discourses. Established practices which we perform without 
questioning function no doubt for the sake of justification of power relations (Fairclough, 
2001, p. 27). In other words, by means of ordinary linguistic practices, we tend to 
contribute to the construction of consent for domination in society unintentionally. 
 
2.1.3.1. Members’ Resources 
Members’ resources, which sounds like capital in Bourdieu, is as Fairclough defines it, 
what “people have in their heads and draw upon when they produce or interpret texts-
-including their knowledge of language, representations of the natural and social worlds 
they inhabit, values, beliefs, assumptions, and so on" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 20). This 
definition also seems similar to Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive approach, since both of them 
are based on the internalization of relationships and structures, and eventually these 
inputs are applied in the production and consumption of the social world. 
 
Furthermore, the reproduction of relations, which seem self-evident, takes place based 
upon this notion of members' resources. However, Fairclough opposes the notion that 
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members' resources are seen as “background knowledge” which is a narrow definition 
in one sense because resources mostly consist of common sense assumptions, and 
“knowledge” thus might not be the correct conceptualization (Fairclough, 2001, p. 118). 
Indeed, people rarely have true knowledge about the events and contexts they act in; 
instead, they accumulate assumptions, values, and ideas from interactions and dissolve 
them in the form of categorizations to invest them as capital. On that account, Fairclough 
sheds light on the interrelation between language, power, and ideology in his book titled 
Language and Power. He claims, “Routine and unselfconscious resort to members’ 
resources (MR) in the ordinary business of discourse is, I shall suggest, a powerful 
mechanism for sustaining the relations of power which ultimately underlie them” 
(Fairclough, 2001 p. 9). As it is in the concept of habitus envisaged by Bourdieu, 
members' resources also function as mediator between the social order and members 
themselves; that is, "social structures shape members' resources, which in turn shape 
discourses; and discourses sustain or change members' resources, which in turn sustain 
or change structures" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 135). Fairclough's critiques and propositions 
about legitimate language and capital become clearer when he is compared with 
Bourdieu in the following sections.   
 
2.2. Pierre Bourdieu 
2.2.1. Habitus 
To undertake a reading of critical discourse analysis with Bourdieu's approach, one needs 
to have recourse to the concepts -habitus, fields and (symbolic) capital and power- which 
constitute the skeleton of his theory. As I discussed in the critical discourse analysis 
section, discourses are perceived as practices, and those discursive practices are 
products of cognitive structures. Cognition is programmed to internalize structures and 
to establish its own schemes, which corresponds with the notion of habitus in Bourdieu. 
Those internalizations create sets of dispositions and regulate action not by obeying but 
harmonizing with structures. To account for such regulations of action, Bourdieu, with 
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inspiration from the Aristotelian concept of hexis, “the incorporated and quasi-postural 
disposition” (Swartz, 1997, p. 108), developed habitus as  
 
a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be 
objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious 
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order 
to attain them (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 53). 
 
Bourdieu clarifies his intention to constitute a theory of practice in An Invitation to 
Reflexive Sociology as to break with some essential traditions. Practice follows a certain 
logic which can be apprehended neither by positivism nor by idealism. As Bourdieu 
claims, habitus functions as follows: 
 
[…] against the positivistic materialism, the theory of practice as practice 
posits that objects of knowledge are constructed, and not passively 
recorded; against intellectualist idealism, it reminds us that the principle 
of this construction is found in the socially constructed system of 
structured and structuring dispositions acquired in practice and 
constantly aimed at practical functions (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 
121). 
 
2.2.1.1. Internalization 
Habitus is “structuring structures” which are both the cognitive and the embodied form 
of practices. That is, habitus results from early socialization experiences in which external 
structures are learned and internalized. As a result, says Swartz, “internalized 
dispositions of broad parameters and boundaries of what is possible or unlikely for a 
particular group in a stratified social world develop through socialization” (Swartz, 1997, 
p. 103). In this sense, habitus is not a given but an ongoing process which is constructed 
in time and space. Although habitus in Bourdieu seems to be used as an economical term 
-since it implies “class habitus”- the concept functions as “generative schemes" that are 
generalizable for all areas of the social world (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 94). On that account, it 
is also convenient for discourse studies where we need to examine the relation between 
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individuals' positions and what they produce as discourse accordingly. According to Di 
Maggio, habitus is "a kind of theoretical deus ex machina by means of which Bourdieu 
relates objective structure and individual activity” (Di Maggio, 1979, p. 1464). Critical 
discourse analysts share the same concerns as Bourdieu to construct a relational 
perspective. 
 
2.2.1.2. Relationality 
Furthermore, we can argue that the effect of mediation of discourse between agency 
and structure is generated by habitus. Like Fairclough and Chouliaraki, who argue that 
“representations of a practice are generated as part of the practice” (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 37), Jenkins also interprets habitus as "not just manifest in behavior, 
it is integral part of it" (Jenkins, 1992, p. 46). Bourdieu tries to overcome classical dualism 
and also to distance himself from French structuralism by inserting “strategy” into his 
theoretical instruments. If all actions follow particular interests, then agents necessarily 
act in a strategic way. To apply a strategy is to mind time and space conditions for an 
action. Choices, says Swartz, "do not derive directly from the objective situations in 
which they occur or from transcending rules, norms, patterns, and constraints that 
govern social life; rather, they stem from practical dispositions that incorporate 
ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting through time and space" (Swartz, 
1997, p. 100). Those choices or strategies are generated by habitus which functions as 
structuring structures. According to Swartz, actors are practical strategists who are 
linked to social structures through the concept of habitus. In other words, they 
differentiate themselves from others by employing different strategies according to the 
logic of the field. 
 
2.2.1.3. Cognition 
We already know that critical discourse analysis utilizes the cognitive approach to make 
sense of the dialectical relationship between discourse and society. Similarly, Bourdieu's 
theory of action, according to Swartz, "is practical rather than discursive, pre-reflective 
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rather than conscious, embodied as well as cognitive, durable though adaptive, 
reproductive though generative and inventive, and the product of particular social 
conditions though transposable to others" (Swartz, 1997, p. 101). Here one point needs 
to be mentioned. Swartz does not distinguish discursive and non-discursive actions, he 
rather sees Bourdieu's theory of action in terms of practice which also encapsulates 
discursive practice. This corresponds with the critical discourse analysis tradition which 
approaches discourse as practice. 
 
As we can remember from both Fairclough and Van Dijk, the social determination of 
cognitive resources which bear upon the production and interpretation of discursive 
practice is the reflection of the internalization of social structures and carries the traces 
of past practices and struggles (Fairclough, 1992 and Van Dijk, 2001). Likewise, Bourdieu 
portrays the practices produced by habitus as 
 
always tending to reproduce the objective structures of which they are 
the product, they are determined by the past conditions which have 
produced the principle of their production, that is, by the actual outcome 
of identical or interchangeable past practices, which coincides with their 
own outcome to the extent (and only to the extent) that the objective 
structures of which they are the product are prolonged in the structures 
within which they function (Bourdieu, 1977, pp. 72-73). 
 
I argue that habitus, which produces dispositions to fit objective structures, might stand 
for the “missing link” between discourse and domination, as problematized by Van Dijk. 
He designates it as social cognition, whose operationalization already sounds like the 
function of habitus. According to Van Dijk, “ignoring cognitive properties of ideologies 
causes theoretical deficiencies, since ideologies are socially shared mental 
representations; that is, they are socially acquired, shared, used, changed and even 
reproduced through members’ practices” (Van Dijk, 1998, p.134). Here, Van Dijk tries to 
find out the cognitive ground of the reproduction of dominance. Similarly, "to explain 
why inegalitarian social arrangements make sense to both the dominant and the 
dominated”, says Swartz, “Bourdieu employs the concept (habitus) to emphasize the 
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class-based character of socialization” (Swartz, 1997, p. 104). In Outline of a Theory of 
Practice, Bourdieu describes habitus as the source of regularities and talks about 
cognitive structures. Accordingly, 
 
the habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated 
improvisations, produces practices which tend to reproduce the 
regularities immanent in the objective conditions of the production of 
their generative principle, while adjusting to the demands inscribed as 
objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the cognitive and 
motivating structures making up the habitus (Bourdieu, 1977, p.78). 
 
Both in Bourdieu and in van Dijk, the notion of cognition stands out as the generating 
principle. Habitus provides schemes of perception through principles of vision and 
division and contributes to the production of classifications. By means of these principles, 
the social world seems “taken for granted” and habitus is responsible for the 
sustainability of social relations. Bourdieu calls this the “commonsense world”, in which 
agents create common meaning, and emphasizes the effects of habitus on the basis of 
this creation: 
 
One of the fundamental effects of the orchestration of habitus is the 
production of a commonsense world endowed with the objectivity 
secured by consensus on the meaning (sens) of practices and the world, 
in other words the harmonization of agents’ experiences and the 
continuous reinforcement that each of them receives from the expression, 
individual or collective (in festivals, for example), improvised or 
programmed (commonplaces, sayings), of similar or identical experiences 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p. 80). 
 
The influence of habitus on the reproduction of social order can be best understood in 
the logic of the field where habitus is produced and reproduced. Now I am going to zoom 
in field theory by referring to how habitus is included into the “game”. 
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2.2.2. Fields 
There should be a ground of existence for the manifestation of the interplay between 
agency and structure. This base functions both as the boundary and as the rule of the 
game. Bourdieu identifies such an invisible but determining structure as the field. In fact, 
the field is a spatial metaphor (Swartz, 1997, p. 118) which refers to the structure of the 
social setting in which agents, equipped with different forms of capital, enter into a 
relationship of position-taking. Bourdieu clarifies the field as 
 
a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. 
These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the 
determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, 
by their potential and present situation in the structure of the distribution 
of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the 
specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective 
relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology etc.) 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). 
 
For Bourdieu, the concept of field is an analytical instrument which he employed in his 
studies to make sense of relations in the intellectual, artistic, and economic fields. All 
these fields share homologously the same logic and they are relatively autonomous 
social microcosms (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 97). However, their autonomy is 
measured in proportion to their distance from the field of power.  
 
To track changes in a social space, thinking in terms of field prevails teleological and free 
will-based explanations, and this, instead, focuses on the reciprocal relationship 
between habitus groups and structures. As an analytical method, as Swartz points out, 
the concept of field reflects the meta-theoretical dimension of Bourdieu's thought 
(Swartz, 1997, p. 118). Fields are conceptual constructions that enable one to think in 
terms of relationality. As Bourdieu stresses, "to think in terms of field is to think 
relationally" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). 
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Bourdieu’s theoretical framework moves beyond substantialism and all his notions are 
in relationship with each other in a configuration. This is called field theory. According to 
Bourdieu, his concepts like habitus, field, and capital are not meaningful in isolation, but 
they make sense in a system (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 96). Indeed, in field 
theory, each of these concepts functions in harmony to portray the existing social order. 
Bourdieu appeals to a game analogy in The Logic of Practice to account for social 
relations in Algeria. The game in a field is a learning process where agents internalize the 
rules over time. As Bourdieu defines it, “in the social fields, which are the products of a 
long, slow process of autonomization, and are therefore, so to speak, games ‘in 
themselves’ and not ‘for themselves’, one does not embark on the game by a conscious 
act, one is born into the game, with the game; and the relation of investment, illusio, 
investment, is made more total and unconditional by the fact that it is unaware of what 
it is” (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 67). 
 
Although agents are born into the game unconsciously, field dynamics produce 
dispositions which enable them to think that it is worthwhile to play. So if it is worth 
playing, then one can invest in the field by using the proper type of capital. Bourdieu calls 
this investment in the field as illusio, i.e., “players are taken in by the game, they oppose 
one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the extent that they concur in their belief 
(doxa) in the game and its stakes; they grant these a recognition that escapes 
questioning" (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). Individuals' interests are practically 
adapted to the logic of the field and those interests struggle against each other to get 
the reward of legitimate capital in the field. Positions in the field are distributed 
according to the intensity of capitals. Each investment ends up with the positioning of 
the investor in the field. In other words, those investments are a struggle of position-
taking. In Distinction (1984), Bourdieu investigates how the personal tastes of individuals 
constitute their class position and how their class positions produce distinctive 
dispositions, while they also position themselves with strategic choices of taste among 
others in the same field. In this sense, fields draw the borders of agent practices and 
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reversely, those practices shape and reshape the boundaries of the field. Habitus and 
field are in a dialectical relationship and they are complementary parts of practice. 
According to Bourdieu, “These practices can be accounted for only by relating the 
objective structure defining the social conditions of the production of the habitus which 
engendered them to the conditions in which this habitus is operating, that is, to the 
conjuncture which, short of a radical transformation, represents a particular state of this 
structure” (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78). 
 
Since boundaries between different fields are unstable, fields are not static 
configurations. Struggle over valued and restricted resources causes fields to be open to 
transformations. Subfields may expand or shrink according to their autonomy from the 
primary field, which is the field of power. The field of power, in Bourdieu, is 
conceptualized as a meta-field which functions as a regulatory principle, and on the other 
hand, the field of power signifies the dominant class. It consists of a conflict between 
economic and cultural capital and subfields are shaped as a result of this conflictual 
relation (Swartz, 1997, p. 136). Bourdieu’s studies on the literary field, artistic field, and 
academic field are a product of his intention to search for how cultural fields are 
positioned across the field of power. Let me briefly mention some of those subfields, 
since they matter for this study to account for the transitivity of the journalistic field in 
which representatives of other fields are positioned. 
 
Bourdieu's interest in media is seen in his studies on television (He has a book also, On 
Television, 1999). Departing from the analysis of television as a medium, Bourdieu 
problematizes the journalistic field in general. In TV programs, Bourdieu observes the 
participation of people from different fields such as the political, academic, etc., and their 
discussion around actual political issues. Furthermore, all these fields are represented 
through individual agencies, and interaction between individuals, therefore, signifies the 
relationship between different fields. Bourdieu makes clear his point in an article in 
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Bourdieu and the Journalistic Field, which is edited by Rodney Benson and Eric Neveu, 
stating that, 
 
What I am proposing is quite different: I postulate as a hypothesis that 
when the historian addresses the journalist it is not a historian who speaks 
to a journalist- which is already a start in the construction of the object- it 
is a historian occupying a determinate position in the field of the social 
sciences who speaks to a journalist occupying a determinate position in 
the journalistic field, and ultimately it is the social science field talking to 
the journalistic field (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 31).  
 
Those agents are distributed in the overall space and they struggle for the right to 
determine the legitimate discourse. Although Bourdieu’s findings seem to point out 
mostly television’s effects on different fields, he investigates the whole journalistic field, 
including the making of news, production of ideas and commenting on particular issues. 
Bourdieu draws attention to the motivation behind the media visibility of those fields. 
Accordingly, he claims, “Those who deal professionally in making things explicit and 
producing discourses -sociologists, historians, politicians, journalists, etc.- have two 
things in common. On the one hand, they strive to set out explicitly practical principles 
of vision and division. On the other hand, they struggle, each in their own universe, to 
impose these principles of vision and division, and to have them recognized as legitimate 
categories of construction of the social world” (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37). 
 
The journalistic field provides a suitable ground for those who want to impose their 
vision since it enables them to reach the masses. Therefore, that field is always 
manipulated by the economic and political fields. In other words, the journalistic field 
becomes an instrument of hegemony and loses its autonomy against the field of power. 
According to Bourdieu, this loss of autonomy creates a paradoxical condition: while the 
journalistic field is limited by the field of power, it also imposes its own limitations on 
other cultural fields like the political field, the field of social sciences or the field of 
philosophy (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 41). How is this possible? Both the economic and the 
cultural advantages of the journalistic field attract those people who are professionally 
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engaged in “intellectual interest”. As Bourdieu asserts, referring to journalistic field, "in 
the philosophical field, it strengthens the ‘new philosophers’, the media philosophers. 
By valorizing what has the most value in external markets, it affects the internal relations 
within the field" (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 44). In this way, the logic of all fields, which are in 
interaction with each other, changes, and the fields themselves lose their specificity. 
New entrants into the journalistic field leave their fields' logic behind and adapt to the 
conditions of the journalistic field. This is valid both for the academic field and for the 
political field. 
 
2.2.2.1. Critiques of Critical Discourse Analysis of Field Theory 
What I tried to elucidate about Bourdieu's field theory so far has a lot in common with 
critical discourse theory. The importance of context and conjunctures in the production 
and reception of a discourse is one of these common points. Moreover, critical discourse 
theory provides the insight that the production of discourse is influenced by settings so 
that discourses gain their meanings by referring to those settings. Reciprocally, produced 
discourses can shape the structure of the settings. Even in Van Dijk, we already read that 
some elite and dominant groups have a right to control the settings (or contexts) in which 
discourses are constructed. In this sense, it seems very similar to the notion of field 
envisaged by Bourdieu. In fields also, (discursive) practices are the products of a 
relational relationship between habitus and field structure. Just like the control of 
settings by elites in van Dijk, in fields of cultural production, hierarchically dominant 
habitus groups, or in other words, those who have a great amount of prevalent capital, 
also have the right to determine legitimate discourse in the field. 
 
What is more, according to Fairclough, the order of discourse and field are 
complementary. Even critical discourse analysis can make use of the notion of the field 
by articulating it to the notion of order of discourse. One gain for CDA, as Fairclough 
argues, 
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in internalizing the concept of field would be in elaborating the category 
of order of discourse in the light of Bourdieu’s theoretical articulation of 
relationships between different levels of field –between individual fields, 
but also between fields and the ‘field of power’ (a meta-field in which 
agents with power in the various fields contest the relative value of their 
different capitals), and the ‘field of class struggle’ (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999, p. 114).  
 
Both order of discourse and field focus on relations and struggles in their spaces. Those 
struggles are determinant struggles which cause changes in the boundaries of spaces. 
However, a major criticism of Fairclough and Chouliaraki in the name of critical discourse 
analysis is that interaction is sacrificed for the sake of structural relations. Bourdieu, in 
his analysis of TV debate programs, argues that space is preconstructed in those 
programs since who is invited and who is excluded is already predetermined. Fairclough 
criticizes this understanding of preconstruction, saying that it ignores the theory of 
mediation. According to Fairclough, the "journalistic field is a site of mediation between 
(in Habermas’s terms) systems and lifeworld (or the public and the private) which 
transforms the boundaries and nature of publicness. One feature of this transformation 
is manifest in the tension between the languages of the political, academic, etc. systems 
and the language of ordinary life (more informal and personal), which emerges as a 
pervasive ‘conversationalisation’ of media discourse” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, 
p. 103). It is safe to say that Fairclough is right since Bourdieu considers the fields as 
changing boundaries and losing or gaining autonomy rather than articulation. As in the 
example of media philosophers, Bourdieu understands this emergence on the basis of 
marketization. On the other hand, Fairclough argues that critical discourse analysis 
strives to comprehend, for example, the mediatization of politics as an articulation of the 
political field and journalistic field. This articulation also transforms the political language 
and creates conversationalized discourse. As Fairclough states, “CDA can trace the 
emergence of journalistic order of discourse (and field) from the articulation of orders of 
discourse (fields)” (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 115). Still, Bourdieu's 
contributions to the discussions on media discourse will be more crystallized in the 
following chapter on his variables of capital, symbolic power, and doxa.  
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2.2.3. Capital-Symbolic Power-Doxa 
In order to have an idea about the discursive and symbolic relations in the journalistic 
field, we are now at the last step: the discussion of capital and symbolic power. In 
Bourdieu's field theory, the relation between habitus and the field is mediated through 
investment in and accumulation of different types of capital. This notion of capital is 
different from its classical usage; rather, Bourdieu tears off the economism of the 
classical notion and expands it to other cultural fields. Furthermore, Bourdieu locates the 
notion of capital as an exchange value into his analogy of game. In the fields, agents enter 
into the relation of position-taking by investing specific resources and Bourdieu calls 
those resources capital (Swartz, 1997, p. 73). Bourdieu argues that relations and 
struggles in fields of cultural production, such as the fields of literature, education, art, 
cannot be explained adequately by referring to economic capital. Instead, Bourdieu 
proposes to focus on the notion of cultural capital, which can be internalized in the family, 
objectified in cultural products, and institutionalized in the education system (Swartz, 
1997, p. 76). Cultural capital is transferable and convertible into the other types of capital. 
Especially in market relations, cultural capital, such as academic credentials, is 
instrumentalized for economic mobilization. In cultural fields, cultural capital is directly 
related to the hierarchization of agents.  
 
Symbolic capital, on the other hand, functions in Bourdieu's studies to account for 
symbolic systems which represent the objective reality. Departing from his study on the 
Kabyle people, Bourdieu discovers the importance of symbolic relations in the 
maintenance of social order. Symbolic capital necessitates the recognition of those who 
share common worldviews. According to Bourdieu, "in the symbolic struggle for the 
production of common sense or, more precisely, for a monopoly over legitimate naming, 
agents put into action the symbolic capital that they have acquired in previous struggles 
and which can be juridically guaranteed. In this way, titles of nobility, like educational 
qualifications, represent real titles of symbolic property which give one a right to the 
profits of recognition” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 135). In other words, symbolic capital is an 
34 
 
instrument of symbolic power which enables agents to elevate themselves both 
discursively and materially in a particular field.  
 
What is symbolic power then? Symbolic power is the ability to produce and reproduce 
the symbolic representation of social reality in symbolic systems. For this study, symbolic 
power is a very functional conceptual tool to make sense of the symbolic/discursive 
construction of the old and new Turkey. Of course, just as is true with other practices in 
different fields, the application of symbolic power is not independent of habitus and field 
dynamics. As Bourdieu claims, for symbolic power to be realized, one needs to have 
symbolic capital. Also, an imposition of vision and division on others requires a certain 
authority which has already been gained through struggles (Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 137-
138). Both conditions are dialectical, since the accumulation of symbolic capital brings 
the authority to make legitimate classifications, while being authority in a field enables 
one to invest more and more symbolic capital in those impositions. For instance, in the 
political field, the more symbolic capital one has, the more powerful the implication of 
one’s symbolic power which aims to impose a particular world-view. To change the world, 
as Bourdieu states, "one has to change the ways of making the world, that is, the vision 
of the world and the practical operations by which groups are produced and reproduced" 
(Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 137). 
 
In this sense, symbolic power is also responsible for the reproduction of dominance 
through principles of vision and division and classifications. When the social world is 
reduced to these categories, it becomes harder to make sense of and reveal what is going 
on behind closed doors. These categories mediate the meaning; or, if you like, people 
make sense of the world through consensual categories. Furthermore, since the 
dominated sections of the society appeal to the same categories of perception, they see 
the reality outside with the eyes of the dominant groups. That is why, according to 
Bourdieu, "Sociology has to include a sociology of the perception of the social world, that 
35 
 
is, a sociology of the construction of the world-views which themselves contribute to the 
construction of this world” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 130). 
 
The making of perceptions does not happen by itself; rather, specialists, intellectuals, or 
politicians contribute to both the creation and adoption of classifications. It is an 
intellectual labor that produces all kind of dominations at a symbolic level. In some texts, 
Bourdieu, just like Gramsci, associates specialists and intellectuals with classes and 
argues that these groups work for class interests. Each dominant class imposes 
generalized classifications which conceal the unequal class relations. This is a sort of 
discursive struggle based on the discursive formation of social reality, and as Bourdieu 
argues, "this discourse is a structured and structuring medium tending to impose an 
apprehension of the established order as natural (orthodoxy) through the disguised (and 
thus misrecognized) imposition of systems of classification and of mental structures that 
are objectively adjusted to social structures" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 169). Here, adjusting 
mental structures to social structures is a significant issue for the success of symbolic 
power and the effectiveness of discourse, since symbolic power does not create social 
reality out of nothing. For construction and reconstruction, mental and social structures 
should overlap. As can be seen in Fairclough, discursive practices become effective when 
they are naturalized (Fairclough, 1992, pp. 87-88). Similarly, Bourdieu gives the example 
of class as an analytic classification:  
 
The class (or the people, or the nation, or any other social reality 
ungraspable in any other way) exists if there exist people who can say that 
they are the class, by the mere fact of speaking publicly, officially, in its 
place, and of being recognized as justified in so doing by people who 
thereby recognize themselves as members of the class, people or nation, 
or of any other social reality which a realist construction of the world can 
invent and impose (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 139). 
 
Arbitrary categories such as class come into existence when they are recognized or 
misrecognized by different sections of society. This turns out to be symbolic violence 
over dominated people since they accept these categories as if they were real and they 
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themselves were part of this reality. Journalists, politicians, academics, bureaucrats, 
media specialists, etc., all these habitus groups from different fields strive to impose their 
own visions via televisions, newspapers, or internet sites by constructing classifications 
which also classify those producers. Bourdieu says symbolic power is a way of making 
the world with words and “in this sense, symbolic power is a power of consecration or 
revelation, a power to conceal or reveal things which are already there” (Bourdieu, 
1990a, p. 138). Depending on who uses that power, the influences and consequences of 
discursive constructions may change. For instance, the systematic use of nationalist 
discourses by politicians may cause harassments against ethnic groups in a society. Even 
some discourses which seem “neutral” can have significant implications, since they 
address established categories and prompt the unconscious embodiment of those 
categories. Bourdieu exemplifies through the case of a bishop's speech in an interview: 
 
When a bishop declares, in a newspaper interview, that it will take twenty 
years for French people of Algerian origin to be regarded as French 
Muslims, he is making a prediction that is charged with social 
consequences. It is a good example of the claim to legitimate handling of 
the categories of perception, of symbolic violence based on a tacit, 
surreptitious imposition of categories of perception endowed with 
authority and designed to become legitimate categories of perception, 
which is of exactly the same type as the symbolic violence performed by 
those whose labels slip imperceptibly from ‘Islamic’ to ‘Islamicist’ and 
from ‘Islamicist’ to ‘terrorist’ (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37). 
 
This example takes us to the concept of doxa, which Bourdieu uses mostly instead of 
ideology. Normally, the bishop's speech can be seen as ideological, since he appeals to 
the over-generalization of categories such as French and Muslim. Yet, since Bourdieu 
finds ideology an ambiguous and distorted concept, doxa can be more effective to 
understand the tacit acceptance of established categories. As in the case of ideology, 
people accept things without knowing and questioning (Bourdieu, 1994, p. 268). 
Furthermore, Bourdieu explains doxic modality in In Other Words: 
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And one may even explain in sociological terms what appears as a 
universal property of human experience, that is, the fact that the familiar 
world tends to be ‘taken for granted’, perceived as natural. If the world 
tends to be perceived as evident and to be grasped, to use Husserl’s terms, 
with a doxic modality, this is because the dispositions of agents, their 
habitus, that is, the mental structures through which they apprehend the 
social world, are essentially the product of an internalization of the 
structures of the social world (Bourdieu, 1990a, pp. 130-131). 
 
This shows once more the relationality of both the production of symbolic or discursive 
reality and the experience of social reality. Bourdieu defines this as the complicity of 
agency and structure. Although symbolic systems enable people to communicate, they 
imply power relations more than communication. Just as in Foucault, power is 
decentralized and emerges in daily confrontations through different mediums. According 
to Bourdieu, constituting or appealing to the schemes of perception, such as race, nation, 
gender, people, etc., refers to the relations of domination. Bourdieu gives the example 
of the words “soft” and “hard” and claims that the association of “soft” with femininity 
and of “hard” with masculinity shows the embeddedness of doxic acceptances in the 
body. He clarifies that “these practical schemes –implicit, tacit, very hard to make 
explicit- are constitutive of the doxa, as the philosophers call it; in other words, the 
universe of the tacit presuppositions that we accept as the natives of a certain society” 
(Bourdieu, 2005, p. 37). While discussing the findings of this study, how tacit acceptances, 
categories of thoughts, and principles of perception operate and how they are 
performed by professional agents are going to be made clear. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
 
Concerning my research objectives in this thesis, what is significant is to investigate the 
construction of a hegemonic political perception through the use of the new Turkey 
discourse. In this sense, words themselves become the immaterial bricks of this 
construction and therefore need to be examined in order to uncover how they build up 
a totality. To this end, I utilize a qualitative research model which deals with the 
properties of the object rather than the quantity. 
 
Since my unit of analysis is newspaper columns, naturally I will adopt a textual analysis 
method in general. According to Charmaz (2006), “Texts draw on particular discourses 
and provide accounts that record, explore, explain, justify, or foretell actions, whether 
the specific texts are elicited or extant” (p. 35). Each text has its own writer and also a 
context which that text is a part of. To scrutinize the discursive strategies embedded in 
those texts, I will apply critical discourse analysis. Among the different tendencies in 
critical discourse analysis, Fairclough’s model is the most appropriate, since he seeks to 
uncover the relational and contextual construction of the discourse. As he clarifies,  
 
by critical discourse analysis I mean which aims to systematically explore 
often opaque relationships of causality and determination between (a) 
discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and cultural 
structures, relations and processes; to investigate how such practices, 
events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of 
power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these 
relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing 
power and hegemony (Fairclough, 1995, Pp. 132-133). 
 
Critical discourse analysis is not only a way of analyzing the data, but also a framework 
in which the object of research is constructed. Its relationality and contextuality enable 
me to locate the new Turkey discourse in meaningful contexts which influence the 
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construction, reconstruction, and also transformation of the discourse. Thus, it can be 
used together with the Bourdieusian framework in a communicative way because critical 
discourse analysis has already been developed as an eclectic and interdisciplinary 
tradition. 
 
This is also consistent with what Derek Layder calls as adaptive theory. Basically, as 
identified by Layder, adaptive theory aims to integrate the empirical part of one’s 
research into the pre-existing theories, and to reveal emergent theory which can be 
derived from the data (Layder, 1998). Furthermore, focus of adaptive theory is practices 
and the social relations and organizations in which those practices take place. Therefore, 
social research’s focus becomes how and why particular cases are intertwined with the 
forms of power and relations which encompass them (Layder, 2015, p. 244). In adaptive 
theory, the relationship between data collection, data analysis, and existing theory is 
crucial and helps to eliminate the gap between theory and data. For this purpose, I use 
in an adaptive way critical discourse analysis, which is related to data collection and 
analysis part of the research, and a Bourdieusian perspective, which is an already existing 
theory. The epistemological compatibility of these standpoints helps me to integrate 
method with theory. As Layder claims, the main objective is to reconciliate the fruitful 
parts of the different positions and perspectives (Layder, 2015, p. 290). I already 
discussed how discourse is constructed in a way that is relational and context-dependent 
(critical discourse analysis) and how constructed discourses function in the reproduction 
of power relations (Bourdieu) in the theory chapter of this study. For my objectives, what 
matters is not only the new Turkey discourse itself, but also the social relations in which 
the discourse is produced. Therefore, as part of the analysis, it is vital to adaptively utilize 
critical discourse analysis to reveal conditions which are embedded within the new 
Turkey discourse.  
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3.1. Sampling 
Selecting a research sample for this study was difficult. First of all, I need to elaborate 
why I chose 2010 and 2016 as a range of analysis: 2010 was the year in which new Turkey 
claims became visible. The 12 September 2010 referendum, which included a 
constitutional amendment package, was regarded as a threshold between the old and 
new Turkey. From that day on, the new Turkey discourse has experienced certain turning 
points. Every election, referendum, political case and political initiative has brought 
along a different depiction of this new Turkey. Therefore, at the end of the 1 November 
2015 election, what the new Turkey meant was totally different from what it had meant 
in 2010. In order to scrutinize such ambiguous “newness” claims, I limited my object of 
research to that six-year period.   
 
My purpose is to understand the operation of the journalistic field through newspaper 
columns; therefore, I tried to establish a sample which encompasses the whole field. For 
that reason, I applied purposive sampling. Based on my background knowledge on the 
topic, I conducted an extensive scan of the archives of the internet sites of pro-
government mainstream newspapers. Because I searched for “Yeni Türkiye” (The New 
Turkey) and “Eski Türkiye” (The Old Turkey) on the internet sites of the newspapers, I 
was able to reach to articles whose title and content included the words Eski Türkiye or 
Yeni Türkiye. Instead of conducting a case study, my purpose was to scrutinize all kind of 
uses of the new Turkey discourse in newspapers to capture the discursive change in a 
particular period.  
 
Accordingly, I collected columns and op-eds from newspapers which are known as close 
to the AKP government such as Sabah (including Sabah Perspektif), Akşam, Yeni Şafak, 
Star (including Star Açık Görüş), Türkiye and Takvim. I was able to reach only two articles 
each from the newspapers Zaman and Taraf as their internet sites were closed and their 
archives deleted because of their relationship with the Gulenist organization which has 
recently been accepted as a terrorist organization by the state, supposedly the one 
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behind the 15 July 2016 coup. On the other hand, as a result of purposive sampling, I 
scanned the actors who positioned themselves as pro-new Turkey and I found 4 articles 
from the Hürriyet and 2 articles from the Vatan newspapers. Both newspapers are 
exceptions among the others, since they are not directly wedded to the government; 
rather, they are known to follow a more nationalistic perspective. While 5 of the articles 
belong to Hüseyin Yayman, who had been an academic and became an AKP deputy, 1 of 
them belongs to Taha Akyol, who is known as a right-wing journalist who mostly supports 
AKP policies. Ultimately, I found 185 columns and op-eds, but 3 of them were not 
available on the internet. Consequently, I collected 182 articles written between 2010 
and 2016. They are listed in Excel by date, as shown in figure 1. Finally, I personally 
translated into English quotations from the newspaper columns to be used in the analysis 
chapter, while other parts of the columns were left in Turkish, since I analyzed not the 
whole texts but only the parts in which new Turkey discourse is mentioned.   
 
 
Figure 3.1. Sample list of the articles 
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3.2. Coding and Analysis 
To code the articles in accordance with the aim of this study, I utilized the Atlas TI 
computer program. I turned the newspaper columns which I retrieved from the internet 
sites into the PDF format and transferred all of them into Atlas TI. I followed a pattern in 
which general codes were descending to the specific codes. First, I coded and categorized 
the articles depending on their general political themes, then appointed sub-codes which 
indicate discursive strategies in those topics. For example, whereas “Kurdish question” 
can be a general thematic code, “peace-building discourse” is a sub-code under the 
category of that Kurdish question. Similarly, “discourse of pluralization” is a sub-code of 
the claims of democratization. What the new Turkey represents in different contexts was 
explained in those categories. In other words, I identified thematic changes in the use of 
the new Turkey discourse; in the first period, what shows up are democratization and 
normalization, liquidation of tutelage, and the Kurdish question; on the other hand, in 
the second period, the new Turkey is defined through the new constitutive others, 
imperial claims, and a cult of leadership. Of course, not all the articles corresponded to 
the major categories which were included in the analysis. The reason for this is that I did 
not impose pre-established categories on the texts; rather, categories emerged from the 
texts themselves, which is a more proper way to understand what is going on in the 
discursive field. In this sense, thematic categories are not external but immanent to the 
research material. Therefore, to capture the general tendency and changes, I had to 
neglect the articles in the analysis which did not fit the general categories. To give an 
example, only a few columns were about the economic character of the new Turkey 
claims. Since the majority of the articles were about democratization, liquidation of the 
tutelage, etc., these limited number of articles about the economy were neglected and 
not taken into the analysis. Those articles are also part of the discursive field but do not 
represent the “general tendency”. 
 
I conducted the analysis of newspaper columns under the guidance of Bourdieu’s 
symbolic power and doxa concepts. Through the operation of these concepts, I traced 
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how categories, perspectives, and political divisions are imposed in the texts. 
Furthermore, I utilized the critical discourse analysis tradition to locate different 
discourses in different contexts and also to scrutinize the role of wording in the 
construction of meaning. One point worth mentioning is that I paid regard to the 
diachronic approach in the analysis to catch the temporal changes in political contexts. 
Accordingly, under each category, newspaper columns were placed and analyzed 
diachronically, which allowed me to pursue the evolutive transformation of the 
discourse. Basically, I focused on how new Turkey is portrayed with and through words 
and changing meanings in the journalistic field. Yet I have to make clear that I am not 
arguing that newspaper columns in themselves represent the operation of the 
journalistic field, since the whole field is composed of broadcasting, publishing, 
marketing, and the relations of media owners with the field of power. Yet I consider 
writing columns as a crucial practice of the journalist field because actors from different 
fields can get in or out depending on their pursuing an interest.     
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CHAPTER 4 
CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF THE COLUMNS 
 
In this chapter, without applying to theoretical concepts, I will present the analysis of the 
newspaper columns by referring to the political contexts which influence the meaning of 
the new Turkey discourse. By dividing the columns into two periods, I will seek for the 
change in the imposition of wording, themes, categories of political perception, 
oppositions, representations of the self and the other, etc. Furthermore, while doing so, 
I will provide basic narratives of the contexts to establish the relationality and 
contextuality of the new Turkey claims. Then in the next chapter, I will link the findings 
in this chapter to the theoretical instruments.  
 
4.1. Period between 2010 and 2014 
4.1.1. Democratization and Normalization 
After the 2007 general elections, the AKP strengthened its power and initiated a political 
liberalization process aimed at solving the chronic problems of Turkey. This process was 
a product of an agenda which was formulated by liberal intellectuals beginning from the 
1990s to the middle of the 2000s. Therefore, some journalists, academics, and 
intellectuals supported liberalization politics and contributed to the propagation of ideas 
put forward by the AKP. The year 2009 was a critical year when Turkey had significant 
attempts in the political field. Kurdish question, which stems from the equal citizenship 
demands of the Kurdish people, was causing reciprocal deaths because of the warfare 
policies. To bring this war to an end, the AKP initiated a peace-making policy called the 
‘democratic initiative’. In this process, the Turkish state negotiated with the PKK 
(Kurdistan Workers’ Party), which is accepted by Turkey and many states as a terrorist 
organization. However, the process ultimately failed. At least in the beginning, this effort 
was positively welcomed by many sections of the society, since it offered hope of peace. 
Similarly, to solve the tension between Turkey and Armenia around the Armenian 
question, the AKP announced that diplomatic relations between the two countries 
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started again, which was called the ‘Armenian Opening’. In the same period, the ‘Alevi 
Opening’, the implementation of other democratic rights, and abolishing military 
tutelage were also on the government's agenda.  
 
There was an expectancy oriented to the institutionalization of those political 
developments after 2010 referendum. When the referendum was concluded in favor of 
the AKP, the discourse of liquidating tutelage and, correspondingly, the discourse of 
democratization became the basic reference point in defending AKP policies. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and most AKP-engaged actors, including journalists and academics in 
the media, put ‘new Turkey’ discourse into circulation to define current political 
conditions as shaped by AKP politics. In this sense, politics is placed in the antagonism 
between the old and the new; the former is attributed an anti-democratic meaning.  
 
4.1.1.1. The ‘Old Turkey’ as the Constitutive Other 
The new Turkey, like the differential relation in the Saussurian signification chain, is 
identified only in relation with its opposite version. In other words, what makes Turkey 
new is its ‘non-old’ character. This categorical contradiction has been produced and 
reproduced by media actors over and over. In this sense, producing negative opinions 
about the old Turkey is as politically functional as new Turkey discourse itself. This is an 
apparent strategy to discredit what is old in order to make the new seem self-evidently 
favorable. At the same time, categorical oppositions limit the field of politics and force 
one to choose one of two sides. For a hegemonic power, construction of the perception 
of politics through contradictory categories makes it easier to control dynamics of the 
political struggle. In this sense, we observe the manufacture of the old Turkey discourse 
and systematical critiques towards the old Turkey in different contexts. In most of the 
columns, old Turkey is notably mentioned and characterized as wicked. As Rasim Ozan 
Kütahyalı claims, the masters of the old Turkey,  
 
considered an important part of the society as slaves. It (the old Turkey) 
treated or tried to behave viciously those who were seen as slaves. It aimed 
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to plant the guns into the houses of Gülen community members, it killed 
non-Muslims and wanted to present this massacre as if committed by the 
religious people. It did its best to overthrow AK Party government. It 
created a fake sheikh and a fake headscarfed woman; and established a 
fake religious sect. First it created the conditions and later oppressed all 
the religious people. It blacklisted the people. It created a montage of 
Fethullah Gülen tapes and planted a fake map behind Ahmet Kaya. It 
compelled both Gülen and Kaya to leave this country. Kaya died of grief, 
while Fethullah Gülen has been living outside for 11 years with 
homesickness. This mindset did all this mentioned, but we, who long for a 
real democracy, should never and can never do the same things. We have 
to be very sensitive concerning the justice in the new period (Kütahyalı, 
24.02.2010, Taraf). 
 
Kütahyalı accuses the old regime of being brutal to both religious and Kurdish people. In 
this sense, here in Kütahyalı’s text, Fethullah Gülen, who is the cult leader of a religious-
social organization which organized parallel to the state (and in the state), and the late 
Ahmet Kaya, who was a famous Kurdish singer, symbolically represent the religious and 
ethnic victims of the old Turkey. For sure, both figures are seen in the articles of Kütahyalı 
as primary components of the new Turkey. In this way, perception of the new Turkey is 
built upon the old Turkey’s anti-democratic exercises. As Kütahyalı did, it is possible to 
refer to the new Turkey by overemphasizing the old one without directly mentioning 
characteristics of the new one.   
 
4.1.1.2. Kemalism as the Old Turkey 
In the quotation above, referring to the brutal deeds of the old Turkey, Kütahyalı 
condemns the nationalist and secular paradigm. In the columns quoted in this study, 
Kemalist ideology is held as responsible for all trespasses of the state; therefore, when 
columnists use the phrase ‘old Turkey’, it means nothing other than Kemalism in that 
period. Kemalism is seen as a regime of the state which has a secular, nationalist and 
militarist structure. During the referendum process, in order to demonstrate the 
advantage of legal regulations aiming at the liquidation of military tutelage, columnists 
often applied to a strategy which emphasized the organic relation between Kemalism 
and tutelage to criticize the side of ‘No’. From a different viewpoint, the process of the 
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referendum revealed a necessity for the AKP side to glorify the democratic standards 
Turkey had reached after the AKP came to power and strengthened its power. To 
maintain this aim, Kemalism has often been kept on the agenda to curse former 
conditions. As can be seen below, in a similar manner but in different years, İhsan Dağı 
and Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı in their columns portrayed the old Turkey as a tyranny of the 
state consisting of the domination of Kemalist military elites and the subordination of 
the people at their hands: 
 
We know the old Turkey; it was a country which was governed by the ones 
who assumed that the people existed for the state and that owners of the 
state was Kemalist civic-militarist bureaucracy. It was a country in which 
people’s identities were repressed and the energy of the country was 
wasted for the purpose of standardization of the society and subjugation 
of the people to the official ideology and the whims of state elites. 
Privileged classes of the old period, in which people were controlled 
through artificial fears and an authoritarian governance was legitimized, 
used to take ruling the country for granted and stage a coup whenever 
they lost control. In those days, ‘letting the tanks out’ was so easy. 
Commanders used to seek for ruling not only the military but also the 
country. They hanged the prime minister who opposed them, closed the 
political parties, and made millions of people’s lives miserable. They also 
made a constitution which enabled them to keep ruling the country and 
the people which were already under the tutelage. In the old Turkey, the 
state which was a Kemalist civic-military bureaucracy was in charge of the 
economy as well as everything else. They used to waste the resources of 
the country since they were irresponsible and felt unrivalled (Dağı, 
07.12.2010, Zaman). 
 
People of Turkey lived under the black propaganda carried out by the state 
for 90 years. Ideological state apparatus imposed onto the people a 
constant fear and paranoia. Whereas in other countries state functions as 
a mediator of differences in the society, Turkish state did its best to set 
social elements, which constituted the state itself, against one another. 
According to the calculations of the state, Kemalist ideology and Kemalist 
regime could have survived only in that way (Kütahyalı, 05.10.2013, 
Sabah). 
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Although the concept of the state seems neutral, in almost all columns, the state is used 
with negative connotations while pointing to the old Turkey. As a discursive strategy, 
mentioning the tension between the state and the people serves to degrade the old 
Turkey, in which the state was the enemy of the people, and to promote the new Turkey, 
where the state and the people are peacefully integrated thanks to the AKP’s power of 
governance. Hatem Ete, a think-tank researcher and academic, differentiates the role of 
the state and governments in the history of Turkish politics beginning from the 1960s 
until the AKP period. According to him, instead of the government, the state -involving 
military and other power coalitions- functioned as a crisis-solver in the society and such 
interventions of non-political actors perpetuated the tutelage regime. Yet, as Ete argues, 
this situation was reversed, with Erdoğan’s power and his persona replacing the old 
state:  
 
In 1990s, the fact that this (state) reason was stuck, lost its reflex and was 
taken hostage by the particular gangs, started a depressed period in 
Turkey politics. From 27 April the e-memorandum until now, in the public 
eye, Erdoğan himself has become the representative of the hopes 
attributed to the state reason (Ete, 02.07.2011, Sabah Perspektif).   
 
What is meant by the ‘old regime’ or the ‘old Turkey’ is not always clear in terms of its 
beginning and ending. The old Turkey discourse is usually defined by referring to the 
foundation of the republic and ‘one-man period’, but sometimes it may begin from the 
1960s so that the Democrat Party, which is esteemed as the ancestor of the tradition 
that AKP follows, is not counted as part of the ‘old’ Turkey. A similar effort is seen in the 
identification of the Turgut Özal period as a break from the old Turkey, because Adnan 
Menderes (the leader of Democrat Party), Turgut Özal (the leader of Motherland Party) 
and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were considered as links in the chain of the same political 
tradition. According to Doğan Gürpınar, what is meant by being ‘old Turkey’ is the period 
of the 1990s, symbolized in the politics of Mesut Yılmaz and Tansu Çiller (Gürpınar, 2016, 
p. 344). Eventually, the old Turkey discourse was constructed in such a manner that all 
the cruel incidents were now attributed to this ambiguous discursive subject. According 
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to Ete, the new Turkey, which represents an increase of democratic standards and the 
normalization of state-society relationships, can only be achieved by facing the sins of 
the past: 
 
Political memory of Turkey is disabled because of the pains which were 
inflicted on purpose by the state in line with a particular policy. The state, 
which has ever come to see social differences and dynamism as dangerous 
for the total sovereignty of the state and the sections dominating the state, 
suppressed different social segments in almost all periods ever since the 
establishment of the republic. Within this scope, construction of the new 
Turkey, which represents an increase in democratic standards and 
normalization of the state-society relations, is not possible without facing 
the past. The fact that coup attempts in AK Party period has started to be 
judged, and that facing and judgement has become possible, also 
strengthened this process. These efforts continued with the unveiling of 
the mystery about 28 February, Susurluk, perpetrators-unknown murders 
in the 1990s, Çorum-Maraş incidents, and violation of rights and 
massacres (Dersim, policies against non-Muslims, Independence Courts) in 
the one-party period. The fact that the prime minister apologized for 
Dersim massacre in the name of the state has functioned to trigger the 
efforts of bringing all dark cases to light. In this way, 2011 became a year 
in which all sins of the history of the republic have been raked up and they 
were cleared (Ete, 31.12.2011, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
Hatem Ete, in his article quoted above titled “2011’de İç Politika” [Domestic Policy in 
2011], in which he reviewed the year 2011 in terms of domestic politics, comes to 
conclude that AKP the managed to reveal all inhuman practices both carried out and 
concealed by the old Turkey. Ete’s text in this sense includes a certainty that 2011 was 
the year of facing the past incidents. That facing, at the same time, implies the beginning 
of the new Turkey, which ‘apologizes’ in the name of the old. 
 
4.1.1.3. Claim of Pluralism 
4.1.1.3.1. Pluralization of the Military and State 
The new Turkey, in contrast with the old Turkey’s uniformity and standardization, had to 
have democratization and pluralization claims. According to Tanıl Bora, AKP founders 
took lessons from the 28 February period to reinforce their power and embarked to 
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constitute a counter-hegemony with the discourse of democracy (Bora, 2016, p. 478). 
Accordingly, the new Turkey would be a free place for all identities which had been 
despised by the old regime. Furthermore, at that period, the discourse of democracy was 
carried one step further and called ‘advanced democracy’. Both important normalization 
attempts like the Kurdish opening and the influence of the 12 September referendum in 
2010 enabled pro-AKP actors to identify a ‘brand new’ democratic political atmosphere. 
The fates of all ethnic and religious groups were equated with that of the AKP and 
Erdoğan, once a victim of the old Turkey. Especially Kurdish people’s rights were 
mentioned and pronounced much more emphatically while describing the plural and 
equal character of the new Turkey. As Kütahyalı claims,   
 
We will reconstruct the State of the Republic of Turkey. We will create a 
Turkey in which religious people, Kurds, Alevis and non-Muslims become 
all equal citizens and we will do this with the virtue alliance of all 
conscientious people. A young person who performs five time prayer and 
whose mother wearing a head scarf will be able to become military officer 
if he wants. A Kurdish or Alevi youth will also be able to enter into any 
institution without denying his/her identity. An officer of Turkish military 
will be able to read Fethullah Gülen’s pieces in the garden of the officers’ 
club and will be able to turn the pages of Zaman newspaper without 
feeling the ‘fear of dismissal’. And another military officer will also be able 
to read Cumhuriyet newspaper with the same self-confidence and 
ruminate on the books of İlhan Selçuk or Ümit Zileli in the garden of the 
same officers’ club in a Sunday afternoon. A Kurdish officer of the military 
of Turkey will be able to sing Kurdish songs with his touching voice in his 
friend’s wedding in the officers’ club. Turkish military officers and 
sergeants will be able to sing all together Ahmet Kaya’s song Kum Gibi in 
a military mess by the sea. An Alevi military officer will play saz and sing 
the folk songs from Pir Sultan (Kütahyalı, 24.02.2010, Taraf). 
 
Kütahyalı appeals to settled symbolisms of Turkish politics: A military officer whose 
mother wears the headscarf as a religious other of the old Turkey; lhan Selçuk, Ümit Zileli 
and Cumhuriyet newspaper as representatives of the old Turkey; Ahmet Kaya and a 
Kurdish and Alevi military officer as an ethnic other of the old Turkey. In that way, 
Kütahyalı addresses almost all the vital problems of the republic by caricaturing them 
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through symbols. All these symbolic actors are supposedly going to coexist in the new 
Turkey without having to hide their identities and identity practices. Kütahyalı 
romanticizes the prospective political setting and draws positive images like singing 
Ahmet Kaya songs and playing Pir Sultan folk songs in the military zones. What is striking 
here is the fact that Kütahyalı establishes the discourse of pluralization in reference to 
militaristic concepts. This makes sense within the context of the demilitarization 
initiatives in politics after the 2007 elections. The military was seen as the most crucial 
obstacle to the democratization of state institutions. Therefore, there was a belief that 
democratization of the military and its structure would definitely generate a democratic 
culture in politics. 
 
In 2012, Kütahyalı wrote another column titled “İşte Yeni Türkiye...” [Here is the New 
Turkey…] right after the General Assembly of the AKP on 02.10.2012. This time, Kütahyalı 
treats pluralization on the basis of politics as an institution. In the direction of the 
objectives determined by the AKP, Kütahyalı appeals to another symbolism, 2023, the 
100th year of the Turkish Republic. He claims that the new Turkey is a destination which 
is going to be reached by the 100th year of the republic and that this republic is going to 
belong to the entire nation when it has been achieved. Like other texts of Kütahyalı, this 
text also has positive future projections about the new Turkey: 
 
2023... The centenary of our republic... 
The New Turkey Republic will not be any more a republic based on the 
dictatorship of a minority which perceives the values of the majority of the 
society as threat.   
This republic will belong to the whole nation when we arrive 2023. 
The New Turkey Republic will be civic and democratic republic in which the 
ruler is the majority of the nation but rights of the minorities are also 
protected.  
The New Turkey Republic will be a republic in which the closure of political 
parties are totally removed.  
In the New Turkey, prohibitive and restrictive rules in the establishment of 
the political parties will be removed.  
In the New Turkey, standardizing rules in the political parties will be 
removed. 
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In the New Turkey, not political parties but real persons will be punished.  
In the New Turkey, all the obstacles in front of the participation in the 
politics will be removed. 
In the New Turkey, regulations about the elections will be reconsidered.  
In the New Turkey, measures will be taken to ensure justice in the 
representation (Kütahyalı, 02.10.2012, Takvim). 
 
In Kütahyalı’s column, we see strong claims that the new Turkey is going to ensure 
pluralism in participation in politics and governance. As we are going to see also in the 
following chapters, journalists (or columnists) tend to employ a sense of ‘certainty’ when 
speaking about future projections, compared to academics and think-tank researchers. 
Kütahyalı’s columns are full of examples of this kind of certainty, which cause the 
circulation of new Turkey claims without questioning.    
 
4.1.1.3.2. Pluralization of the New Social 
Besides the pluralization of the state and politics, there is also an emphasis on 
pluralization at the societal level, which is often mentioned by Ali Bayramoğlu. The claim 
of new Turkey contains not only structural changes in the state organization but also 
social changes which influence the forms of relationships among different sections of the 
society. That is, pro-AKP intellectuals display an effort to make people think as if political 
regulations which have been made in favor of democratization have had a sudden 
influence on the society so that micro relations among individuals have become more 
democratic and tolerant. Without a ‘magic wand’ the transformative effects of even the 
most democratic regulations take decades. Yet, according to Bayramoğlu, ‘the new 
social’, composed of pluralist re-individualization, shapes ‘the political’ in the new Turkey, 
and also confrontations and conflicts of social identities end up with democratic outputs: 
 
Confrontation of the religious and the secular has become the most 
important generator for different value systems to start to exist in one 
body. A structure in which secular, religious, traditional and modern value 
systems are consumed by the same citizen is both new and significant. 
Confrontation of identity and history functions as rereading of the 
republican period, and as democratization and becoming transparent of 
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ascribed identies through discovery of the non-Muslims. Society opens the 
path for the politics by preceding it and functions as to nurture different 
value systems. Tension between military and civic, for the first time, has 
moved beyond the image of conflict between political understanding and 
the army due to the developments in recent years and the country has 
reached the point at which political and militarist functions of the army 
are discussed with social perspectives by the society. If Turkey is to solve 
its chronic problems, patriarchal residuals and Kurdish question, it will 
happen in this framework in which the societal encompasses the political 
more and more. Turkey will experience its conflicts again in this framework. 
Whoever does not understand and touch upon this societal, from right to 
the left, will keep staying out of date. This is what the new Turkey’s 
circumstances are about… (Bayramoğlu, 23.09.2011, Yeni Şafak). 
 
The new condition which Bayramoğlu defines as the encompassing of the social is 
considered as one which is capable of solving the vital problems of Turkey. Accordingly, 
the confrontation of categorical dichotomies, such as religious and secular, identity and 
history, and military and civil, functions to contribute to the democratic and pluralist 
maturation of the society. In another column in 2012, Bayramoğlu defends the same 
argument with a single example about abortion: 
 
An acquaintance I came across was saying during the conversation: “Our 
family is pious and conservative, with our daughters wearing headscarfs, 
you know. The abortion issue was spoken last night. There occurred a 
disagreement between my wife and my daughters. My wife was 
supporting the opinions on the side of the prime minister about the 
abortion, whereas my daughters were opposing”. A heterogeneous Islamic 
section as an inevitable result of the change, open society and 
democratization, but more importantly… becoming heterogeneous of 
Islamic perception…The fact that the relation between Islamic identity and 
religious people turns into a relation of interaction…Issues of new religious 
‘standing’ which is produced through everyday life, ethical problems and 
its answers which are internal to the religion but individual-centered and 
which highlight historical ones. All of this defines the New Turkey, and 
maybe I should say even dominantly. From the prime minister to the 
commentators and the politicians, those who maintain this discussion 
should not forget that we are living in such a country (Bayramoğlu, 
05.06.2012, Yeni Şafak). 
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Bayramoğlu, on the basis of this example, portrays the new Turkey as an open and 
democratic society with heterogeneous religious views. This new Turkey discourse is 
supported by a piece of ‘evidence’ which consists of his friend's statements concerning 
his family's differing views about abortion. Strikingly, Bayramoğlu presents such diversity 
among religious people as if it were something that never happened in the old Turkey. 
Of course, Bayramoğlu wrote this column after Prime Minister Erdoğan had condemned 
abortion as “murder”. Therefore, at the same time, Bayramoğlu implicitly criticizes 
Erdoğan’s opinions on abortion by reminding his readers of the democratic and plural 
dynamics of the new Turkey.  
 
However, although Bayramoğlu argues that conflicts between different identities lead to 
democratic and tolerant conditions in the society and that democratic culture shapes the 
new politics (23.09.2011, Yeni Şafak), he nevertheless warns that without a new 
constitution, the chaos of the institutionalization of politics and change will continue. We 
can see the same tendency in the other columnists’ articles. The common expectation 
was that the democratic conditions established by the AKP would ultimately conclude 
with a social contract that guaranteed democratic rights for all. Bayramoğlu later on 
discusses the possible conditions for the new constitution in his column titled “Yeni 
Türkiye’nin Doğum Belgesi” [The Birth Certificate of the New Turkey]: 
 
Before the election, the most significant expectation of the country was a 
new and civic constitution. This expectation is in progress. It is in progress 
since the new constitution corresponds to a social contract which will unite 
religious people, seculars, Turks and Kurds around new social and political 
common grounds which Turkey has been in need for years. As it is known, 
‘constitutional process’ did not proceed in an intended way and pace. The 
fact that the relation of Kurdish question and violence surrounded the 
country, that idea of security prevailed the politics in almost all cases, Syria 
problem, MİT (National Intelligence Organization) crisis, and problems of 
seizure of law and rights caused constitution topic to go back. A new social 
consensus firstly requires discussion, conversation and reconciliation. In 
Turkey, issue of constitution tries to proceed unfortunately in a condition 
of ‘absence or even gap of discussion and politics’. Therefore, ‘Commission 
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of Reconciliation’, which was established as inter-parties in the parliament, 
did not become influential [...] 
    
[...] Ömer Çelik, who is one of the Vice Presidents of AK Party, in the 
interview we had yesterday, was speaking hopefully, highlighting what 
should be done. “What is important is to make choice. What is it going to 
be: the last constitution of the Old Turkey or the first constitution of the 
New Turkey? Our choice must definitely be the second one. The new 
constitution should be the birth certificate of the new Turkey. In this 
perspective, what is important is not to write a constitution text but to 
discuss and to reconciliate. The text should be the result of this 
reconciliation“. It is not possible to disagree with Çelik.. (Bayramoğlu, 
03.05.2012, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Referring to Ömer Çelik, Bayramoğlu hopes that the new constitution will be the birth 
certificate of the new Turkey, though he had declared many times in the other columns 
I discussed above that we were already living in the new Turkey. In effect, such 
discrepancy is not surprising, since the power of the new Turkey discourse comes from 
that ambiguity and contradiction. As is seen in the first quotation, when the context 
changed, Bayramoğlu talked about “the absence of discussion and politics in Turkey”, 
though he argued before that new democratic and pluralist politics come from the 
demand of the people in new Turkey. We are going to see clearly that this contradiction 
is intrinsic to the new Turkey discourse while discussing the other topics. 
 
4.1.2. Demilitarization of Politics: Liquidation of Military Tutelage 
Debates on tutelage constitute the main part of the new Turkey discourse in this period. 
Construction of the discourse is based on a vision which imagines a country without any 
kind of tutelage. Indeed, as a representative of religious people who were repressed 
under the Kemalist secular status quo, the AKP had to deal with the military dynamics 
which shaped politics for decades to sustain its hegemonic power. Besides military coups 
and interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980, the AKP and its proponents kept 28 February 
1997 post-modern coup always on their agenda, because it targeted directly the religious 
patterns in the political field. According to Tanıl Bora, to rescue politics from tutelage, 
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the AKP constituted its strategy on the basis of the opposition between nation (people) 
and elites. This strategy led the AKP to overcome another military intervention, called 
the ‘e-memorandum’, on 27 April 2007. The AKP never stepped back, and it strengthened 
its power after the 2007 general elections through the party’s ability to polarize politics 
on the axis of democracy against military tutelage (Bora, 2017, p. 479). Such polarization 
would find an expression in the discursive segregation of the old and the new Turkey. As 
Gürpınar claims, military tutelage was equated with the old Turkey, whereas the AKP 
mediated liberal principles through its emphasis on demilitarization and the right to 
sovereignty (Gürpınar, 2016, p. 336). 
 
Indeed, by virtue of the discourse of supposed demilitarization, the AKP was welcomed 
by different segments of the society in that period. According to H. Bahadır Türk, 
technicians of opinion used demilitarization as a milestone in the advocacy of the AKP 
and in this way stigmatized critics as if they wanted to return to the days of military 
tutelage (Türk, 2014, p.392). In effect, the discourse of demilitarization or liquidation of 
military tutelage includes significant inconsistencies and ambivalences. Paradoxically, 
after each election result (including referendums), columnists declared that tutelage had 
been liquidated; however, before each upcoming election they also remind of us that 
tutelage was on guard. Correspondingly, in their columns, the constitution and 
reconstitution of the new Turkey always differs and shows up in different contexts. The 
liquidation of tutelage, as is true with the new Turkey discourse more broadly, is used 
without any essence, and this flexibility allows pro-government actors to operationalize 
it as a tool for symbolic power against the opposition.  
 
4.1.2.1. Perceiving the 2010 Referendum as a Battle between Military Tutelage and 
Democracy 
2010 was the year in which discussions around military tutelage reached their peak due 
to the constitution referendum. The AKP undertook to make changes in the constitution 
in favor of the demilitarization of jurisdiction. It proposed the removal of the article that 
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prevented the trial of generals who had participated in the coups in the past. Also, new 
changes were going to pave the way for the trial of military officers in civil courts. Such 
promises were regarded as signs of the liquidation of the military tutelage; therefore, 
pro-AKP actors in the media attributed crucial meaning to the referendum and 
succeeded in portraying it as a conflict between democracy and tutelage. Of course, 
these conflictual categories of perception were established first by Prime Minister 
Erdoğan and AKP members, then they were reproduced through variable mediums. 
According to Yayman, who was an academic and later became AKP deputy in 2015, this 
referendum would accelerate the construction of the new Turkey: 
 
Although it was not mentioned more in the propaganda period, 12 
September referendum will have a significant multiplier effect and change 
Turkey’s ill fate. This influence, though not in the short term, will pave the 
way for the constitution of a new Turkey in the medium and long term. At 
the end of the past 30 years, facing of society with the coup and calling 
pro-coup actors to account though delayed, first of all enabled Turkey to 
transcend a psychological threshold. While the fact that ‘yes’ votes had 
won the referendum enabled Turkey to rediscover its ability of problem-
solving, these results may lead many structural problems to be addressed 
more pertinaciously. When the story of making 1961 and 1982 
constitutions is considered, putting popular will in pledge and the 
established tutelage system, the significance of what has been achieved 
will be seen more clearly. Referendum results may provide the possibility 
of changing the 100-year-old fate of Turkey. Turkey can become ‘great’ 
and an ‘order-making’ country both inside and outside by overcoming its 
acquired helplessness and frustration (Yayman, 15.09.2010, Zaman). 
 
He expects that facing the system of tutelage after the referendum can lead Turkey to 
change its destiny and in the long run it may make it an important international leader. 
In this sense, the established order before the referendum is discredited as an obstacle 
to Turkey's development. What is usually done to consecrate the ‘new’ conditions of the 
period after the AKP came to power, as Yayman also did, is to compare it with the former 
periods under military rule. Yayman indicates the 1961 and 1980 constitutions as 
examples of tutelage in order to show the importance of the 2010 referendum. Although 
new regulations can bring only partial changes, they are presented as if they are a means 
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of total liberation for Turkey. Opposition groups who do not support those changes for 
various reasons are easily cast as if they are against democracy and national 
independence. Hatem Ete, in his column titled “Referandumun Mesajı: Yeni Siyaset, Yeni 
Türkiye” [Message of the Referendum: New Polities, New Turkey], locates the AKP and 
the opposition parties, which are the Republican People’s Party (CHP, hereafter), 
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, hereafter), and Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, 
hereafter) on an axis of democracy and tutelage. According to him, supporters of ‘Yes’ 
are standing on the side of democracy, whereas supporters of ‘No’ are standing on the 
side of tutelage. As he argues, 
 
Existing politics experienced an axial shift. Referendum results registered 
the center of gravity of prevailing politics as ‘tutelage-democracy’ axis. 
Such axis, in the referendum period, caused many unforeseen alliances 
and dissolutions, and downgraded the ethnic, denominational, ideological 
and political dichotomies which make of old political dispositions. 
Nationalism, seen as survivor among the old political values, was taken 
into the referendum process as a political dynamic by neglecting this 
political transformation, but could not be influential. Therefore, it can be 
said that the attempt which aimed to turn the referendum campaign into 
a vote of confidence towards to the government by taking it out of context 
has failed and the opposite sides in the referendum process positioned 
themselves on the tutelage-democracy axis as constitutional amendment 
package had foreseen (Ete, 19.09.2010, Sabah). 
 
As Hatem Ete comes to conclude, considering the results of the referendum (58% Yes, 
42% No), even nationalism lost against the demand of democracy. Of course, the results 
can be interpreted in various ways, yet the problematical issue here how different 
oppositional tendencies, which met in the side of No, are all described as the ‘tutelage 
front’. Such generalization and totalization of political positions functions and functioned 
as the criminalization and otherization of political opponents. This can be seen as a 
‘success’ of those columnists and other AKP apologists coming from different fields. All 
those visible actors in the media impose their generalizations and produce categorized 
opinions towards the opposition. In another column in 2011, Ete uses the same strategy 
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and marks political attempts of the AKP as being ‘on behalf of the national will’, while he 
stigmatizes the objections to those politics as pro-status quo and pro-tutelage: 
 
AK Party, in its every attempt of change in favor of the national will, 
confronted with the resistance of pro-tutelage actors and institutions 
which supported the maintenance of status-quo. The resistance against 
AK Party, which has been wanted to be rendered impotent through 
implicit-explicit, legal-illegal pressures since 2002, turns out to be a visible 
conflict due to the approaching Presidential election and 22 July 2007 
general election. The period between 22 July 2007 and 12 September 2010 
finalized the conflict between status quo and change in favor of the latter. 
After 12 September referendum showed to the pro-status quo actors that 
conflict is not a true strategy, especially CHP and actors such as media, 
army, and judiciary were exposed to the developments oriented to replace 
conflict politics with negotiation politics (Ete, 02.04.2011, Sabah 
Perspektif). 
 
4.1.2.2. Perceiving the 2011 General Election as the Introduction to the New 
Turkey 
If the new Turkey discourse, in reference with the liquidation of military tutelage, was 
uttered strongly in the period of the 2010 referendum, the period of the general 
elections in 2011 ‘registered’ the fall of tutelage and declared once again the birth of the 
new Turkey. As was the case in the referendum, the AKP’s win was taken as the defeat 
of tutelage, which at the same time implied that the political rivals of the AKP are 
naturally on the pro-tutelage side. Before the election, the common belief among 
columnists was that Turkey had dealt with the tutelage, and therefore that the 
constitution of the new Turkey began with the referendum. Taha Özhan and Hatem Ete, 
both of whom are think-tank researchers (Taha Özhan is also a deputy of the AKP) in 
SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research), argue almost the same 
thing: that the general election will be the most important step in the inception of the 
new Turkey:   
 
The general election, which is going to be held on 12 July 2011, will be one 
of the crucial destinations of the will to change which has increasingly 
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gained momentum in favor of the status quo since early 2000s. For the last 
10 years, within the most decisive and radical change process of the 
history of the Republic which has proceeded with the leadership of AK 
Party; all institutions, actors and mindsets which sustain the tutelage 
system has been forced to change and they have lost their influence in the 
system. At this point today, the agendum is which parameters the new 
Turkey is going to be reconstructed on. One of the most powerful signals 
towards the coordinates of the construction period will be started with the 
July election (Ete, 02.04.2011, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
What is the most basic property of 12 June 2011 election? It stands for a 
genuine beginning for Turkey to face with its political and collective 
memory since ‘12 September’. Here, ‘12 September’ corresponds to both 
the rupture after referendum and also the deep destruction which began 
with 1980 coup. All the experiences in the long 30 years between the coup 
and the referendum will have to get into the path of the ‘New Turkey’ after 
13 June. Together with 12 June referendum, the struggle upon the 
construction of a new political system proceeded to a different stage and 
the construction process of the New Turkey started in an unpreventable 
way. For this very reason, 2011 election already turned out to be the 
election which was purchased by the market and society, because 12 June 
means only station on the way, as a result of 12 September. It was not as 
easy as was claimed, to take position by politically realizing that the New 
Turkey was established. For many political currents, it was not easy to 
notice that the wreck of the 1990s had been removed after 2002 or that 
bureaucratic and military tutelage had become out of date after 2007 
(Özhan, 07.05.2011, Sabah Perspektif).  
 
According to Ete, the election results will determine the parameters of the new Turkey, 
whereas Özhan argues that the process of the constitution of the new Turkey had started 
‘inescapably’ through the referendum and that the general election would deepen the 
distance between tutelage and the new Turkey. After the elections, Rasim Ozan 
Kütahyalı, in his column titled “Eyyamcı Takımının Son Günleri” [The Last Days of the 
Favouritist Rabble], interprets the results of the election with a new born baby analogy. 
According to him, the period between 2007 and 2011 was a transition period -even 
though he wrote many columns implying the existence of the new Turkey even before 
2011- and the new Turkey finally was born subsequent to the general election on 12 June 
2011:  
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The last 4 years has been an exact transition period for Turkey...We have 
seen no Old Turkey in classical meaning and this obsolete order has been 
gradually dissolving. Yet, there hasn’t been, either, a New Turkey which 
has left behind this obsolete order. In the last 4 years we have experienced 
the birth pains of the New Turkey; however, now, the New Turkey was born 
as a cherub after 12 June process...The New Turkey is not even in the level 
of crawling, but fortunately it was born already... And democrats of the 
New Turkey have no tolerance to such newborn baby’s slightest possibility 
of being damaged. Therefore, conscientious people of this country are very 
sensitive about the clearance of the Old Turkey’s mess in every field. Not 
only in political issues, but also in the field of economy, sports and media... 
(Kütahyalı, 24.07.2011, Sabah). 
 
Kütahyalı declares the birth of the new Turkey; however, paradoxically, he at the same 
time awakes everyone to the wrecks of the old Turkey. In another column titled “Yeni 
Türkiye’nin Şampiyonluk Mücadelesi” [The Struggle of the New Turkey for Championship] 
which he wrote at the end of 2011, Kütahyalı expresses the process of the new Turkey 
with a football match analogy. He sees 12 June as the final match for the declaration of 
the new Turkey. However, this does not mean that the old Turkey and military tutelage 
have been totally eliminated: 
 
Has military tutelage ceased to exist totally? Of course not. Have we totally 
eliminated the Old Turkey? Of course not. We are at the very beginnings 
of being a civic and democratic country in the real sense. Old Turkey habits 
are still continuing. But as Çetin Altan says, there is no need to fall in 
despair. The day the New Turkey was declared completely is the evening 
of 12 June. The New Turkey did not start when AK Party came to power. 
We were living in the Old Turkey also in the 2003-2011 AK Party period. 
However, that 9-year period was that of a close struggle and even warfare. 
I compare the last 9 years with the story of an Anatolian team which was 
qualified for the final and succeeded to become the champion despite any 
kind of sneaky and wicked ruse and which was always despised until the 
final match (Kütahyalı, 25.12.2011, Sabah). 
 
The old Turkey or tutelage system, as an everlasting enemy, is always kept in the political 
agenda so that the AKP can maintain its political struggle by showing itself as victimized. 
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What is at stake here is the sacredness of political will in the face of military power. As 
usual, pro-AKP actors develop an argumentation line which claims that the AKP must be 
defended against the risk of the usurpation of that will. Therefore, those actors associate 
whatever happens to the political or legal detriment of the AKP with tutelage and the old 
Turkey by means of discursive strategies. Here are two examples of ‘bureaucratic 
tutelage’ and ‘judicial tutelage’ in different periods: 
 
Despite the manipulations, exposed is more and more evidence that the 
prosecution included the old and new MIT executives in the investigation 
because of Oslo or Imralı meetings which was conducted within the scope 
of knowledge, approval and directive of the political power. This reason 
means that the prosecution questioned the political power’s policy to fight 
against terrorism, and thus, developed a policy by acting like a political 
actor. Such attitude, which means seizing the government’s political will 
based on collective support by resorting to the bureaucratic privileges, is 
one that we call and condemn ‘tutelage system’ in the old Turkey. Since 27 
May 1960, the effort of intervening with the government’s right to policy-
determination through legal-bureaucratic privileges is called in this 
country as Kemalism. In this framework, it is possible to denominate as 
neo-Kemalists those actors that included MIT executives in the 
investigation because of their actions which they carried out to apply 
directives of the political power, and the community which supported 
them. In our opposite side, there are neo-Kemalists of the new Turkey who 
became privileged as a result of their struggle against Kemalist privileges 
of the old Turkey, and these people show tendency to sustain pro-tutelage 
dispositions which they took over (Ete, 18.02.2012, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
Even in the new Turkey, the biggest opponent of the existing civic and 
elected government is inside the state itself. When one spoke of the state 
in the old regime, what it brought to mind was TSK (Turkish Armed Forces). 
The state meant TSK. In the current amorphous regime in which we 
overcame the military tutelage, things got more complicated. It seems 
that civic government rules over a part of the state as it should be in a 
democracy; on the other hand, there are also quite powerful bureaucratic 
and juridical tutelage elements who want to take the place of TSK in the 
state. Bureaucrats and members of the judiciary who want to place the 
civic government under tutelage act coordinately as if they were instructed 
by the same center. Now, struggle for political power is between the 
government which came to power through democratic means and this pro 
neo-tutelage, neo-Unionist state power. The mindset which suffocated the 
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spirit of 23 July 1908 is now trying to turn the passive revolution which we 
have experienced in last 5 years into its own tutelage regime in a new 
disguise. This is the political reality that we are experiencing, and the rest 
is nothing but empty talk and a pack of lies. Don’t believe it (Kütahyalı, 
25.07.2013, Sabah). 
 
In the first quotation from the column titled ‘Vesayet, Siyaset, Cemaat’ [Tutelage, Politics, 
the Community], Ete criticizes the prosecutors who held an inquiry about the MİT 
bureaucrats accused of maintaining the negotiation process with Abdullah Öcalan and 
other PKK leaders through the Oslo meetings. Ete uses particular wording such as 
‘usurpation of political will of the government which based on social support’, 
‘bureaucratic privilege’, and ‘tutelage system’ and ‘tutelage front’. Furthermore, he 
describes this tutelage front as ‘neo-Kemalists of the new Turkey’ who have acquired 
privileges as a result of their struggle against ‘Kemalist privileges of the old Turkey’. As 
can be also inferred from the title of the column, Ete, by defining neo-Kemalists of the 
new Turkey, refers to the complex relations in the jurisdiction led by Gülen. This case 
reveals the in-state organization for the first time and identifies it as a new tutelage 
group.   
 
In the second quotation, Kütahyalı claims that the civic government still has control over 
only certain parts of the state; on the other hand, there are also bureaucratic and 
jurisdictional tutelage groups who want to be substituted alongside the TSK in the state. 
Kütahyalı, in the period following the Gezi Park protests and before the adjudication of 
the Ergenekon case, keeps his readers awake against a new tutelage front. While Ete 
uses the concept of neo-Kemalists, Kütahyalı prefers to use ‘neo-Unionist’ (neo-İttihatçı), 
yet it is not clear whom Kütahyalı is referring here. Without having to point to any 
signified subject, he contributes to the production of ‘vigilance politics’ on behalf of the 
AKP.   
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4.1.2.3. Perceiving the 2014 Local Election as the Last Round for the Old Turkey 
Claims 
It is clear, then, from what has been said up to this point that the discourse of the 
liquidation of the tutelage or establishment of the new Turkey is something indefinite 
which was ‘registered’ so many times and that conversely, the old Turkey and tutelage 
are deemed as if they are going to rise from the dead in the times of elections. This time, 
at the end of 2013, Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı and Markar Esayan, a Turkish-Armenian 
columnist and later a deputy of the AKP in 2015, applied the same strategy to produce 
opinions in favor of the AKP for the upcoming local election. The strategy is ever there 
to be employed: To construct categorical oppositions in which the AKP is positioned as 
pure good who represents democracy and justice, while the others are positioned as 
pure evil always waiting in ambush to vandalize the country. As Kütahyalı claims in his 
column titled “Eski Türkiye’ye Dönüş Planı ve Sarıgül” [A Plan to Return to the Old Turkey 
and Sarıgül];  
 
Old Turkey front is planning to render the 2014 İstanbul election as the 
beginning of the comeback. Therefore, they attach great importance to 
the İstanbul election. The scheme is exactly like that: Mustafa Sarıgül will 
won İstanbul for CHP; as a result of this, the spell of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
will be broken and later on he will lose the presidency and the whole 
Turkey. It is also part of their plan to, subsequent to success in 2014 
operation, empty out Silivri. Then all murderers and coup plotters in the 
jail will be let out with heroic anthems. Peace and solution process will be 
ended, and a civil war will start. This war, it will be claimed, will continue 
until the last PKK militant is killed. After, great operations will be 
conducted to restore the regime to the old secularist and nationalist 
factory settings. As a continuation of this plan, there is a desire to lock 
somehow Recep Tayyip Erdoğan down. 
 
[...] In this operation which targets first Erdoğan and then AK Party and 
thereby actors such as Abdullah Gül and Bülent Arınç, it is understood that 
Fethullah Gülen Movement will be the next target. The first target of this 
plan which can be called the operation of returning to the Old Turkey is 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and its last, Fethullah Gülen. That is to say, we 
eventually encounter with a plan of exterminating AK Party and Hizmet 
[Service] Movement again. But this time it is a more subtle, longer-
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reaching, more professional, and more powerful plan in terms of external 
support. The tension between AK Party and Hizmet Movement makes the 
ones who’ve organized this plan happy. Old Turkey actors, in 2005, were 
telling the USA Ambassador about Mustafa Sarıgül as follows: He is a man 
who broke the record in corruption and who is shallow, a liar, an imposter 
and a thief. You can read these in detail in Wikileaks documents. What I 
explained above underlies the reasons of the fact that those who called 
Sarıgül as a thief and an imposter now regard him as hope. Thus, to 
support Kadir Topbaş in 2014 İstanbul election is not only a local choice, 
but also a slap against the ones who want to turn back to the Old Turkey 
(Kütahyalı, 14.11.2013, Sabah). 
 
Kütahyalı calls the local elections an ‘operation’ and this wording follows a nightmare 
scenario for Turkey. According to Kütahyalı, Mustafa Sarıgül, the candidate of the CHP 
for Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul, represents the old Turkey coalition and if he is 
to win, Turkey will be driven into chaos on behalf of the tutelage front. Furthermore, it 
is reminded that the AKP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Fethullah Gülen and the ‘Hizmet 
Movement’ (now called a terrorist organization) are under threat by the old Turkey with 
foreign support. Here, the AKP and ‘Hizmet Movement’ are treated again as the primary 
components of the new Turkey. Yet in the period after 2013, the state identified the 
‘Hizmet Movement’ as ‘FETÖ-PDY’ (Pro-Fethullah Terrorist Organization-Parallel State 
Organization) as a result of its parallel organization in the state itself. As the state’s 
discourse and approach had changed, engaged intellectuals have adopted this new 
conceptualization.  
 
Kütahyalı interestingly talks about the importance of supporting Kadir Topbaş for the 
sake of the new Turkey against Mustafa Sarıgül. As in the other elections, the victory of 
the AKP and Kadir Topbaş would be a ‘slap’ against the groups who wanted to turn back 
to the old Turkey. In that way, even a local election, which was just expected to choose 
who would govern the municipal interests was, by means of discursive constructions, 
turned into a milestone that divided the old and the new Turkey. We observe the same 
strategy in Markar Esayan’s column titled “Eski Türkiye’deki Son Kapışma ve Erdoğan” 
[The Last Tussle in the Old Turkey and Erdoğan]. As Kütahyalı did, Esayan also uses 
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different wording and describes the period of local elections as a form of ‘guerilla 
warfare’. Furthermore, according to him, this local election in 2014 will be the last fight 
between the old and the new Turkey: 
 
Of course, we cannot know what the moves in this ‘guerilla warfare’ are, 
whose first round will last until 30 March, and how influential they will be. 
I think, this is the last and the biggest fight of the old Turkey. Reanimating 
the old Turkey will not be possible if civic politics becomes successful in this 
election. Whoever convinces the people about carrying the new Turkey will 
win the election. I hope all weaknesses of the old state will probably be 
addressed based on the lessons taken from this serious experience. At this 
point, Erdoğan has no rival in the eyes of the political base (Esayan, 
26.12.2013, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Accordingly, if civil politics (actually Erdoğan) were to win the election, then there would 
be no chance to ‘resuscitate’ the old Turkey anymore. In a similar manner to Kütahyalı, 
Esayan goes beyond the actual meaning of the local election and attributes it an 
importance as if it would decide Turkey’s fate. Indeed, this is a primary strategy followed 
by intellectuals in each election. Word choice matters in this kind of totalizing 
argumentation. That is why Esayan perceives the elections as a form of warfare and the 
biggest fight. Such preferences aim to indicate the intentions of the old Turkey and in 
that way, contradictions are maintained in favor of the new Turkey.  
 
4.1.3. Discourse of Peace-building: Kurdish Question  
For some, the Kurdish question can be traced back to the foundation of the republic, 
while for others it emerged after the 1970s, especially with the foundation of the PKK, 
which is accepted as a terrorist organization. However, regardless of the beginning of the 
problem, the Kurdish question remains unsolved.  
 
In short, the Kurdish question arises from the establishment of the nation-state and as 
part of a modernization process intended to homogenize the nation on the basis of 
Turkishness and secularization. This modernization project was confronted with the 
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resistance of Kurdish people whose majority was also non-secular, and in response the 
state initiated an ongoing oppression against Kurdish culture which resulted in massacres 
in the early republican era. With the formation of the PKK in 1978, Kurdish resistance 
turned to an armed struggle targeting the Turkish armed forces. Thousands of people on 
both sides have died in the subsequent conflict. In each period, the state defined and 
redefined the problem and constructed its solution policies accordingly. According to 
Mesut Yeğen, who studied the Kurdish question from Foucauldian framework, the 
Turkish state, by neglecting the Kurdish identity, has not intentionally distorted the 
Kurdish problem as a matter of reactionism, resistance of the tribes and banditry but has 
already perceived it through such concepts (Yeğen, 2015, p. 24). He focuses on the 
historical and institutional processes behind this perception. As the state paradigm 
changes, political concepts which make possible to approach the Kurdish question also 
differs. In the ‘normalization’ context, AKP supposedly perceived the problem in 
accordance with the democratic values and laid emphasis on the Kurdish identity. Such 
political stance was considered as one of the significant markers of the new Turkey 
project.  
 
As I mentioned before, one of the main democratization policies of the AKP was its 
Kurdish Opening also called the Democratic Initiative. The process began with 
negotiations between MİT and the PKK in 2009, which were later called the ‘Oslo 
Meeting’ and continued with ups and downs. In 2010, some partial democratic 
liberations about Kurdish language and culture were realized; however, clashes started 
again in 2011. In 2013, negotiations began once more between MİT bureaucrats and 
Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK who is serving a sentence of life imprisonment, and 
also he was allowed to meet with BDP deputies. In this period, the democratic initiative 
was replaced with the name of ‘the Solution Process’.  
 
Considering this context, columnists wrote many articles supporting the Kurdish opening 
in relation to the new Turkey discourse. In effect, the Kurdish question is not 
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independent of the other issues that I have covered so far. It was treated both in the 
discourse of democratization and liquidation of tutelage parts because the Kurdish 
question is a multi-dimensional problem and also an encompassing one. Here, in this 
section, as in the previous ones, I am going to focus on how the new Turkey discourse 
was established around discussions of peace-building and how the discourse of the old 
Turkey was taken into the picture. 
 
4.1.3.1. Associating the Emergence of the Problem with the Old Turkey 
In accordance with the AKP's settlement policies towards the Kurdish question, there 
emerged prudent articles which point out the significance of understanding the history 
of the problem and empathize with the conditions of the PKK’s emergence. Such an 
attempt of understanding the PKK as ‘a product of historical conditions’ intends to 
establish a dialogue with Kurdish people, in order to show the authenticity and sincerity 
of peace process. On the other hand, this empathy functions in another way, i.e., since 
the AKP, arguably though, removed the conditions which generated the PKK with the 
new Turkey envisagement and democratization attempts, there is no need any more to 
maintain the armed struggle. Instead, the PKK should enter into a process of 
disarmament and become a political actor. In other words, the PKK is perceived as a 
consequence of the old Turkey conditions and the new Turkey intrinsically delegitimizes 
it. Taha Özhan, who often writes about the Kurdish question, talks about the ‘vicious 
circle’ of violence, by not only criticizing the PKK, but also referring to the tragic 
sociological and political conditions which created it:  
 
Another actor, who strives to survive in heavier conditions, of the political 
history which I express so far is Kurdish political movement. Unfortunately, 
this political tradition, whose political parties have been closed until today, 
became more radicalized in its every new party compared to the former 
one and targeted the old Turkey. It performed almost perfectly what it was 
expected from PKK and Kurdish political movement in order to sustain 
status quo. One has always been taken for the other the fact that human 
right violations are demands which require to be expressed timelessly and 
the discourse which is necessary to be (political) subject. We are facing 
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with a tragic condition which unifies the political discourse level of the 
wisest actors and of stone-throwing children; that of PKK militant in the 
mountain and of deputy in the parliament; the reactions of an activist in 
diaspora who was completely alienated to Turkey for 25-30 years and of 
the mayor of the city whose population is almost 2 million. This literally 
corresponds to a level on which the political and the sociological, the old 
and the new, the status quo and the change became meaningless. Under 
these circumstances, speaking, discussion and negotiation lose their 
meaning and we are always forced to stay within a bloody vicious circle 
(Özhan, 03.04.2011, Star Açık Görüş). 
 
According to Özhan, the Kurdish political movement turned its face towards the old 
Turkey; however, this was a result of radicalization that transpired after many Kurdish 
parties were closed. Here Özhan establishes a causation to locate the Kurdish political 
movement -including the PKK- in a particular context, because as I said earlier, there was 
a necessity to produce commonsensical discourses due to the vulnerability of the peace 
process. In a similar way in different years, Taha Özhan and Mücahit Küçükyılmaz, who 
is a former think-tank researcher and still a presidential advisor, historicize the problem 
and establish causation: 
 
It is possible to divide Turkey’s examination about Kurdish problem into 
roughly three periods: 1) Problems emerged as a result of primitive nation-
building practices which had been implemented throughout the early 
years of the republic and one-party period. 2) The period which stuck 
between the backwardness parentheses from the establishment of 27 May 
order until 1980 coup. 3) From the armed struggle period which began 
during coup and continued its existence to the period until the end of the 
1990s in which the state reason collapsed. We passed to the new phase 
after 1999 under the pressure of heavy costs which were produced by 
these three periods. After Öcalan was brought to Turkey, we entered into 
a different and complicated phase of Kurdish problem. We witnessed 
together that provocations of the old Turkey worked hardly after 
normalization of politics and country in the new period; that attempts of 
the defeated left fantasy of 1970s to there ensued its existence in an 
amorphous political plane through Kurdish question; and that structural 
breaks and occupations in our region. At this point, the actors of the new 
Turkey and the new Middle East appeared to be those distanced from 
violence or undemocratic ways, whereas actors of the old Turkey turned 
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out to be those who cannot abandon pulling the trigger to fire their last 
bullets (Özhan, 20.08.2011, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
[...] On the other side, Kurdish people, who went back into their shell after 
Sheikh Said rebellion which includes also religious concerns, experienced 
the long years that passed until 1980s as a trauma which deepened the 
feeling of being excluded. During this period, they neither produced 
influential leader figures nor acquired a social and political framework in 
which they can express themselves. What turned trauma into a breaking 
point was the unpleasant experiences subsequent to 12 September 1980 
coup, such as Diyarbakır Prison. Some parts of the Kurds broke harshly 
their long term silence as a result of the fact that PKK started to organize 
terror attacks. However, PKK, as a Marxist movement which stand against 
Kemalist center as an ideologically secular movement as Kemalism itself, 
never came through its basic claims because of this characteristic 
(Küçükyılmaz, 06.04.2013, Sabah Perspektif).  
 
The aforementioned periods in Özhan’s article are almost the same ones which are 
identified to characterize the old Turkey: the one-party period, the 1960s, and the 1980s. 
Accordingly, in an implicit way, the old Turkey was regarded as responsible for the terror 
issues, whereas in a ‘normalized’ new Turkey, terror issues are nothing other than the 
residuals of the old Turkey. With the normalization process, what is expected from the 
PKK is to disarm and to join the political field; otherwise, the PKK would be regarded as 
an old Turkey actor and would never find legitimacy, instead being marginalized and 
excluded from democratic processes. However, as Küçükyılmaz argues, since the PKK is 
both Marxist and also as secular as the Kemalist regime, it failed to reach the Kurdish 
base and to achieve its basic claims. Here, by pointing out the PKK’s secular character, 
Küçükyılmaz shows a tendency towards a point at which the Kurdish question can only 
be solved on the basis of the Islamic commonalities among Kurdish and Turkish people. 
This was also one of the main strategies for the AKP in the peace process, to meet on 
common ground with Kurds on the basis of Islamic civilization, which is assumed as the 
trademark of the new Turkey.  
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4.1.3.2. Perceiving the Opposition Parties as Old Turkey Actors 
Here, similar to the attitudes in the referendum in 2010, opposition parties objected to 
the peace process for various reasons. While the CHP criticized the process on the 
grounds that it was not being maintained transparently, for the MHP, to negotiate with 
a terrorist organization was not acceptable. Even the BDP had doubts about whether the 
process would be guaranteed and legalized or not. In this context, the AKP presented 
itself as a founding actor of the new Turkey and representative of the will for peace in 
the society. Pro-AKP writers and commenters in the media always supported this 
position by arguing that the AKP took upon itself a very significant mission in attempting 
to solve the Kurdish question, whereas the opposition parties (and PKK) stood with the 
old Turkey and did not support the possibility of peace. Opposition parties were also 
blamed for resisting the liquidation of tutelage, which was discussed in the previous 
section. In this sense, the old Turkey discourse was used as a functional instrument to 
criticize the opposition parties in the context of the peace process. In two different 
columns, Taha Özhan appeals to this strategy by focusing on the BDP and MHP and 
argues that the AKP is 
 
the most powerful actor of normalization and solution in the Kurdish 
problem. 14 years ago, those who claimed that tension between 
secularism and Islam would be removed by AKP tradition used to be 
accused of dreaminess. Today what is done in the sphere of the problem 
through democratic initiative confronts a similar accusation. BDP, as long 
as it is only the party of Kurdish problem, moves away from being a 
constitutive part of the New Turkey. However, it should be realized that 
there is no place for Kurdish problem in the New Turkey, which is the only 
way to contribute to the normalization (Özhan, 03.04.2011, Star Açık 
Görüş).  
 
BDP and MHP, which are directly and indirectly the two parties of the 
Kurdish question respectively, either watch the ‘New Turkey’ dynamics 
without changing the position or take the wrong position. MHP seems to 
deeply believe that problems of the last 20 years, which coincide with an 
ordinary and short moment in the history of this country, will exist as the 
main axis of Turkey politics. Similarly, BDP also seems to be convinced that 
by freezing the political time period, it has to stay a political actor under 
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‘constant state of emergency’ in the old Turkey. Both BDP and MHP are 
sorely scared of ‘disarmament or politization of PKK’. MHP seems to 
believe that the country will be separated, while BDP deeply believes that 
it cannot speak without guns. However, if a New Turkey is to exist, there 
will not be a place for the Kurdish question in it or vice versa (Özhan, 
07.05.2011, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
In both columns, Özhan states that the BDP and MHP cannot be part of the new Turkey 
as long as they stick to their own political agenda. Furthermore, he assertively claims 
that the Kurdish question is not going to exist anymore in the new Turkey. In 2013, in the 
period of the Solution Process, Hüseyin Yayman also criticizes the PKK and BDP, but 
treats Öcalan in a positive way: 
 
[...] There is a PKK which calls for revolutionary people’s war and supports 
the solution unwillingly by ‘approaching it with caution’, and a BDP which 
cannot produce a policy and cannot be freed from the control of the 
mountain. Opposite to these, there is a portrait of Öcalan who utters 
‘millennial brotherhood’ and talks about the National Pact (Misakı Milli), 
common future, sharing a common fate and notion of ‘US’ … (Yayman, 
22.03.2013, Hürriyet). 
 
The BDP is considered as under the charge of the PKK, which is already a sort of tutelage. 
Interestingly enough, even though the BDP is the only legal interlocutor of this process, 
Öcalan is much more respected by some intellectuals. Of course, the BDP is at the same 
time a strong political rival of AKP in the East and South East regions. In this sense, a 
possible success of the peace process could have increased the potential support of the 
BDP as well as that of the AKP government. Therefore, discourse towards the BDP is 
always established through its relation with the PKK and the armed struggle. Now, in 
what follows, the question of why Öcalan was considered as a peace-maker despite his 
‘bad reputation’ is going to be dwelt upon.  
 
4.1.3.3. Peace-Building with Kurds in the Context of Foreign Politics 
As was discussed before, the politics of the AKP on the Kurdish question are based on 
the discourse of democratization and normalization. Accordingly, some normalization 
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steps like the removal of the state of emergency, the replacement of ‘Turkified’ names 
of places with Kurdish ones, the liberty to establish Kurdish institutions in universities, 
the liberty to broadcast in the Kurdish language, etc. increased the belief that a solution 
of the problem was possible. While the AKP tried to convince society about the 
sustainability of the peace process, there were important developments in the Syria crisis 
which also influenced domestic politics in Turkey. With the effect of the Arab Spring, 
uprisings against Bashar Assad began in 2011 then turned into a civil war in Syria. Syria 
was divided into different sections and the PYD (Democratic Union Party), an armed 
organization which is also accepted by Turkey as terrorist organization, advocating the 
self-governance of Kurdish people in Syria, conquered the city of Kobane and declared 
de facto self-government in 2012.  
 
These events raised hopes for the Kurdish population in Syria since they were living free 
of the Assad regime. The declaration of self-government in the name of the PYD also 
caused excitement among some parts of the Kurdish population in Turkey. In that 
context, the AKP was cautious and thus maintained a balanced politics for the sake of 
the peace process, even though Turkey saw the PYD as a terrorist organization connected 
with PKK. The declaration of self-government in Syria triggered nationalist tendencies in 
Turkey and increased the fears of separation because of border security risks. Therefore, 
the AKP and its intellectuals in the media had to keep positive relations with Kurdish 
people for the sake of the peace process, without also offending the Turkish side. In 
order to overcome nationalist reactions about Kurdish separatism, columnists often set 
the discourse of ‘fear of separation’ to work. That is, to overcome doubts about the 
separation of Kurds among the Turkish population, columnists perceived those doubts 
as ‘fear’, and traced the roots of that fear back to the indoctrination of the old Turkey. 
As Cemal Haşimi, who became a bureaucrat in the prime ministry in 2014, argues, 
 
The New Turkey is being constructed by exposition to great pains. In the 
construction period, making policies based on the fears of the old Turkey 
provides a functional shelter for the defenders of the old Turkey. Whatever 
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the reason, there is an explicit Kurdish-phobia which crosses various 
political positions, and this phobia, downgraded thanks to the political 
success of AKP, is activated in every crisis situation [...] 
 
[...] It is necessary to add that this manner did not and will not find an 
interlocutor among Kurds, who are an inseparable part of the New Turkey 
and the New Middle East. That is why, the fight is not in between Kurds 
who support Turkey and who are against Turkey, and neither in between 
Turkey, Turks and Kurds, but in between those who support the new Turkey 
and the last residuals of the old Turkey. For, there is no contradiction 
between the achievements of the New Turkey and those of Kurds in the 
Middle East order which is about to be established (Haşimi, 04.08.2012, 
Sabah Perspektif). 
 
According to Haşimi, the AKP made this ‘fear of Kurd’ diminish despite the old Turkey’s 
attempts in crisis periods. By equalizing the achievements of the new Turkey with the 
achievements of Kurds in the Middle East, Haşimi points to an inclusive characteristic of 
the new Turkey which is assumed as built by the AKP. Haşimi argues that there is no 
conflict between Kurds and Turks; rather, the conflict exists between residuals of the old 
Turkey and the new Turkey. In other words, the old and the new Turkey are placed onto 
the war and peace axis.  
 
Moreover, Hatem Ete questions the underlying reasons for nationalist reactions in the 
context of the achievements of Kurdish community in Syria. Similar with Haşimi’s 
arguments, Ete points to the secularism and nationalism policies of the early republic: 
 
The republic constituted its official ideology on two principles which would 
determine the basic parameters of the domestic and foreign policy 
throughout the following years: secularism and nationalism. The political 
regime, which aimed to carry out a new nation-building project based on 
these two principles by ignoring the existing social fabric, also defined the 
perception of threat on the basis of the possibility of disapproval of these 
two principles by the society. Resistance against secularism policies was 
codified as ‘reactionism’ or pro-‘sharia’ standing, whereas resistance 
against nationalism/Turkism was codified as ‘separatism’. It defined 
religious people and/or non-Turk components, who got organized on the 
basis of religious and/or ethnic demands, as potential domestic enemies. 
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The regime was organized on the basis of vigilance against the possible 
threats of these domestic enemies (Ete, 06.08.2012, Star Açık Görüş). 
 
What Ete meant by the republic is of course the old Turkey itself.  Residuals of the old 
Turkey still constitute an impediment in front of the solution of the Kurdish question. 
According to Ete, the AKP succeeded in overcoming the perception of ‘reactionism’ of 
the republic; however, it cannot yet transform the discourse of separation which haunts 
the nationalist tendencies. Moreover, his discourse towards the achievements of Kurds 
in Middle East can be considered as pragmatist:  
 
However, Turkey, as long as it was able to get rid of the paranoia of separatism, 
could have made peace with Kurds in the neighboring countries just as she had 
made peace with Islamic entities in the Middle East because it eradicated the 
paranoia of reactionism emanating from the state reason. Turkey could have 
utilized the existence of Kurds in the neighboring countries as a step of 
intervening with the Middle East by leaving the threat of separatism behind 
just as she had increased its influence in the Middle East on the basis of Islamic 
movements’ rise to power by leaving the threat of reactionism behind. But, 
today, while Turkey at a point at which she feels apprehension about the fact 
that Islamic movements came to power, it feels apprehension about the 
political achievements of Kurds in the neighboring countries, because it still 
cannot get rid of paranoia of separatism. It is clear then: Change in the Middle 
East will deeply affect all ethnic and denominational structures living in this 
geography. Kurds also will receive a share because they are also in the same 
geography. In this new distribution of roles, political position of all entities 
which do not bond their fates to the existing authoritarian regimes will be 
better than today (Ete, 06.08.2012 Star Açık Görüş). 
 
Accordingly, if Turkey succeeds in maintaining peace with Kurds, this can be instrumental 
in giving it a voice in the Middle East. Ete also uses the word ‘paranoia’, like ‘fear’, to 
describe doubts on the separation of Kurds. Such wording aims to differentiate AKP 
politics from the old Turkey approach to the Kurdish question. Yet despite all its peaceful 
initiatives to deal with the paranoia of separation, Hatem Ete claims that the AKP could 
not achieve total normalization on this issue due to the threat of the PKK, the armed 
terrorist organization, and due to the strong influence of the old Turkey policies about 
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nationalism. However, two months later, Hatem Ete would write oppositely, after the 
ordinary Congress of the AKP on 30 September 2012: 
 
When perceptions of threat, defined for the sake of a dream of monist 
nation-building construction, were removed, there emerged a legitimate 
political space for the excluded political and social sections of the society. 
Demilitarized politics enabled the democratization of the state reason. 
Removal of the threats of reactionism and separatism from the state 
reason changed the way of perceiving the developments outside as well as 
providing political legitimacy of domestic social sections which were 
associated with those threats. The fact that religious social-political 
sections ceased to be a threat enabled Islamic actors leading Arab revival 
to be perceived as legitimate representatives of the people. Moreover, the 
fact that Kurds inside were ceased to be a threat enabled Kurdish actors 
and organizations, who participated in democratic processes outside, to 
be considered as legitimate political partners (Ete, 07.10.2012, Star Açık 
Görüş). 
 
Ete, in his column titled ‘Yeni Türkiye Kongresi’ [The New Turkey Congress], reviewed the 
history of AKP politics until 2012, which displayed political normalization through the 
struggle with the tutelage front. Contrary to what he said two months before, Ete 
claimed later that the demilitarization of politics led to the democratization of the state 
mentality and to a change in the way of perceiving foreign politics in terms of Islamic and 
Kurdish actors. As often mentioned, peaceful involvement in foreign politics is 
considered as a trademark of the new Turkey.  
 
4.1.3.4. Perceiving the New Turkey as a Problem-Solver: The Solution Process 
In 2013, when the democratic initiative was begun under the banner, ‘the solution 
process’, the perception of ‘AKP as a peace-maker despite the old Turkey’ increased in 
all media. In this sense, we can assume a linearity in the discourse on the Kurdish 
question until the end of 2015. The peace process, which was often interrupted with 
political maneuvers, entered a new period after the Nowruz festival on 21 March 2013. 
That Nowruz was so significant that Abdullah Öcalan’s letter was read to the crowd for 
the first time and it was broadcast by many mainstream TV channels. Öcalan’s letter, 
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which consisted of the emphasis on brotherhood based on common history, common 
future, and common civilization, was especially welcomed by the AKP and BDP, as they 
were the interlocutors of the process. The process continued with partial withdrawals of 
the PKK to outside of Turkey’s borders and peaceful approaches of the AKP government. 
In this context, hopes for peace corresponded to the envisagement of the new Turkey, 
and pro-AKP columnists portrayed the normalization and democratization of the new 
political atmosphere by comparing it with the old Turkey. Hüseyin Yayman, writing after 
2013 Nowruz, points to the transformation of Nowruz conditions beginning from 1990s 
until 2013: 
 
I have to say, as an experienced Nevruz/Nevroz/Newroz follower, that we 
are confronted with a positive situation...First of all, reaching to the point 
where Öcalan’s letter was read today from a Turkey in which Nevroz was 
banned in 2012 and death penalty was spoken 3 months ago, is a 
significant change... It is necessary to recall past celebrations in order to 
understand 2013 Nevroz. Derivative parties of HEP (People’s Labor Party) 
celebrated the Nevroz for the first time in 1991. Nevroz was seen as a 
‘political challenge against the state’ for PKK in 1990s, and it was seen as 
a way of massification for HEP/DEP/HADEP/DEHAP/DTP. 1992 Nevroz was 
written in history as ‘bloody Nevroz’, and more than 100 people died. It is 
an unnamed revolution to come to these days passing from 1990s...I think, 
2013 Nevroz will be the ‘last political Nevroz’, if normalization continues... 
(Yayman, 22.03.2013, Hürriyet).  
  
Yayman starts the article with a particular wording: To define Nowruz, he chooses to use 
Nevruz, Nevroz and Newroz all together. Such wording functions as an intermediary 
which addresses both Turkish and Kurdish sides. Yayman describes the normalization 
which reached up to the legalization of Nowruz (in which even Öcalan’s letter can be 
read) as a ‘revolution’. Indeed, even if it did not take long, the recognition of Öcalan as a 
de facto legitimate actor signifies a radical turn for Turkish politics. Interestingly enough, 
Öcalan was regarded as a new partner of the new Turkey. While Hüseyin Yayman refers 
to the new Turkey by citing the Öcalan’s words, Mücahit Küçükyılmaz interprets Öcalan’s 
‘new’ arguments as indicative of a will to partake in the legitimate center of the new 
Turkey politics: 
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Analysis of the Middle East has always had an important place in Öcalan’s 
readings at all times... The main motivation of İmralı Solution Process also 
consists of the developments in the Middle East... While the letter signals 
the existence of ‘a new Middle East’, ‘a new Turkey’ and a new PKK, it 
emphasizes democratic struggle (Yayman, 22.03.2013, Hürriyet). 
 
So the messages coming from İmralı in the solution process reflects an 
effort to produce a new conceptual framework in order to get a position 
in the legitimate center. Öcalan, in his letter which is not even close to 
Marxist-Leninist paradigm, by arguing that modernist paradigm was 
destroyed and saying that it is time to forgive each other, referred to the 
spirit of Malazgirt and Çanakkale, to the law of brotherhood, to the 1920 
parliament, to the truths in the messages of Moses, Jesus and Muhammad. 
So to what extent is this discursive change trustworthy? The fact that 
İmralı, at least, is obliged to this discursive change and even have imposed 
actions which this change requires to the armed Kurdish forces is a 
sufficiently important step. Above all, the fact that old, unacceptable and 
sharp separatist thesis and negotiation discourses have never been raised 
should be interpreted as a manifestation of the will to position itself in the 
legitimate center (Küçükyılmaz, 06.04.2013, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
Since Öcalan’s power of influence on the some sections of the Kurdish population is very 
strong, the de facto legitimacy given by the government to Öcalan enabled the AKP to 
establish a peace-making relationship with Kurdish people. Also, this showed the state 
of affairs of the peace process and increased the possibility of a successful solution. In 
this context, Küçükyılmaz was able to point out to a sort of legitimacy of Öcalan and 
Yayman could positively mention Öcalan’s political insight.  
 
According to Küçükyılmaz, what led to the destruction of political taboos was the goal of 
the ‘Great and Democratic Turkey’, which is a big umbrella that will unite the nation and 
be dominant in the Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. In this sense, Küçükyılmaz, 
contrary to the old regime, talks about peace between society and state in the new 
Turkey:  
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The biggest difference between the new Turkey and the old one is that 
extremisms and marginalities are now gathered in a balance center and 
the society, whose common ground expanded, has produced a will to 
construct a powerful future together with the state. While the secular way 
of governing which is discriminative, patronizing and dominating vanished 
together with problems it had generated, the New Turkey order, in which 
all sections of the society have found a place, is being established on the 
basis of democracy. All sections who want to exist legitimately can find a 
place in this reconstructed democratic social center (Küçükyılmaz, 
06.04.2013, Sabah Perspektif). 
 
New Turkey discourse here is grounded with the discourses of democratization and 
pluralization, and Küçükyılmaz criticisizes the old regime as being secular, dominating 
and segregating. In fact, as can be inferred from the other columns about the Kurdish 
question, there is a dialectical relationship between the new Turkey and peace-building. 
Different from the discourse of tutelage, there is no consensus on whether the new 
Turkey is an outcome of peace-building or whether the peace itself is an outcome of the 
new Turkey. Rather, the usual approach is that the new Turkey is taken for granted and 
that peace in the Kurdish question should be its intrinsic condition. Yet, according to 
Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, who already mentioned the ‘declaration of the new Turkey’ 
several times in different contexts, AKP’s Diyarbakır meeting was this time the ‘official’ 
declaration of the new Turkey: 
 
The point to which Ahmet Kaya case reach today is one of the indicators 
of the transformation of Turkey in 5 years. The persistent struggle of 
Gülten Kaya herself for justice played an important role in this current 
situation of Kaya case. Therefore, official declaration of the New Turkey in 
Diyarbakır in 13th anniversary of murder of Ahmet Kaya is very meaningful. 
That historical date which the Prime Minister intentionally chose, 16 
November, is a turning point (Kütahyalı, 23.11.2013, Sabah).  
 
Referring to Erdoğan’s speech in the meeting, Kütahyalı points out to the connection 
between Ahmet Kaya and the new Turkey. That Ahmet Kaya was chosen to be mentioned 
as a symbolic actor in the peace process is not by chance. Ahmet Kaya was exposed to 
systematic nationalist offenses at the end of the 1990s and had to leave Turkey. He died 
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in 2000 when he was living in France. Therefore, considering both the period, the 1990s, 
and and the actors who had participated in those offenses, Erdoğan and AKP-engaged 
intellectuals associated his death with the old Turkey. This approach is reflected in the 
media and many columnists like Kütahyalı often mention the Ahmet Kaya case as 
something which should never happen in the new Turkey. 
 
4.2. Period between 2014 and 2016 
Considering the significant changes in the political field it is safe to say that the pledges 
of the new Turkey have collapsed. Even so, new Turkey discourse has been maintained 
in different forms. Making a periodical division is inevitable for an analytical treatment, 
as the second half of 2013 witnessed significant incidents which reshaped the political 
tendencies. They were the Gezi Park protests and the 17-25 December case, which were 
considered by the AKP government as coup d’état attempts.  
 
Briefly, the Gezi Park protests began on 28 May 2013 as a reaction to the government’s 
declaration about the construction of an artillery barracks in the area of Gezi Park. With 
the arrival of heavy machines at the park to cut down trees, a group of people gathered 
in the park with ecological concerns to protest the government’s action. According to 
Cihan Tuğal, “when police brutality cracked down on several dozen protestors who 
wanted to protect the last green area (Gezi Parkı) near Taksim, popular determination to 
save this park initiated the biggest spontaneous revolt in Turkish history” (Tuğal, 2016, 
p. 204). In a short while, protests spread to the whole country and clashes ensued. 
Increasing police violence caused the deaths of seven people during the protests. The 
incidents lasted for over a month before the government withdrew their plan on Gezi 
Park.  
 
Towards the end of the year, the AKP government was challenged once more, this time 
with the claims of corruption known in the media as ‘the case of 17-25 December’. As 
Tuğal identified, “Gülen-connected prosecutors rained down thousands of pages of 
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corruption accusations on Erdoğan and his coterie” (Tuğal, 2016, p. 216). In the end, the 
government identified this initiative as a ‘jurisdictional coup’ and associated this 
‘operation’ with the Gülenist organization, a secret organization in the state; therefore, 
some prosecutors and police officers were then displaced. During that period, the 
National Security Council (MGK) took a decision to approach this organization as the 
‘parallel state’ or ‘parallel structure’. 
 
My intention is not to go into details of these cases; rather, I want to show the political 
conditions and contexts in which the gradual transformation of the new Turkey discourse 
began. The Gezi Park protests initially were supported even by people aligned with the 
AKP; however, both the emphasis in the media on the violent acts of the protestors and 
the securitization of discourse towards protests which was produced by the government 
led to a new perception. Also, after the 17-25 December case, these separate cases were 
packed as ‘actions aimed at overthrowing the government’. Tuğal points out that “the 
Islamic press interpreted Gezi and Gülenis assault as a combined neocon-Israeli 
conspiracy planned in advance. This interpretation consoled the AKP’s base” (Tuğal, 2016, 
p. 217). The latter case was the ultimate point of conflict between the AKP and the 
Gülenist organization. The abstaining manner in AKP from this organization since 2012 
(the case of MIT crisis) has crystallized henceforth. It started to be defined as the parallel 
state because of its positioning in the Turkish state and thus was counted as an old 
Turkey actor. 
 
The perception of the Gezi protests and the case of 17-25 December signalled a new 
agenda for the AKP. Claims of pluralism and democratization gave way to securitization 
policies. AKP members and AKP-engaged intellectuals in the media declared so many 
times that the new Turkey, as a conjugate of the AKP, was under the threat. As ‘the old 
Turkey coalition’ expanded, the government’s perception of threat also broadened 
correspondingly. Therefore, to re-consolidate his power, Erdoğan initiated a new 
strategy aiming at escalating polarization in the political field. Tuğal identifies Gezi and 
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17-25 December case, which have changed the course of politics, as respectively “the 
dagger in the front” and “the dagger from within”, and he argues that “the AKP regime 
is now much more based on coercion than it was during its first eleven years in power. 
In that sense, it is less hegemonic. It has further consolidated its base and power bloc, 
but it has done so at the expense of the ongoing purges of secular and Islamic liberals” 
(Tuğal, 2016, p. 217). It is safe to say that dispersion of the hegemonic bloc influenced 
the modalities of the political discourse.   
 
For this study, it can be observed that this change of strategy reflected upon new Turkey 
discourse in the newspaper columns in three ways: first, in the replacement of the old 
Turkey with new constitutive others, especially with the discourse of ‘global forces’; 
second, in the emergence of imperial discourse composed of conspiracy-like arguments; 
and third, in the adaptation of new Turkey discourse to the presidential system. Of 
course, the argument of this paper is not that discourses on democratization, 
pluralization or peace-building suddenly melted away. Some columnists continued to 
mention these topics in this period: Bayramoğlu (12.07.2014, Erdoğan’ın Yeni Türkiye 
Planı [Erdogan’s New Turkey Plan], Yeni Şafak), Mahçupyan (31.03.2015, Yeni Türkiye (1) 
[The New Turkey (1)], Akşam& 09.04.2015, Yeni Türkiye (4): Toplum [The New Turkey (4): 
Society], Akşam) and Kütahyalı (20.11.2014, Yeni Türkiye’nin İstanbul Tasavvuru [The 
New Turkey’s Envision of Istanbul], Sabah) emphasize plural character of the new Turkey; 
Esayan (16.02.2015, Ankara Palas’ta Başbakan’la Bir Yeni Türkiye Buluşması [A New 
Turkey Meeting in Ankara Palace with the Prime Minister], Yeni Şafak), Altınok 
(26.10.2014, Etyen Mahçupyan Yeni Türkiye’ye İyi Gelecek [Etyen Mahcupyan will be 
Good for the New Turkey], Türkiye) and Kütahyalı (29.08.2014, Yeni Çankaya Yeni 
Türkiye’yi Kuracak [The New Çankaya will Establish the New Turkey], Sabah& 28.10.2014, 
Yeni Türkiye Alevileri Kazanmak Zorunda [The New Turkey Has to Involve Alevis], Sabah) 
talks about conditions of the minorities; and Esayan (22.03.2015, Barış ve Yeni Türkiye 
En Kritik Safhasında [Peace and The New Turkey are in the Most Critical Phase], Yeni 
Şafak& 23.03.2015, Yeni Türkiye’nin Formülü ve Kandilin Tercihi [Formula of The New 
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Turkey and Qandil’s Choice], Yeni Şafak), Bayramoğlu (12.07.2014, Erdoğan’ın Yeni 
Türkiye Planı [Erdogan’s New Turkey Plan], Yeni Şafak& 16.05.2014, Yeni Türkiye’ye 
Doğru (1) [Towards The New Turkey (1)], Yeni Şafak& 17.05.2014, Yeni Türkiye’ye Doğru 
(2) [Towards The New Turkey (2)], Yeni Şafak) , Özhan (21.03.2015, Nevruz, Eski Mesaj 
ve Yeni Türkiye [Nowruz, Old Message and The New Turkey], Star& 10.06.2014, PKK, 
Silahsızlanma ve Yanlış Sorular [PKK, Disarmament and Wrong Questions], Star), Dalay 
(05.07.2014, Temsil Krizinden Temsil Gücüne Yeni Türkiye’nin Cumhurbaşkanı [From the 
Representation Crisis to the Representation Power The President of the Republic of The 
New Turkey] , Star Açık Görüş) and Selvi (20.10.2014, Yeni Türkiye, Eski Kandil [The New 
Turkey, The Old Qandil], Yeni Şafak) write about their expectations on the peace process. 
 
Yet all these expectations were overshadowed by the discourse of vigilance and grand 
narratives on imperial claims. In other words, democratization was subordinated to the 
securitization of the state and to the desire of being a ‘world’ state. In this last section, I 
am going to portray how new Turkey discourse and its constitutive others have 
transformed and how such discourse has shifted from positive politics to anti-politics. In 
this part, new Turkey discourse is placed on and constructed through new categories of 
perception which enable the discourse to fit the new political conjuncture.  
 
4.2.1. Change of the New Turkey’s Constitutive Other 
4.2.1.1. New Tutelage Front against the Popular Will 
In this period, what we observe is the replacement of Kemalism with the ‘parallel state’ 
in terms of the tutelage connections of the old Turkey. However, the parallel state is not 
perceived as the generator of tutelage as it was in Kemalism discourse. Instead, it is 
regarded as a part of a much more sophisticated tutelage center. To put it another way, 
what is at stake in this period is the fact that discourse of tutelage becomes a signified 
whose signifier is not definite or overdetermined. It was easy to identify the source of 
the tutelage before 2014 since Kemalism and militarism were functioning as a ‘master 
key’. After Gezi and the 17-25 December case, writers and commenters in the media 
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started to mention bureaucratic and jurisdictional tutelage instead of military tutelage. 
Furthermore, they refer usually to the unidentified notion of ‘tutelage centers’ which can 
only make sense when it is thought of in terms of the discourse of ‘global forces’ on 
which I am going to shed light in the following part.  
 
In the previous part, I went into how the discourse of tutelage works in the election 
periods. Similarly, between 2014 and 2016, columnists applied the same strategy in four 
elections and also in the change of the president of the republic. The presidential election 
on 10 August 2014 marked a new period in Turkish politics, since for the first time the 
president of the republic was chosen by the people as a consequence of the 2007 
referendum. In the elections, the AKP nominated Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the CHP and 
MHP nominated the joint candidate Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, and the HDP nominated 
Selahattin Demirtaş. The AKP side constructed their electioneering based on identifying 
Erdoğan with the people and associating the opposition candidates with pro-tutelage 
actors. Yasin Aktay, who was an academic and think-tank researcher and also who is still 
AKP deputy, reflects on his party’s strategy on his column before the election: 
 
The fact that the presidency of the republic were opened to the people, in 
other words, to the politics and discussion disturbs some people from the 
beginning is about the mindset and reflexes of the old Turkey. The fact that 
this mindset is carried by the current opposition parties is the great 
paradox of Turkey politics. It is their own problem that the opposition 
parties do not feel hopeful about the ballot box. But, this is also a problem 
which they meet a lot of difficulties to make the people pay the price for. 
The opposition parties, who desire that the people come to them without 
they change their position, eventually tried creatively all formulas of the 
democracy without people. The tutelage, which was established and 
maintained with the army and institutions of tutelage, became gradually 
dysfunctional in the assertive conditions of the New Turkey. Sociological 
conditions of AK Party and organic leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
invalidated all the attempts of tutelage recently. The attempt of joint 
candidate is a flutter of pro-tutelage mindset which is intrinsic the old 
Turkey (Aktay, 14.07.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
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According to him, the opposition parties with the old Turkey mindset are located against 
‘the people’. If I leave aside the general discussion on who is ‘the people’, it is clearly 
seen that AKP views that it alone represents ‘the people’. Random use of the notion of 
‘the people’ enables Aktay to produce a binary opposition on the axis of the people and 
pro-tutelage mindset. Interestingly enough, based on such categorical imposition, the 
strategic coalition between the CHP and MHP (joint candidate) is described as part of the 
old Turkey tutelage, although these two parties were merely entering into a fair 
democratic competition, just like the others. 
 
To emphasize the popular will in presidential elections amounts to another discursive 
strategy. Although military tutelage was supposedly overcome, it is accepted that the 
presidency of the republic as an institution still has the residue of the tutelage. Then, the 
election rather than the appointment of the president would mean a precursor of the 
new Turkey. In other words, the triumph of popular will would register the birth of the 
new Turkey. In this sense, a new categorical dichotomy is set to work: the elected and 
the appointed. I argued before that the new Turkey discourse draws its strength from its 
comparison with the past. Galip Dalay, who is a think-tank researcher, and Taha Özhan 
talk about the pro-tutelage character of the old Turkey's presidency:  
 
In the former system, which was designed as the guard of the tutelage 
regime and as the equilibrant against the elected ones, the basic quality, 
which is looked for in the presidential bid, used to consist of his/her 
relationship with this pro-tutelage ideology and his/her passion towards 
defending the system based on this ideology (Dalay, 05.07.2014, Star Açık 
Görüş). 
 
Moreover, presidency of the republic, which was codified as the ultimate 
position of the tutelage regime, has been neither impartial nor symbolic in 
a negative or positive way. For years, harsh representation of the 
constitutive ideology has been called as ‘symbolic’, whereas protection of 
the tutelage regime at the expense of crises has been called as 
‘impartiality’ (Özhan, 28.08.2014, Star).    
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The new ‘tutelage free’ structure of the presidency would combine with Erdoğan’s 
popular support, and this ‘perfect match’ corresponds to the sacredness of being elected. 
This implies the reduction of democracy to only being elected by the people. Also 
perceiving every oppositional action by relating it with the pro-tutelage mindset 
strategically delimits the field of politics. Therefore, Erdoğan’s presidency would basically 
mean a victory against tutelage. This strategy also has the power to categorize critiques 
directed to AKP and Erdoğan on the basis of elections. Yiğit Bulut, who is the key advisor 
of Prime Minister Erdoğan, defends the AKP and Erdoğan by emphasizing the virtue of 
being elected:  
 
Recently, those, who attacked immodestly to ‘Turkish State and 
Government, to the elected leader, and to the popular will’ in the 
newspapers they manage, in the columns they write and in the TV 
programs they make by cooperating in any case, are resigning voluntarily 
one by one. Word, lie, slander, blackmail and montage; to put it simply, 
apparatus is over for them! (Bulut, 03.08.2014, Star). 
 
The discourses of the ‘elected leader’ and ‘popular will’ act as a shield against critiques. 
Bulut talks about the ‘attacks’ in the media against the AKP and Erdoğan before the 
presidential elections and points out the ‘parallel state’ as an agent that applies 
aspersion, blackmail, etc. Given that those offenses exist in some cases; nevertheless, on 
the one hand, discursive choices such as popular will and being elected, on the other 
hand, wording like parallel state and ‘attacks’ may serve to fixation of the political 
positions. In this sense, this discourse can only belong to the criminal field, not to politics. 
Therefore, it restrains the field of political movement of the oppositional parties. 
 
Use of the notions like ‘the nation’, ‘the people’, and ‘popular will’ on behalf of the AKP 
and Erdoğan became increasingly visible after the presidential elections. Also, all these 
concepts which fetishize ‘being elected’ were accepted as the kernel of the new Turkey. 
Reconstruction of the new Turkey once more is located upon the principles of anti-
tutelage. As Taha Özhan argues, Erdoğan’s presidency would mean the closure of the old 
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Turkey (28.08.2014, Star), which has already been claimed many times subsequent to 
each election. Moreover, both Özhan and Kütahyalı claim that the election strengthened 
the power of the nation and popular will in the new Turkey:   
 
With take-over today, Erdoğan, whose identity and past was registered 
through the choices of the nation, is becoming the president of the republic. 
If he wants to participate again in the election after 5 years, he has to 
appeal again to the nation to get their favor. Erdoğan is receiving the 
presidency of the republic from the state in the name of the nation. After 
10 August, the nation strengthened its place in the center of the new 
Turkey. The address and the method was shown for all who want to do 
constitutive politics (Özhan, 28.08.2014, Star). 
 
28 August 2014 is the first day when Çankaya was shaped through the will 
of the majority of the nation and this will was manifested in Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan. The New Turkey Republic was also officially declared with 
Erdoğan moved to Çankaya (Kütahyalı, 29.08.2014, Sabah). 
 
While Özhan says that Erdoğan receives the presidency in the name of the nation, 
Kütahyalı goes one step further and claims that Erdoğan’s presidency is the declaration 
of the foundation of the New Turkey Republic. The common opinion among columnists 
is that the AKP had been challenged by pro-tutelage actors until the presidential election. 
It is not a coincidence that the columnists picture every election as a battle between the 
AKP and illegitimate/illegal groups. The characterization of the opposition as the old 
Turkey actors who operationalize the tutelage system naturalizes the perception that the 
AKP succeeds in reflecting popular sovereignty despite all illegal interferences. Gezi 
protests and 17-25 December case were conceptualized in this way to indicate new 
constitutive others of the new Turkey. Esayan mentions these cases by comparing them 
with the 28 February period in his column titled “Yeni Türkiye’ye Hoşgeldiniz” [Welcome 
to the New Turkey] in which he talks about the role of the people and Erdoğan in the 
abolition of the ‘new tutelage’: 
 
In fact, we are experiencing a miracle which cannot be underestimated. In 
Gezi crisis and 17-25 coup, I looked at the situation, I saw how new 
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tutelage is powerful, how it spread everywhere and how it cultivated in 
each field, and I said “Erdoğan has gone!” Because, normally it has to be 
like this. I knew also this going will take a short time just as 28 February 
which was said that it would last millennium...But, in this interregnum, we 
would pay great prices as it was in 1990s after Özal [...] It did not like this... 
30 March and the election yesterday also announced the victory of that 
(Esayan, 11.08.2014, Yeni Şafak).   
  
After the presidential election the same strategy continued among columnists. Etyen 
Mahçupyan alluded to Gülen’s parallel organization by referring to the non-politic 
attempts based on claims of corruption to hurt the AKP (07.10.2014, AKP Döneminin 
Basit Gerçekleri, Akşam) [Simple Facts of AKP Period], Burhanettin Duran claimed that 
pro-tutelage groups instrumentalized the Gezi protests, 17 December case, and Kobani 
demonstrations to overthrow government (17.10.2014, Yeni Türkiye İmkanının 
Tehlikeleri, Sabah) [Dangers of the Possibility of the New Turkey], and Erdal Tanas 
Karagöl alerted before the general election in 2015, against those who organized Gezi 
protests and 17-25 December ‘coup’ (02.04.2015, Hedef Türkiye’nin Siyasi ve Ekonomik 
İstikrarı, Yeni Şafak) [Political and Economic Stability of Turkey Become the Target]. At 
the same time, these attempts are located in a global context, and in that way the subject 
of the discourse of ‘the enemy’ becomes gradually ambiguous. 
 
4.2.1.2. Discourse of the ‘Global Forces’ 
What dominates post-2013 Turkish politics is the discourse of internal and external 
forces which relocate the new Turkey approaches from domestic politics to the 
international realm. Instruments of the discursive struggle against Kemalism were 
definite: the AKP and Erdoğan utilized the discourse of liquidation of military tutelage 
and demilitarization of politics to fortify their power over state. Yet the Gezi protests and 
17-25 December were not cases which the AKP was able to approach with the 
instruments of demilitarization or democratization. Rather, the AKP perceived those as 
coups and extended the list of actors behind them up to the international connections. 
Both discourse of tutelage and discourse of global forces were operationalized together 
as a political strategy. The discourse of tutelage, on the one hand, functions against 
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oppositional parties mostly in the election periods; on the other hand, the discourse of 
global forces was uttered whenever the AKP encountered a challenging condition. In this 
sense, the discourse of global forces is the more encompassing and also includes the 
discourse of tutelage. Before the presidential elections, Yiğit Bulut talks about the 
‘internal and external coconspirators’: 
 
A reminder for those who try to test our right to life and those who will 
want to test it again; as long as this state and nation keep taking a step 
with the determination to shape a centuries old future, domestic and 
external coconspirators will be pale in comparison with this standing... 
Note: Post-10 August period will be more difficult for “the certain ones, 
parallels, coconspirators, domestic proxies and their Masters”... (Bulut, 
03.08.2014, Star). 
 
As can be seen in the quotation, Bulut refers to a concept of the enemy which is 
intentionally left indefinite. By using the discourse of ‘parallels’, he certainly means the 
Gülenist in-state/parallel organization but as only a part of a bigger coalition which is 
guided by the ‘Masters’ outside. One day later in another column, Bulut similarly 
mentions those forces who want to prevent Turkey’s development (04.08.2014, Star). 
Bulut’s discursive strategy is more inclined to conspiracy-like argumentation than other 
columnists. Yet, regardless of habitus and fields, there emerged a tendency to apply 
conspiracy among the columnists when security concerns started to haunt the political 
field. İbrahim Karagül also, in a very similar manner with Bulut, declared the new Turkey’s 
power against global forces and ‘international projects’:  
 
So, is the New Turkey a hollow slogan? Is it a language for mass 
communication in accordance with the daily accounts of a political party? 
If so, this nation and all of us will be disappointed. But it is not like that. It 
should not be like that and it will not. Because, the history forces us. The 
geography forces us. Our selves and identities force us. In the presence of 
this comprehension, we will not let any world power and international 
project make us step back and lower our head (Karagül, 30.08.2014, Yeni 
Şafak). 
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A more ambiguous image of the enemy opens a path to reconstruct public opposition in 
terms of the ‘we’ and ‘they’ dualism. When a columnist talks about an indefinite ‘third 
person plural’, he does not need to specify who consists of that ‘they’. Such wording, like 
a package, enables columnists to freely codify the opposition or social movements as 
enemies of the new Turkey and in that way, they are criminalized before the public 
opinion. This strategy is apparent in Markar Esayan’s articles both after the presidential 
election in 2014 and before the general election on 7 June 2015:  
       
Because, in Gezi crisis and the process of 17-25 December Coup, the main 
purpose was to break Erdoğan’s connection with his party and to split the 
party. They relied on deputies of (Gülen) community in the party, 
dissatisfaction of the deputies who completed three periods, and feeling 
of horror which was produced in these two crisis. Dominant crisis would 
have stupefied the party and dropped Erdoğan’s guard, and the separation 
would have taken place. Any kind of madness including picking a civil war 
was ventured (Esayan, 28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
[...] Now this grassroots movement based on less Westernized 
disadvantaged religious section reached to the limit. The limits of us and 
the West... The limit of the West necessitated them to start a war against 
this movement and its leader with the slogan of “Enough! The people 
should not have a say anymore!” In fact, Cain wants to annihilate Abel 
again. Either we will pass this threshold or will be dispersed towards an 
uncertain process. But, the history will never repeat itself. [...]That the 
whole world took position against this grassroots movement is because of 
the the fact that the world will re-find the change where it already 
experienced the change in 1914. Ottoman was a reality and shaped the 
world. Our collective memory is calling us to the place where the incident 
happened. The murderer is also there. We encountered and we cannot 
turn back anymore (Esayan, 07.06.2015, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Here, Esayan utilizes the passive voice to emphasize intention of the enemy but not the 
enemy itself. He perceives the ‘Gezi crisis’ and ‘17-25 December coup’ as a part of a 
bigger plan which could cause even a civil war. In the latter quotation, Esayan points to 
‘the West’ and the whole world as if they all are against this ‘grassroots movement’. 
Apart from the ‘whole world’, even ‘the West’ is not a clear-cut concept. The discursive 
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construction of the whole world and the West as an enemy and comparison with 1914 
reveals Esayan’s strategy, which is to reconceptualize the general election as if it were a 
real war. This strategy has everything to do with the changing perception of the new 
Turkey after the vital political crisis in 2013. As I mentioned earlier, new Turkey discourse 
has been transformed from claims of democratization and peace-building to total 
struggle against internal and external challengers of the state (or the new Turkey). This 
situation of paranoia strengthens the polarization politics of the AKP and constrains 
politics once more on the axis of national power and global forces. To put it another way, 
this cannot be called politics anymore, since it imposes a permanent situation of vigilance. 
As İbrahim Karagül claims, even power struggle in Turkey does not have local motivations, 
but rather should be seen as a part of global operation against rising of Erdoğan and the 
new Turkey:    
 
[...] There will emerge also an extraordinary resistance. Did this resistance 
already drag Turkey into crisis to crisis? In fact, the fight, which we saw as 
the domestic power struggle, is happening right here. Gezi uprising, 
encouraging Alevis to the riot, and de facto involvement of the ‘ally’ 
Western intelligences in this organization was the struggle of stopping the 
transformation in Turkey and its march to the future. While doing so, the 
masses were provoked with a great anger towards Erdoğan on the basis 
of terror in streets and dignity of Erdoğan was targeted. Erdoğan would 
be fallen out of favor with the people of Turkey, the pioneers of this great 
march would be eliminated together with Erdoğan, and the country would 
be squeezed in a nation-state pattern which is intrinsic to 20th century by 
being caged again in the borders of Anatolia […] In other words, both 
Turkey and the geography would be kept away from this new political 
rising and power accumulation, and tutelage and hegemony would 
maintain (Karagül, 20.01.2015, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Where Karagül targets Western Intelligence services, Özhan emphasizes Western-
oriented oppositional discourse and resorts to the analogy of war, as the others did: 
 
On the other hand, the second axis, on the ground of mostly a secular 
political theology, is the oppositional discourse which was constructed 
through translation from the West. This approach which ‘shoots over the 
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shoulders of other capital cities to the government of its own country’ was 
much more uncontrolled (Özhan, 14.03.2015, Star).  
 
Considering the opposition as on the side of the global forces creates, one way or 
another, a perception of treachery. As is already clear, one can see the discourse of global 
forces in any case in which the AKP government faced challenges. Same strategy can be 
traced in particular cases. After the Soma disaster in which 301 mineworkers died 
because of a fire in a coal mine, Markar Esayan talked about those who wanted to start 
a civil war by abusing the disaster: 
 
There is a serious psychological warfare in the social and certain media. 
They went as far as even to write about their wishes to pick a civil war. The 
aim is to oppress the people under the feeling of anger, violence, fear and 
horror, and to unbalance the politics. It this is achieved, we surrender to 
chaos and this chaos always avails to the unfavorable side. Difficulty of 
those periods, while fighting for the workers’ rights or the injustice, is not 
to be wasted by those who want to abuse this situation (Esayan, 
18.05.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Esayan evades the critiques which claim that disaster happened as a consequence of 
AKP’s neglect by generalizing abusive examples in the media and having recourse to 
conspiracy. Interestingly enough, Esayan continues his article by claiming that this is a 
war of sovereignty and that the AKP must take this ‘century-long oligarchy’ seriously. To 
define post-2013 new Turkey discourse, nothing can be a better example than this state 
of mind which can link the critiques directed to the AKP about the Soma disaster to the 
century-long oligarchy. In a similar way, after rescuing 49 hostages from ISIS (Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria) in the Mosul Consulate, while İbrahim Karagül refers to those 
who watch for an opportunity to make an uproar and who want to stop the rise of the 
new Turkey as a part of a bigger international project, according to Murat Çemrek, who 
is an academic and think-tank researcher, ISIS itself is a challenge against the new Turkey: 
 
What do you think those who busted MIT trucks and impose the idea of 
that ‘Turkey supports terror’ think about now? What do they feel? Which 
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project were they part of? Was there a relationship between hostage case 
and this raid? What kind of a relationship was there between making a 
fuss of that “Turkey supports ISIS” for months in the Western press and 
these raids? (Karagül, 21.09.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
Because, the existence of ISIS in itself is a challenge against the New Turkey 
which was produced in consequence of reshaping Turkish foreign policy by 
AK Party governments. In fact, what does this happenings mean other 
than the questioning of the New Turkey with ISIS? (Çemrek, 27.09.2014, 
Star Açık Görüş).  
  
There is no single sphere in which the discourse of global forces did not spread. Before 
2013, the obstacle before the peace process was Kemalism and the old Turkey. Yet 
Esayan talks about internal and external tutelage structures (22.03.2015, Barış ve Yeni 
Türkiye En Kritik Safhasında [Peace and The New Turkey are in the Most Critical Phase], 
Yeni Şafak) and several intelligence services directed by a ‘superior mind’ who want to 
sabotage the peace process and the new Turkey (23.03.2015, Yeni Türkiye’nin Formülü 
ve Kandil’in Tercihi [Formula of The New Turkey and Qandil’s Choice], Yeni Şafak). 
Especially after 2015, from the bottom to the top of the government, many columnists 
and commenters in the media, regardless of their status, adopted the discourse of the 
‘superior mind’. Cases which cannot be explained with established conceptual tools are 
associated with this concept of the ‘enemy without a marker’. Likewise, the discourse of 
‘superior mind’ signifies a hypervigilant mode of thinking and a continuous state of 
emergency for the political field. As the name implies, ‘superior mind’ is the acceptance 
of the idea that a certain subject -it may be a country, a group, or an organization- is 
superior to all others, and therefore that it is capable of designing the whole world 
system. Moreover, this subject is never identified, because its power comes from this 
unidentifiability. To use the discourse of superior mind functions both to abdicate 
responsibility in any inefficacy of the AKP and also to make people gather around 
Erdoğan and the AKP against the attacks of that superior mind. 
 
Yiğit Bulut is one of the pioneers of that strategy. Different from the other columnists, 
Bulut has usually talked about the financial forces arrayed against the new Turkey since 
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he was promoted to president Erdoğan’s chief advisor responsible for the economy in 
2014. To portray the threats against Erdoğan and the new Turkey, he uses different 
descriptions. Besides the rhetoric of ‘superior mind’, ‘external forces’ and ‘global 
operations’, Bulut talked about the ‘interest rate lobby’ many times in TV programs, 
columns, and interviews after Erdoğan brought forward the manipulative influence of 
this lobby and its relation with the Gezi Park protests. The interest rate lobby, like the 
superior mind, is an enemy of Turkey which cannot be defined by referring to particular 
subjects. In his article after the general election on 1 October 2015, Bulut signals the 
defeat of the ‘dark order’ which feeds on financial manipulations: 
 
My dear friends, don’t be scared! Take it easy but don’t be relax! Those 
dark days and the equations in which political outcomes were obtained 
through economic-financial manipulations will not come back once more... 
The DARK ORDER, which they established, was destroyed irrecoverably 
and the new EQUATION and ORDER, in which the real owners of this 
country produce and get fair share from their production, is establishing... 
[...] The ‘spoiled children’ of Turkey assume that THIS ORDER goes like that 
and they pocket again trillion dollars under the name of trivial interest, 
commission etc. by RAISING POLITICAL UNREST... (Bulut, 23.11.2015, Star). 
 
Also, in different columns, Bulut ‘reveals’ different economic forces that are operating 
against local production. According to Bulut, the new great Turkey's power will be based 
on the development of ‘local and national’ producers. He appeals to the very common-
sensical argument: “we can produce local products but it is blocked”. This strategy can 
be traced in two different columns: 
 
The truths, which I tried to write above but told only one percent of, 
become notorious among our all producers whom we call “Anatolian 
(economic) capital” which is “out of the borders of Byzantium” and they 
proceed on their way by choosing a strategy like “let it be small, let them 
not intervene with us, let us feel comfortable”. Those, who stay in the 
borders of Byzantium, furnish the money through AB treatises and keep 
TÜSİAD and TOBB, do not give the life chance to these men (Bulut, 
25.07.2014, Star).  
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Turkish firms can produce “from mobile phone to a lot of products which 
we bought with a price of billions of dollars for the defense industry”, but 
they do not want to get involve into the way of “branding, emerging, 
growing and competing” as a result of fears, pressures, and direct-indirect 
sanctions. As I also wrote above, they are BEWARING OF. Dear friends, 
let’s ask at this point: Where, whom and how does the pressure come 
from? The pressures are domestic and foreign! (Bulut, 27.03.2015, Star). 
 
Bulut imposes a vision based on categories of a Byzantine and an Anatolian capital, and 
in that way, he indicates the internal and external structures which work against the new 
Turkey economy. Using of the concept of Byzantium is not a coincidence: It implies both 
what is called ‘Istanbul capital’ (Istanbul sermayesi) and its international connections. In 
other words, the conflict between the Anatolian capital and the Byzantine (Istanbul) 
capital represents the competition in the market between local firms whose owners are 
mostly conservative and religious people and Istanbul-centered companies whose 
owners are usually seen as secular and as engaged with the old Turkey. Accordingly, local 
producers cannot compete with foreign economic powers because of pressures and 
sanctions which aim to stop Turkey’s economic growth.  
 
Bulut also speaks of a bigger system which has the ability to control the media, military, 
and economy. According to him, all these interventions were made to design Turkey 
since the beginning of the republic until Erdoğan came to power. Interestingly, Bulut 
blames this foreign coalition for military tutelage in Turkey:  
 
In 1980, the same system worked again and the ORDER, which trapped 
Turkey again through the “soldier’s bayonet” in 1960, this time used the 
same means. We witnessed that the method in the period between 1980 
and 2003 was simplified, but the structure worked exactly the same 
including 28 February and attempts of electronic coup. The core of the 
system was always the same: the elements such as “the order outside-the 
derivative proxies inside, created media-virtual public opinion” shaped 
Turkey in a way as they want by also using the army as the LAST IRONER 
(son ütücü) (Bulut, 31.08.2014, Star).  
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Indeed, in many of the columns after 2013, the emphasis on Kemalism as ‘responsible 
for the sins of the past’ evaporated. Bulut talks about the military tutelage as a kind of 
‘proxy’ of the external powers. The notion of ‘the order’, which Bulut writes in capital 
letters, substitutes for all the images of the enemy which I have discussed so far.  In 
another column, his choices of the word to define the enemy become differentiated: 
 
6- Today also SOME MEMBERSHIP AND ALLIANCE processes, which are 
pumped by the “placed thinkers-speakers-writers” in the Turkish public 
opinion, is the continuation of the same “trick” as long as THEY ARE NOT 
GROUNDED. The greatest success of Mr. Erdoğan is ‘his realization of this 
trick’ and his decisive actions to make Turkey ORGANIC by taking the 
INORGANIC one out of the pot. 7- Ergenekon and similar organizations 
mean to stop ESTABLISHED MECHANISMS, which was constructed by the 
English and recently the Germans, by saying that “let this system not 
deteriorate, let it stay in the pot, let us use it whatever we want and, let it 
not plant by returning to the soil” and mean to take the hands of the 
ESTABLISHMENT “suffocating us”, off our throat... (Bulut, 09.11.2014, 
Star). 
 
This text includes the historical ‘German and English plot’ against Turkey and Erdoğan’s 
success in ruining their plans. It is worth recalling that both texts were written after the 
presidential election in which Erdoğan won. Here, what Bulut calls inorganic Turkey 
substitutes for the old Turkey and signifies a break with its essence and a sort of 
dependency on foreign countries. Conversely, organic Turkey is a reflection of the new 
Turkey and marks its independent and essential character. Finally, this reveals another 
categorical antagonism, which is between organic and inorganic. As a continuation of the 
concept of the order, Bulut conceptualizes ‘the establishment’, again in capital letters, 
to show what made Turkey inorganic in the past. Of course, what is to be done to point 
out changing enemies by both Yiğit Bulut and all the other columnists which are 
mentioned in this section is a herald of one last strategy, which is a discourse of imperial 
claims consisting of grand narratives, as I am going to show in the next section.   
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4.2.2. Imperial Claims: Discourse of Restoration of the Republic or Symbolic Re-
foundation of the Ottoman Empire 
Turkey, led by the ELECTED PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC-CHIEF 
COMMANDER, departed to define “a new concept of national defense 
which is worthy of the world state” and is elaborating it technically! 
Frankly, Turkey now “came into play” in every field. Since this departure 
will discomfort those who want to push in the one, which “broke the shell 
of itself”; a new “NATIONAL STRATEGY”, which suits the departure, should 
be developed and is being developed very meticulously and faster.. (Bulut, 
01.09.2014, Star). 
 
This quotation from Bulut’s column is a good way of summarizing what I am going to 
discuss in this section. It covers almost all elements of the thematic changes of the new 
Turkey discourse. The expansion of the constitutive others of the new Turkey from 
domestic actors to international actors had an influence on the claims of the new Turkey. 
While the new Turkey had been a name of a democratization project based on 
demilitarization, it shifted to the discursive instrument of bigger claims after the end of 
2013. The globalization of Turkey’s enemies means the globalization of the new Turkey 
itself. Therefore, the content of new Turkey discourse becomes fantasized as it becomes 
globalized. Furthermore, the new Turkey started to represent a desire to turn back to 
the ‘old’ times when the Ottoman Empire was powerful. More clearly, the period after 
2013 is a period of will to have a voice in world politics again, just as it was in the Ottoman 
case. In this period, the concern is not to re-establish the Ottoman Empire in a real sense; 
instead, the Ottoman Empire is used allegorically to portray claims of the new Turkey in 
the direction of 2023. 
 
In the light of this background narrative, I am going to show different strategies and 
perceptions which shape new Turkey discourse: On the one hand, the claims of the new 
Turkey turn out to be grand narratives such as the discourse of civilization, discourse of 
the ideal (dava söylemi), restoration of the republic, becoming a world state and global 
power, etc. On the other hand, there is the discourse of cult of leadership accompanied 
by presidential elections.  
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4.2.2.1. Analogy of the First World War 
The candidacy of Erdoğan in presidential elections is presented as the beginning of a new 
era for Turkey. This is the period which is mostly compared with the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire in respect to the First World War. One hundred years after the 
beginning of the war, Erdoğan’s presidency is seen as a chance to recover from a 100-
year old break in Turkish history. In this sense, new Turkey discourse is produced as a 
continuation of the Ottoman period, and interestingly enough, 2014 is regarded as the 
end of an era which began with the war in 1914. Both Kütahyalı and Karagül appeal to 
the same comparison before the election:  
 
In this confusion, nobody paid attention to the young with black hair who 
were moving around there. 19-years old Gavrilo Princip was one of 6 
organization members who is determined to kill Arşidük. Princip quickly 
drew his pistol, walked and approached to back of the car stopping and 
fired two shots. The first bullet hit Arşidük by the neck and pierced his neck 
vein. The other bullet hit the stomach of the duchess. It was exactly 10:50. 
This incident, which happened 100 years ago today, was the last straw. 
The biggest war, which history of humankind witnessed, started that day. 
We declared that we take place in this war at 29 October 1914.  29 October 
1914 was sort of the date of death of the Ottoman. 9 years later, a brand-
new Turkey state would be born in again a day of 29 October. Now, also 
100 years after 1914, we are experiencing the birth pains of the Republic 
of the New Turkey (Kütahyalı, 28.06.2014, Sabah).  
 
Prime Minister Erdoğan, in the presentation of the Document of Vision 
which was prepared for his Presidential candidacy, was especially 
emphasizing the fact that the republic had been founded after Ottoman 
and Seljuk Empire and he was being strongly applauded. The First World 
War. A century passed over it. Within this time period, 100 years after the 
incident, which had started the war that Anatolian people and near 
abroad fought over, the slogans of the “New Turkey”, the “Vanguard 
Turkey”, the “Great Turkey”... (Karagül, 12.07.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
According to Kütahyalı, just like the foundation of the republic, we are experiencing the 
birth pain of the new Turkey state. Again, he uses the discourse of the new Turkey as if 
a new state is being established. İbrahim Karagül, on the other side, emphasizes the same 
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war but does so by referring to the Erdoğan’s speech from the ‘document of vision’. The 
presidential election campaign of Erdoğan started with this ‘document of vision’, which 
includes the objectives of the new Turkey. As Karagül mentions, it designates a vision of 
a new and great Turkey as a world leader for the election. Furthermore, the document 
of vision indicates symbolic years such as 2023, 2053 and 2071, which imply respectively 
the centenary of the foundation of the republic, the anniversary of the conquest of 
İstanbul, and that of the battle of Manzikert after which Turks settled in Anatolia. Of 
course, this document of vision also influenced the way new Turkey discourse is uttered. 
Departing from democratization and demilitarization, the AKP and Erdoğan re-
conceptualized the new Turkey in an imperial manner. After 2013, as I discussed in the 
previous sections, the AKP’s recourse to the discourse of nationalization against ‘non-
national’ opponents brought about a discourse of returning back to ‘our essence’, which 
eventually resulted in Ottoman references in politics. Hatice Karahan, who is an 
academic and think-tank researcher, points out the rise of the new Turkey by referring 
to statements of the second sultan of the Ottoman Empire:   
 
“Each state has two wings as material and spiritual. If these two wings are 
strong, victory never ceases. But, if one of the wings is broken, apart from 
the victory, the state cannot escape from falling”. This advice, which had 
been a lesson to Orhan Bey, later on has been spread to numerous 
generations for centuries. It has become a magical formula behind a great 
nation’s making a magnificent history. The advice, for that nation, rushes 
to help not only when the nation rises but also when its wing is broken. It 
becomes a sacred formula and provides to stand up and to fly. And that 
nation reaches today’s Turkey by crossing very long years and roads. The 
year is 2014... Ankara, the capital of the Republic of Turkey, is witnessing 
the hopeful and fresh efforts for modern conquest under the name of the 
“New Turkey” (Karahan, 23.08.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
What Karahan described as ‘the modern conquest’ is a reflection of the changing 
parameters of the new Turkey discourse. The notion of conquest draws a direct analogy 
with the Ottoman period and indicates the imperial vision of the new Turkey. Very 
similarly, one can observe the unification of the new Turkey discourse among columnists 
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on the basis of Ottoman references. Rahim Er, who is a journalist, also compares the 
current condition with 1914 and considers the new Turkey as an opportunity of 
reckoning with that period when the Ottoman Empire was defeated:    
 
One century ago, 1914 is the year when we lost the State of Osman’s 
Ancestry (Devleti âli Osman) which the West named as ‘empire’ as a 
mumpsimus. Everything was finished in the First World War. The following 
ones, Lozan and etc. is nothing other than the registration of the loss on 
the table. Today we are talking about what we were at 1914. It is a big 
accounting of the collective conscience [...] The issue of the New Turkey is 
deep. Both everyone and also the state elites should never overlook that 
the “New Turkey” is never the aim or the Red Apple (Kızıl Elma). The New 
Turkey is the entrance gate, gateway and security gate of 2023 the Great 
Turkey. 2023 the Great Turkey is also entrance gate of 26 August 2071 
Turkey the World State. Yes, it must be understood. Here we are saying 
the sentence which we assumed that it is anticipated: we happen to turn 
back to 30 March 1909, which is a date one day before 31 March. The 
Great state is a state which has the great dreams, targets, aims and long 
plans (Er, 05.09.2014, Türkiye). 
 
His column is full of symbolic dates which reflects the perception of the new Turkey as a 
continuation of the Ottoman period. Moreover, Rahim Er makes an analogy with a riot 
known as the 31 March Incident which was suppressed by the Committee of Union and 
Progress and resulted in the dethronement of Sultan Abdülhamit. He displays the 
historical imperative that the seeds of the new Turkey are rooted in the Ottoman spirit. 
The new Turkey is now perceived as a recovery of the First World War period. In this 
sense, being new is redefined with reference to the distant past and even 
instrumentalized on the way of becoming a world state. Therefore, when the Ottoman 
period is referred to in the context of the new Turkey, what is actually implied is not a 
political, social and cultural newness but a sort of resurrection of the Empire’s values. 
  
4.2.2.2. Restoration of the Republic  
Besides the perception of historical continuity with the Ottoman period, the new Turkey 
was operationalized as a restoration of the republic. Of course, this is not to argue that 
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the discourse of restoration is not independent from the Ottoman influence. With a small 
difference, restoration implies that the republic has been deviated from and should be 
re-established on the basis of local and national values. The republic as a nation-state is 
no longer seen as an adequate system to have an influence in global politics, especially 
in the Middle East. Instead, new Turkey discourse announces the reconceptualization of 
the republic as a world state. Yiğit Bulut compares the opportunity which the new Turkey 
is confronted after 100 years with the early republican period in terms of nation-building: 
 
[...] The Republic of Turkey has “identified a new living space” in the 
beginning of 1900s and has continued in this path for almost 100 years. 
Now we are in the beginning of 2000s, it has been 100 years and the 
identified space is too small for us now. Is there any solution other than 
identifying a new space? Or, instead of defining the NEW LIVING SPACE, is 
your choice to continue to stay in the “constructed barriers of fear” with 
an understanding of “be it small, be it belongs to some people”? Dear 
friends, those, who tried to create ‘a new state’ out of a legacy of the 
empire in the beginning of 1900, had to “identify a state and a nation” in 
conditions of war dynamics.  In their attempts, they made “identification” 
out of the residuals of a 700-year-old enormous empire and after they 
started to the endeavor of “nation-building”. The attempts were lacking 
but it was not possible to do better in those days. After 100 years, 
pendulum of the history fell on us again and “change of identifications” 
and expansion of their scope was unavoidable while the new world order 
is established. What is done today is JUST THAT. Turkey is DESTROYING 
THE WALLS in every field and is identifying a new living space for its “NEW 
CENTURY” (Bulut, 04.07.2014, Star). 
 
According to Bulut, this vision of the republic cannot comply with the ‘new world order’; 
therefore, there is a necessity of redefining a new life space for the new Turkey. In this 
period, what can be traced in the columns is an expansion of Turkey not in terms of 
homeland but in terms of claims and zone of influence. That is to say, since the notion of 
greatness is not countable and measurable, it symbolically functions to constitute a new 
understanding concerning the new Turkey claims as Turkey turned its direction to former 
Ottoman territories. The new Turkey then means to transcend the mental barriers of the 
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republic. Similar to Bulut’s manner, Markar Esayan considers Turkey as the Ottoman 
legacy and talks about historical necessity:   
  
Turkey is not an ordinary country. It is a residual of the empire which was 
multicultural and had multi vassals. And the world peace is still being 
threatened in the lands where The Ottoman had dominated once upon a 
time. We have an experience based on heavy costs we have paid. For this 
reason, one should not fall into the mistake of assuming that the 
independence process, which has taken place for the last 12 years, is only 
composed of Turkey. Turkey cannot escape from its role and 
responsibilities in its region even if it wants to do. In this sense, changing 
mentality of foreign politics is important. Turkey definitely will have an 
important role. It is about the fact that who will decide this role and in 
which mentality this role will be instrumentalized. We are not going to 
resurrect the Ottoman. It is not even possible. We are just making peace 
with our history and rehabilitating the 100 year-old amnesia period. We 
are also recalling ourselves, overcoming the alienation and complexes of 
100 years, and recalling our potential arising from our multiculturality and 
adapting them to today (Esayan, 16.07.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Esayan perceives the 12 years of the AKP power as an independence process. In this 
sense, the new Turkey means the rehabilitation of a 100-year-old alienation process. 
Esayan’s strategy is very common: The republican period is a break with the religious 
values of the Ottoman period and the AKP government brings back those values by 
reconciling the country with its history. In a very similar manner, Burhanettin Duran, who 
is an academic and think-tank researcher, defines the new Turkey as a desire to live the 
year of 1920 in today’s conditions: 
 
Definitely AK Party is the most successful party of our political history. 
Because, AK Party had a chance to both transform and also to periodize 
the Turkey politics. It showed a will to lead the country to a new position 
inside and outside with the discourse of the New Turkey. This discourse 
was turned into a framework vision to make the masses embrace the 
transformation after 2009 Davos and 2010 referendum. It refers to the 
constitutive agency of Erdoğan the President of the Republic. This is a 
desire to live 1920 again in today’s conditions... In other words, it is an 
objective of re-founding the Republic... Each constitutive mission has to 
convey a new language to the masses and elites... Nowadays, the New 
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Turkey discourse, which Prime Minister Davutoğlu contributed by saying 
“restoration”, is in the way of becoming the language of a hegemonic 
politics (Duran, 02.09.2014, Sabah). 
 
According to Duran, the new Turkey’s aim is to re-establish the republic, which is called 
‘restoration’ by Ahmet Davutoğlu. Of course, the fact that Ahmet Davutoğlu, who was a 
former minister of foreign affairs, became prime minister, affected the discursive change 
of the new Turkey. Davutoğlu put forward a claim of ‘becoming a regional power’ when 
he was the minister of foreign affairs and this ideal shaped the foreign policy of Turkey. 
As prime minister, he set the discourse of restoration and civilization to work in order to 
hold regional claims. According to Hüseyin Yayman, the new Turkey is a goal of reaching 
the level of contemporary civilization (02.09.2014, Vatan); in another column, 
Burhanettin Duran claims that Erdoğan’s presidency and Davutoğlu’s prime ministry 
correspond to the power of civilization discourse (22.08.2014, Sabah). According to Tanıl 
Bora, Davutoğlu considers that Turkey has an imperial responsibility in regions once 
under Ottoman rule (Bora, 2017, p. 482). This is consistent with what I quoted from 
Markar Esayan above, stating that Turkey has inevitable responsibilities in the region as 
a consequence of being the Ottomans’ legacy. 
 
 Also, İbrahim Karagül, with his specific enthusiastic tone, interprets Erdoğan’s 
presidency as a part of the historical path of the Turkish nation by referring to the 
Ottoman, Seljuk and early republican periods: 
 
Think about today’s developments as not for one day but together with 
the historical progress and fate of a nation. Only then you can make out 
how the assessments of what happened today will become after 10 years 
and 50 years. Only then you will understand that after the Ottoman, the 
republic project has entered the new period, that this has been a new 
constitution, and that this historical period has raised its own historical 
figures and pioneers. You will understand that in Turkey politics, the valid 
references are now historical figures like Sait Halim Paşa, Nizamülmülk 
and Alparslan and that those, who cannot go beyond tribe politics, will not 
be able to be the political character in the today’s and tomorrow’s Turkey. 
You will understand that the coalescence of the Ottoman accumulation 
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and Seljukian will be influential and that this magnificent wealth has 
started the magnificent rising period after the First World War as it was 
after the Crusades and Mongolian invasion. Brave people make the history. 
People, who are not scared and who do not trill, lead the nations. Both the 
new political language and also social expectation of Turkey reached to 
this highness. We saw this also in the handover ceremony of the 
presidency of the republic. The interest of the world, self-confidence of the 
country, and tears of the people who watch the ceremony in their homes 
and streets in fact was an image of a deep missing and a dream which has 
been raised for years. Turkey carried out handover ceremony as worthy of 
a world state. I am sure that the messages of this transformation was 
noted carefully in many capital cities (Karagül, 30.08.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
In this long quotation, one can see the presentation of Erdoğan’s presidency as a 100-
year-old dream, as a new establishment of the republic, and as a reflection of the world 
state. Karagül refers to the historical figures of the Ottoman Empire and Seljuk Empire, 
which signifies the new conceptualization of the new Turkey discourse. Contrary to the 
period before 2014, the new Turkey shifted from a democratization policy to the ideal of 
becoming a world state. In this period, ‘new’ is accompanied by the word ‘great’. Thereby, 
unlike the old one, it is seen that the new and great Turkey has responsibilities which 
reach beyond the borders by force of being a world state. 
   
4.2.2.3. Claims of Being a Regional Power 
The perception of the new Turkey as a world power has some implications for foreign 
policy. As I discussed briefly, Turkey’s historical necessity in the Ottoman territory is 
reflected in the Syria crisis. As a consequence of Turkey’s being a world state; the AKP 
and Erdoğan claim to represent the oppressed people all over the world. After 2014, the 
AKP government actively supported oppositional jihadist groups in Syria against the 
regime, which increased Turkey’s intervention in Middle East politics. Furthermore, 
hosting over 3 million Syrian migrants enabled Erdoğan to discursively represent the 
claim of justice at an international level. In this sense, the new Turkey started to 
represent global justice towards oppressed people. This is exemplified in the column of 
Erdal Tanas Karagöl who is an academic and think-tank researcher:  
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For example, regarding the Iraq and Syria chaos in its border, Turkey both 
became a model country and also gained an important prestige in the eyes 
of the oppressed people and the weak countries with its justice and right-
based approach. As a secure country, Turkey, in which almost 2 million 
Syrian citizens found asylum thanks to the open door policy for Syrian civil 
war which many countries stayed silent and insensitive, has relieved 
around 4.5 billion dollars from the budget until today. Erdoğan, who utters 
in every platform the human tragedy in Syria, took important actions to 
secure the global justice and peace. Criticizing the decision mechanism of 
BM with the statement of “the world is bigger than 5”, he advocated that 
other countries and people, notably Islamic countries must have a voice in 
the global economy and politics (Karagöl, 08.01.2015, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Karagöl emphasizes both the amount of assistance for Syrian asylum-seekers and 
Erdoğan's objection against the United Nations, implying that Turkey has the power to 
influence global issues. Moreover, what is more significant is that Turkey is now capable 
of representing other weak Islamic countries in global politics. In this sense, it is accepted 
that the new Turkey's role is being a spokesman for the oppressed people of the world. 
This was also declared in the election manifesto of the AKP before the general election 
on 7 June 2015. That manifesto can trace the effects of the prime ministry of Ahmet 
Davutoğlu, since it includes political strategies which reach beyond Turkey. According to 
Ufuk Ulutaş, who is an academic and think-tank researcher in SETA, the election 
manifesto reflects Davutoğlu's vision about the new Turkey: 
 
The fact that a declaration of a political party, which concerns its voters, 
includes the statements which also concerns the Balkans, the Middle Asia, 
the Middle East and Latin America, briefly the whole world is important in 
terms of indicating both the depth mentioned above and also the central 
role of Turkey attributed by Davutoğlu. It is possible to read the text not 
only as a contract which is made with the citizens of the New Turkey, but 
also as a pact which is made with the people in the geographies in which 
Turkish foreign policy is influential (Ulutaş, 17.04.2015, Akşam).  
 
It can be observed that the new Turkey’s promises transcend the people of Turkey and 
address the whole world. Ulutaş argues that the new Turkey’s realist goal is to be a global 
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force which is capable of having an influence on foreign politics. In this period, political 
strategies are determined according to regional and global dynamics. This also applies to 
Turkey’s domestic politics. Similarly, before the election, Etyen Mahçupyan analyzes the 
meaning of the new Turkey in terms of global relations: 
 
The second leg in terms the country envisagement reflects for Turkey the 
dream of not only being integrated to the world but also playing an ever-
increasing international role. Whereas the integration makes individuals 
and institutions the world citizen, the objective in the interstate platform 
is to transform Turkey into a country which cannot be excluded in almost 
every global problem. This does not imply that Turkey must directly 
intervene and play a role in the conflicts necessarily. But it reflects to ‘be 
in the loop’ and to be considered as far as possible in the reconstruction of 
global balances. The third dimension concerning the territorial role and 
position of the ‘New Turkey’ reflects the qualitative leap of what is 
mentioned above. It is possible to call this briefly as ‘global prestige’. 
Turkey, which is envisaged by AKP, will seek for being a part of the ‘big 
game’ with both its power and also what it stands for (Mahçupyan, 
14.04.2015, Akşam). 
 
According to Mahçupyan, the new Turkey envisions an international role for Turkey and 
its citizens. Turkey would function as the intervening party in the construction of world 
politics. Mahçupyan defines the objective of the new Turkey as to reach global esteem. 
According to İbrahim Karagül, Turkey is no longer just an Anatolian state, but a country 
which ‘lends a hand’ to countries from Asia to Africa (20.01.2015, Yeni Şafak). With 
reference to the Ottoman ideal, the aim is to produce a well-esteemed image of Turkey 
in the global arena. What Mahçupyan defines as being part of ‘the big game’ accounts to 
such concern. For the first time since the Ottoman period, desire of being influential 
country was materialized in the new Turkey claims after 2014. Karagül expressed this the 
desire in a sentimental way after Erdoğan became the president of the republic: 
 
When you know that our concern is not a piece of land but is honor and 
dignity, you will understand then what this ideal is. Only then you will know 
what the pain and aches, which we buried in our hearts, is. Only then you 
will understand our concern. You do not need to go back to the far dates. 
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It has not been even a hundred year since all of these. These experiences 
are considered to be happen ‘today’ in the wide date range. For this reason, 
we are talking about not the past but today (Karagül, 30.08.2014, Yeni 
Şafak). 
 
Karagül locates the new Turkey in a rhetoric of ideal (dava). The ideal is one of the early 
rhetorics of the Turkish political right. Mostly nationalists use it in the meaning of the 
ideal of pan-Turkism. Karagül, on the other hand, uses the notion of the ideal by referring 
to becoming a pioneer in all spheres in the world and calls for mobilization for this new 
Turkey ideal. In fact, his inspiration is Erdoğan's speech at the extraordinary congress of 
the AKP after the presidential election. Erdoğan defines the AKP's political existence as a 
‘blessed ideal’ and what matters is the ideal itself, not the actors who carry it. Both 
Abdülkadir Selvi (28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak) and Markar Esayan (28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak) 
directly cite Erdoğan's words in the congress. 
 
4.2.3. Discourse of the Leadership and the Presidential System 
The period beginning from the presidential election, Erdoğan’s presidency, and later the 
AKP congress in which Davutoğlu was appointed to the prime ministry was the 
forerunner of new political norms. As I discussed in the new tutelage section, Erdoğan’s 
candidacy was presented as the representation of the popular will. This had another 
implication: the AKP staff and its organic actors in the media started to equate Erdoğan 
with the people and the state itself more than ever before. Hence, Erdoğan’s fortune 
was identified with the ‘continuity of the state’. Erdoğan’s presidential candidacy is one 
reason for this shift of emphasis towards Erdoğan in the public opinion. Additionally, the 
Gezi protests and 17-25 December case were perceived by the AKP side as if both cases 
targeted Erdoğan. In this sense, there emerged an invitation in the pro-government 
media to unite around Erdoğan in order to protect the privileges which they had gained 
through Erdoğan’s policies. Everyone on the AKP side came to agree that Erdoğan by 
himself represents the claims of the new Turkey. The new Turkey, as a practical 
discursive strategy, this time started to refer to Erdoğan’s powerful presidency. Before 
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the presidential election, Markar Esayan and İbrahim Karagül conceived the new Turkey 
based on Erdoğan’s power as follows: 
 
Isn’t it everything is clear? Erdoğan’s presidential discourse in fact is like a 
proclamation of a new state. It is like an announcement of the re-
foundation of the Republic after a hundred year. A collective conscience is 
being built. A construction of future, which is welcomed by Turkey society 
effusively, is being undertaken. This long road is being walked with the 
brave steps of the brave people and the masses is following them. This is 
not only about Erdoğan. This is Turkey. It is the truths which this nation 
has had to gulp it back and never could have told throughout the history 
of the Republic (Karagül, 12.07.2014, Yeni Şafak).      
 
If Turkey solves its domestic problems and makes its state right and 
people-centered, it has a potential to become a hope and model for the 
Middle East. Vision of the New Turkey and the fact that Erdoğan is able to 
stay in power imply this. Çankaya, 2015 election and consolidation of AK 
Party around Erdoğan in this ideal is something more than domestic 
politics of Turkey, three-period limitation and who will be the prime 
minister. Therefore, the whole world is also in this process (Esayan, 
16.07.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
According to Karagül, Erdoğan’s presidency discourse sounds like a foundation for a new 
state or the re-establishment of the republic after 100 years. Moreover, he equates 
Erdoğan with Turkey and with a truth which has been repressed throughout the history 
of the republic. Associating Erdoğan with the whole country tacitly externalizes the 
opponents, since the enthusiasm of the masses is materialized in Erdoğan's power. In 
this sense, Karagül applies to the overgeneralization of the notion of the masses in favor 
of Erdoğan, which is often done in election periods. On the other side, Esayan presents 
Erdoğan as a meta-politic actor whose fate is vital for the new Turkey's future. This 
strategy implies that a possible defeat of Erdoğan in the election would ruin the Turkish 
state. In a similar vein, according to Erdal Tanas Karagöl, the people did not demand 
anybody other than Erdoğan to establish equal citizenship in Turkey:  
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Improvements in all these fields have increased the quality of life of 
families in socio-economically low and middle level and also increased 
their expectations evenly. In Presidential election in 2007, the fact that the 
people wanted Erdoğan to continue his duty as the Prime Minister was 
derived from the belief that reforms and applications, which are required 
for the realization of equal citizenship, can only be achieved under the 
leadership of Erdoğan. This section of the society, which became more 
visible with the achievements, sees these achievements they gained in 12 
years as milestones of the process which move towards equal citizenship 
in terms of social, political and economic rights. In this process, the 
meaning attributed to Erdoğan, who plays the most active role, is not only 
that he is a political leader but also that he represents the equality. 
Because, the process of finishing the privileges of a particular section has 
started with Erdoğan and the continuation of this process is associated 
with Erdoğan’s becoming the President of the Republic in 2014 (Karagöl, 
31.07.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Karagöl implicitly talks about the conflict between secular and religious sections of the 
society and Erdoğan’s role in ending the privileges of secular people. For that matter, the 
achievements of religious and conservative people after the AKP came to power are 
associated with Erdoğan’s policies. Therefore, as Karagöl claims, Erdoğan’s presidency 
would become the continuation of those egalitarian politics. With reference to the 
people’s opinion, Karagöl emphasizes Erdoğan rather than the AKP as a pioneer of socio-
economic and cultural achievements. The title of his column, Yeni Türkiye’de Orta Sınıf 
ve Erdoğan [Middle Class in the New Turkey and Erdoğan], confirms this strategy.  
 
Along with the fact that Erdoğan won the election, the discourse of leadership became 
dominant in the political field. His new role as president of the republic was seen as 
above all decision-making mechanisms. Even though Erdoğan had to resign from his duty 
of AKP chairperson, he declared that he would continue to engage actively in politics as 
de facto AKP leader, contrary to the principle of impartiality in the constitution. Such an 
active role was already legitimized through tutelage discussions in the media, as 
discussed above. The fact that Erdoğan consolidated his power trivialized other AKP 
actors in terms of their political influence, and this produced a cult of leadership. Markar 
Esayan gives a clue about that leadership in two different columns:   
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It is clear that each influential field including media includes hybridity in 
terms of the old and the new Turkey. Erdoğan is continuing to swim ably 
in an olympic pool with a pioneer group. We will see that honest and pro-
New Turkey people will have started to join him with a fast adaptation. 
Erdoğan is founding the New AK Party of the New Turkey on the basis of a 
mentality dissidence. His party really shows prudence. History will write 
those who passes this phase without betraying Erdoğan and those who 
contributes. Because, this transition implies a something more than AK 
Party and the people are aware of everything, and they are waiting with 
the red card. We must be careful against those who want to muddy the 
water of the pool (Esayan, 18.08.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
Erdoğan the President of the Republic is one of the politicians who 
understand the necessity of change. Therefore, the congress of yesterday 
implies in fact a symbolic farewell. AK Party is passing from being the New 
Party of the Old Turkey to the level of becoming the New Party of the New 
Turkey thanks to the courage and foresight of its leader and actually is 
taking required action not to experience once more the dramatic end of 
ANAP. Furthermore, contrary to expected, the process, with Yalçın 
Akdoğan’s terms, is being carried out trouble-free as easy as falling of a 
log. This is a result of self-confidence a leader and of his principle to value 
his ideal above everything. Erdoğan did not reconcile with the new type of 
tutelage offers and did not make public’s will, which is resigned to him, a 
matter of negotiation behind closed doors. He undertook a risky business 
and achieved the struggle. The most meaningful day of a political leader 
was happened yesterday because of this will. Consequently, Erdoğan is not 
going anywhere, rather he is coming back more powerfully. As of today, 
center of the politics has shifted to Çankaya. Don’t be confused. This is the 
essence of the issue (Esayan, 28.08.2014, Yeni Şafak). 
 
In the first one, Esayan portrays Erdoğan's leadership by making an analogy of an olympic 
pool race. Esayan attributes a constitutive role to Erdoğan in terms of both the new 
Turkey and also the new AKP. His wording implies the characteristics of leadership which 
also could be seen as the one-man system. Accordingly, Esayan claims that the people 
will adapt and join Erdoğan's march on the way of the new Turkey and that those who 
do not betray Erdoğan will be marked in history. Indeed, what Esayan did is to portray a 
political field which cannot operate without referring to Erdoğan. In the second one, he 
points out similar depictions of Erdoğan's leadership. Claiming that popular sovereignty 
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was consigned to Erdoğan, he believes that Erdoğan has a monopoly on the 
representation of the popular sovereignty. Moreover, according to Esayan, the center of 
politics has shifted to Çankaya the presidential palace, which actually implies that the 
parliament is no longer influential than the decisions of Erdoğan. Also, Yiğit Bulut talks 
about leadership as the founder of a new system in Turkey: 
 
It happened also in Turkye just like this. The LEADERSHIP established the 
SYSTEM with the real owners of the territory and confidence, stability and 
production came up...Now there is a new Turkey and the LEADER, who is 
behind the actions taken in 12 years, is also the guarantee and driving 
force of actions which will be taken until 2023... (Bulut, 23.11.2015, Star). 
 
4.2.3.1. Presidential System 
Bulut indicates the leadership (actually Erdoğan) as the driving force of the new Turkey. 
In effect, discussions on the leadership and the system are based on the discussion of 
the presidential regime. The presidential election in 2014 was seen the first step of the 
presidential regime and the election campaign was maintained together with the 
discourse of presidential regime. The presidential regime was emphasized as a vital 
system to reach the new and great Turkey. According to Bulut, the presidential regime 
will solve the problems which arise from the system of ‘weak governments’: 
 
Even though the “Presidential election” is discussed today in Turkey, 
before questioning the system to recall the main detail and opening up the 
issue of PRESIDENCY in detail, I want to make a clear detection: There is 
only reality underlying all problems of Turkey between 1938-2003: “weak 
governments, impotent Prime Ministers and most importantly A 
POWERFUL ESTABLİSHED ORDER against them”! Dear friends, when it is 
looked at the topic of PRESIDENCY in accompany with this detection, the 
first answer, which we will give to those who ask “What will the Presidency 
bring” and who try to trivialize the topic, is very clear: Whoever is elected 
will come to power over %50 and will be accountable only to the Turkish 
people... Let me write clearer: The model of “weak governments” which 
the “ESTABLISHED ORDER” was accustomed to encounter especially until 
2003 will be completely collapsed! Let me write down: Today the system 
is “far away from being perfect” but Prime Minister Erdoğan bridges the 
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gap of the system through his personality and the vote which he received... 
(Bulut, 04.08.2014, Star). 
 
Bulut claims that Erdoğan’s power fills the deficiency of the former system, yet that for 
a more perfect system, a presidential regime is necessary. Both the presidential elections 
in 2014 and the general election in 2015 were seen as de facto election of the 
presidential regime. In this period, what the AKP side argued was that the new Turkey 
demands the presidential regime, since it was perceived as a desire to compete with 
global forces. Bulut defines the presidential regime as a part of the ‘main doctrine’:  
 
It actually appeared “what Turkish citizens will decide for” while Turkey is 
going to the polls. NEW GREAT POWERFUL TURKEY, PRESIDENTIAL system 
which will govern this TURKEY and NEW CONSTITUTION... Do we want or 
not! At this point, let me ask once more: What should the main doctrine, 
which will carry TURKEY to 2023 the centenary of our Republic, include? 
Let us get to the point and question together: 1- Turkey is on the verge of 
historical opportunities as a result of great change and interaction in all 
across the world! We need a new “thesis” a new “paradigm” which 
embraces the change in such a chaos-looking reality. I call this as “the 
main doctrine for transition to 2023 great Turkey”. THIS DOCTRINE cannot 
be separated from the concepts of PRESIDENCY AND NEW CONSTITUTION 
and they must be questioned together! (Bulut, 18.02.2015, Star). 
 
Insistence on the presidential regime is consistent with the globalization of the enemy 
concept and thus the globalization of the claims. At the same time, it becomes apparent 
that new Turkey claims are transferred to the 2023 symbolism. At this point, whether is 
presidential regime an instrument to reach 2023 the great Turkey, or whether it is a final 
objective is not clear. Yet what is explicit is that the new Turkey is now representing the 
leadership, the presidential regime, and dreams of being a great state by 2023. In 
another column, Bulut goes one step further and offers ‘plenipotentiary’ leadership for 
greater goals:      
 
Our Mr. President of the Republic made very important emphasis in one of 
his last speech: The parliamentary system was taken to the waiting room 
when the President of the Republic was elected by the people...Dear my 
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friends, there is an only idea on which the people from each rank, place, 
and position UNITED and CONSOLIDATED: STABILITY IS REQUIRED IN THIS 
COUNTRY. THE LEADERSHIP AND THE SYSTEMIC REVISION, WHICH 
ENABLES THE LEADER TO RULE THE COUNTRY AS PLENIPOTENTIARY, ARE 
ALSO REQUIRED FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THIS STABILITY... It is not 
realistic to expect a performance for the GREAT-POWERFUL 2023 Turkey, 
from a system which was taken to the waiting room by the people. In fact, 
as I already shared before, the main motive which will take us to the ballot 
box is this! It actually appeared “what Turkish citizens will decide for” 
WHILE THE NATIONAL WILL IS ON THE WAY OF BEING REFLECTED IN THE 
ELECTION: NEW GREAT POWERFUL TURKEY, PRESIDENTIAL system which 
will govern this TURKEY and NEW CONSTITUTION... (Bulut, 25.03.2015, 
Star). 
 
Bulut takes the national will as a reference for the imposition of the presidential regime 
and powerful leadership. According to this reading, the people decided to hand over 
their will to the plenipotentiary leadership, like in Hobbes' Leviathan, and this popular 
will eliminated the parliamentary system. Clearly, such an assumption means a sort of 
declaration of deviation from the democratization discourse which was operative until 
2014. Concerns of democratization were replaced in this period with concerns of stability 
based on the securitization of the state.   
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CHAPTER 5 
 INTERPRETATION and CONCLUSION 
 
In the previous chapter, I tried to picture discursive transformation of the new Turkey in 
the journalistic field by focusing on newspaper columns. I aimed to distance myself from 
the field and to scrutinize it from a bird’s eye view. This broad perspective aided me in 
capturing what happened to the new Turkey discourse in the six long years between 
2010 and 2016. While fulfilling this objective, I avoided referring to the theoretical 
concepts because for the theory to be functional we first need to observe how the 
discourse itself traversed the whole field in a particular time period. To put it another 
way, it is unlikely to reach a conclusion without first coming to understand the difference 
between early and later uses of the new Turkey discourse. In accordance with this 
purpose, I constructed a narrative of the contexts in which the new Turkey discourse was 
born and also the ruptures it experienced. Locating the discourse in those settings is 
crucial to if one wants to make sense of the change that discourse underwent in different 
settings. 
 
As a result of the discourse analysis of the newspaper columns, first of all, what is explicit 
is that the new Turkey discourse was pragmatically adapted to changing political (also 
economic and social) conditions. Strikingly, even though one particular political context, 
overtly named the new Turkey gave way to a contradictory and totally opposite one, this 
new context was also called the new Turkey as part of a political strategy. Secondly, in 
each different context, the new Turkey discourse was constructed based on categories 
of perception that were imposed upon the recipients. All these categories were 
established according to the dynamics of the settings. It should be noted that the new 
Turkey itself is also a categorical opposition of the old Turkey. Finally, in the production 
and reproduction of new Turkey discourse, the journalistic field played a mediator role 
in cooperation with the academic and think-tank fields. Representatives of these fields 
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gathered as columnists in the journalistic field and employed certain strategies to get 
potential recognition in the field. Now I am going to interpret and conclude these 
findings by revisiting the theory.  
 
5.1. Contextual Adaptation 
The new Turkey emerged in an atmosphere of claims of facing down the Kemalist status-
quo, accompanied by this claims of fostering democratization and normalization. The 
2010 referendum was the climax of this political liberalization and therefore the period 
after the referendum was called the new Turkey. Yet my analysis here shows that context 
is quite significant for the use of discourse, because it was no longer the claim of 
democratization which makes Turkey new after 2013. Instead, it was the dream of being 
an imperial power, being a world state, restoring the republic and recapturing the glory 
of the Ottoman Empire. Those were the “new” properties of the new Turkey. In other 
words, what characterized the new Turkey radically changed. Of course, the new Turkey 
discourse did not evolve into its new form automatically. Rather, intellectual actors 
(journalists, academics, and researchers) adapted it to the changing settings by 
employing several strategies and justification methods. 
 
Referring to my analysis, I can explicitly assert that late 2013 was a turning point for the 
claims of the new Turkey. Before the serious political crises in 2013 –the Gezi Park 
protests and 17-25 December case- the new Turkey stood for the democratization of 
society, demilitarization of politics, and normalization of conflicts, including Kurdish 
question. Yet the undetermined nature of the discourse means that it was not always 
internally consistent in that period. What had been viewed as “new” before 2013 
suddenly became “old” in the conditions after 2013.  
 
Based on this, one possible consequence of the analysis is that new Turkey discourse is 
the imposition of a temporality on the social reality and of a categorical way of thinking. 
As first envisaged by Erdoğan and AKP executives, the new Turkey meant to overcome 
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the failures, limitations, and oppressions of the “past” regimes. In this sense, the “new 
Turkey” divides Turkey symbolically into two time periods. These temporal divisions are 
internalized and imposed in different ways by intellectuals writing in newspapers. What 
determines the context in terms of circulation of the new Turkey discourse is usually 
elections and referendums. The temporal ambiguity of the new Turkey discourse enables 
intellectuals to re-conceptualize elections or referendums as a milestone which would 
function as a dividing line between the old Turkey and the new one. For instance, as can 
be seen in the liquidation of tutelage chapter, the construction of the new Turkey in 
relation to demilitarization was declared by columnists such as Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, Ali 
Bayramoğlu, Hatem Ete, Taha Özhan, and Markar Esayan several times after the 2010 
referendum, 2011 general election, and 2014 local election as if it was happening for the 
first time. In this sense, as Fairclough argues, “the analysis of the discursive event as 
social practice may refer to different levels of social organization –the context of 
situation, the institutional context, and the wider societal context or ‘context of culture’. 
Questions of power and ideology may arise at each of the three levels” (Fairclough, 1995, 
p. 134). As the political situation differs and the new one loses its newness, the new 
Turkey is redefined once more according to the position of the actors towards the field 
of power.  
 
Furthermore, Van Dijk’s “context models” can function here to understand discursive 
adaptation. Accordingly, depending on the property of the context, discursive adaptation 
has to do with one’s ability to adapt different type of discourses to the changing settings. 
More specifically, Van Dijk argues that “context models are not only about relevance, 
but also about people’s ability to adapt themselves to current situations on the basis of 
a combination of old information and the capacity to analyze current situations” (Van 
Dijk, 2000, Pp. 27-28). As I identified in the analysis chapter, 2013 is the point the when 
political context radically changed. Actors in the journalistic field, in addition to 
newcomers, produced the modes of justification to adapt new Turkey discourse to the 
post-2013 conditions. In fact, it is worth recalling once more that while the claim of the 
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new Turkey was mentioned by Erdoğan and AKP members even in changing conditions, 
it was justified, reproduced, and circulated in the public sphere by means of engaged 
intellectuals; for my study, those agents are columnists. If pre-2013 had been a 
normalization period, post-2013 can be regarded as a vigilance period. So, how come is 
it possible to describe both periods using the same concept of the new Turkey?  
According to Van Dijk, “ideologies not only control what we speak or write about, but 
also how we do so” (Van Dijk, 2000, p. 28). What happened between 2010 and 2016 can 
be considered as an ideological shift. Especially in 2013, one can observe the peace-
making discourse, as part of which even Abdullah Öcalan was included in the idea of the 
new Turkey; however, towards 2015, claims of the new Turkey became more and more 
nationalized and localized. The discourse of national will, which excluded non-nationals, 
is the explicit indicator of this shift. 
 
Of course, contextual change also impinge on the structure of the journalistic field. As 
the new Turkey moved from democratization towards the presidential system, the 
journalistic field grew closer to the field of power, which meant losing its autonomy. 
Therefore, the journalistic habitus had to rearrange itself according to the changing 
dynamics of the field. Recalling that Bourdieu talks about the particular instance of 
relating practices to objective structures, which is conjuncture (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 78), I 
can claim that each political context is a moment for intellectuals in the field to organize 
and reorganize practical strategies for the sake of justifying the new Turkey while 
positioning themselves.Also, which type of symbolic capital is dominating the journalistic 
field changes in time. In the first period, democratization, demilitarization and 
normalization required a sort of legal discourse, since these political values would be 
expected to be realized as a result of some legal regulations. Yet, together with the crisis 
in the political field, legal discourse was replaced with conspiracy discourse and grand 
narratives dating back to the Seljuk and Ottoman periods. The latter period does not 
necessitate a form of symbolic capital based on even a limited amount of legal 
information. Instead, it draws upon the symbolic capital of narratives which romanticize 
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and fetishize the issues. To make sense of the contextual change in the journalistic field, 
we need to understand the change in the construction of the discourse which is 
embedded in the articles.  
 
5.2. Categories of Perception, Discursive Construction of the Constitutive Other and 
Self-Representation 
As the new Turkey discourse has been exposed to contextual changes, it was adapted to 
the changing conditions and been redefined. This is theoretically meaningful when it is 
perceived as a practice which operates in the journalistic field. Basically, it can be argued 
that changes or breaks in the field of power impinge upon the subfields one way or 
another. Yet, I need to tidy up how changes in the field, and therefore changes in the 
discourse, are maintained through intellectual strategies by referring to the Bourdieusian 
concept of symbolic power.   
 
What drove me to approach the new Turkey discourse with a Bourdieusian framework 
was the construction of the discourse in accordance with the categories of political 
perception and, as a result of this, the circulation of the new Turkey as taken for granted 
even in contradictory settings. Indeed, this was uncovered as I penetrated into the 
analysis of the newspaper columns. In different contexts, new Turkey discourse is 
located in the prevalent conflict in the political field and positioned according to the 
strategies of the AKP. This finding is one of the primary outcomes of this study. To 
integrate this finding with theoretical instruments, it would be helpful to recall the 
possibilities of Bourdieu’s concepts briefly. 
 
As Bourdieu defined it, “the symbolic power of agents, understood as the power to make 
things seen -theorein- and to make things believed, to produce and impose the legitimate 
or legal classification, in fact depends, as the case of the rex reminds us, on the position 
occupied in the space (and in the classifications potentially inscribed in it)” (Bourdieu, 
1985, p. 735). This definition of Bourdieu points to a relational mechanism which locates 
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discursive practices in between structured social space and intellectual ability. It also 
indicates the constructed character of the social world which implies the influence of 
power relations. We already know that the symbolic construction of the social world is 
carried out through the principles of vision and division and through socially accepted 
categories. I argue that the way new Turkey discourse is constructed and circulated in 
the media can be comprehended by means of the concept of symbolic power. What is 
manifested in the analysis is the fact that columnist-intellectuals in the journalistic field 
recourse a) to the categories of perception based on conflictual dualities, b) to the 
production of the image of the constitutive other and c) to the production of a self-
representation based on this constitutive other. Just focusing on the change in those 
categorical oppositions and classifications, one can grasp the change in the meaning of 
the new Turkey depending on the context. 
 
In terms of categories of political perception, it is seen that before late 2013, in the 
matter of democratization and normalization, the distinction of the old and the new 
Turkey was established through the conflict between the state (elites) and the people 
(Dağı, 2010;Kütahyalı, 2010, 2013b;Ete, 2011c); whereas in the matter of demilitarization 
and the liquidation of the tutelage system, dichotomies such as tutelage vs. democracy 
and status quo vs. change were employed (Ete, 2010, 2011a, 2012a;Özhan, 
2011b;Kütahyalı, 2013a). Furthermore, respecting the Kurdish question, new Turkey 
discourse is placed into the contradiction between peace and violence (Özhan, 2011b, 
2011c). 
 
On the other hand, when the context radically changed after 2013, the new Turkey was 
this time adjusted to the presidential elections through the categorical opposition 
between being elected and being appointed (Dalay, 2014;Özhan, 2014b;Bulut, 2014c) 
and the opposition between the people-the nation-popular will-national will and the 
tutelage side (Aktay, 2014;Özhan, 2014b;Bulut, 2014c). Furthermore, as the claims 
become globalized and imperialized, new Turkey discourse was constituted in reference 
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to the conflict between organic state and inorganic state (Bulut, 2014g), national power 
and global forces (Karagül, 2015), Anatolian and Byzantine capital (Bulut, 2015c), and 
independence and dependence (Esayan, 2014b).  
 
I will not go into the details of what these oppositions mean in their political contexts, 
since they all were already discussed in the analysis chapter. Instead, I am going to treat 
the operation of them as symbolic power which functions in favor of the dissemination 
of AKP power. Alongside the significant change in the categories or classifications in six 
years, all of them together amount to the functional intellectual performance in the field 
of journalism. As Bourdieu says, “the categories of perception, the systems of 
classifications, that is, essentially, the words, the names which construct social reality as 
much as they express it, are the crucial stakes of political struggle, which is a struggle to 
impose the legitimate principle of vision and division” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 134). This is 
a political struggle because intellectuals draw the boundary of the new Turkey by 
referring to its morally negative version. As I have repeated very often, new Turkey 
discourse has no essence or descriptive meaning; rather, it gets meaning and it is named 
by means of intellectual intervention in the contradictory conditions. Remembering that 
Bourdieu says symbolic power is the making the world with words (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 
138), I can argue that the new Turkey is a product of the symbolic power practice of AKP 
politicians and its engaged intellectuals in the media.  
 
Aware of their positions in the field, columnist-intellectuals use their power to make 
people believe the political existence of the new Turkey not at a symbolic level but as if 
it were real. The way of realizing this purpose is to classify the social reality or, in 
Bourdieu’s words, to impose principles of vision and division and to refer to established 
categories of perception. Therefore, whereas they utilize the democracy-tutelage 
dichotomy in the liberalization atmosphere, with the same purpose, they also draw upon 
the national-non-national dichotomy in the atmosphere of authoritarianization. 
Normally, the word “national” does not sound democratic, since it essentially favors a 
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particular (Turkish) nation. Similarly, distinction between the Byzantine and Anatolian 
capital (even if it is in the economic sense) does not comply with democratic and pluralist 
claims because it, in a way, produces an ethnocentric and xenophobic perception. Yet by 
means of their authority to give a legitimate name to the conditions as the old and the 
new, those intellectuals do not hesitate to call both democratic claims and nationalistic 
claims as the new Turkey, in a contradictory way. As Bahadır Türk argued, “to think 
ideology and discourse on the axis of power is a compulsory” because they have to do 
with the legitimation of dominant power (Türk, 2004, p. 77). In this sense, applying to 
every categorical opposition aims to impose the categories of perception on the 
recipients. As the people are exposed to those impositions, they start to perceive the 
political reality only through those categories. 
  
On the other hand, the same logic can be traced in the production of self-representation 
and of the representation of the other, since both judgments are also based on 
impositions of classifications. Those classifications must be recognized by the people for 
an effective constitution of hegemonic perspective. States or governments endeavor to 
construct common sense in the society, since common sense consists of presuppositions 
which can be easily established through generalizations. “Through the structuring it 
imposes on practices,” says Bourdieu, “the State institutes and inculcates common 
symbolic forms of thought, social frames of perception, understanding or memory, State 
forms  of classification or, more precisely, practical schemes of perception, appreciation 
and action” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 175). In the new Turkey case, the state, or rather AKP 
power, produces the representations of the “other”, of its political rivals, and of enemies. 
In fact, change in the representations in time shows a path beginning from the 
perception of political rivalry towards the perception of the enemy. Either against 
political opponents or against global enemies, in each situation, new Turkey discourse is 
constructed in relation with a constitutive other. In other words, the form of the old 
Turkey discourse always changes, as does that of the new Turkey. 
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Before 2013, what defined the old Turkey was the Kemalist civic-militaristic bureaucracy 
(Dağı, 2010;Ete, 2012a;Kütahyalı, 2013b) which oppressed the people and minorities 
(Kütahyalı, 2010, 2012, 2013b;Ete, 2011c, 2012b;Yayman, 2013;Küçükyılmaz, 2013). It is 
also military tutelage (Dağı, 2010;Yayman, 2010;Ete, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a;Özhan, 
2011b). Depending on the context, it could be also a system of bureaucratic and 
jurisdictional tutelage (Kütahyalı, 2013a). On the other hand, while talking about the 
Kurdish question, the old Turkey was associated with the military coups (Özhan, 
2011c;Küçükyılmaz, 2013). I do not discuss the facticity of these definitions, even they all 
can be truly named because Turkey’s political history is composed of militaristic 
domination. Yet, since these systems of classifications function as a political weapon 
which stigmatizes its interlocutor, actors who are authorized to make identifications 
employ them as a reflection of symbolic power.  
 
When the state officially recognized the Gülenist organization as a “parallel state” after 
2013, representations of the old Turkey were also reconceptualized. This organization, 
which had been considered as a victim of the old Turkey, was re-identified as a 
component of the old Turkey after the 17-25 December case by means of the concept of 
tutelage, since their parallel or in-state organization was uncovered (Esayan, 
2014e;Mahçupyan, 2014;Duran, 2014c;Karagöl, 2015b). Similarly, the concept of 
tutelage was applied to the presidential election in 2014; other candidates and also the 
institution of the presidency of the republic were associated with the pro-tutelage 
mindset (Aktay, 2014;Dalay, 2014;Özhan, 2014b;Esayan, 2014c). In the same period, 
with the claims of restoring the republic, the 100-year-long republican period was 
perceived as the old Turkey that needed to be faced (Bulut, 2014a;Esayan, 2014b;Duran, 
2014b;Karagül, 2014a). Furthermore, in this process, and also towards the general 
election in 2015, the old Turkey was re-designated as under the control of global forces 
and specifically the West (Bulut, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014g, 2015c, 
2015d;Karagül, 2014b, 2014c, 2015;Özhan, 2015a;Esayan, 2015d). 
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On the AKP side, this change of the definitions reveals a way of perceiving political 
opponents. Since they are the ones in power and therefore control the mechanisms of 
imposition, their discursive choices have a strong influence over the subordinated ones. 
As Bourdieu claims, “the self-evidence of the injunctions of the State imposes itself so 
powerfully because the State has imposed the cognitive structures through which it is 
perceived” (Bourdieu, 2000, p. 176). In other words, the state produces schemes of 
perception which prevent thinking out of those frontiers which is already designed by 
the state itself. 
 
This is also valid in the construction of the self-representation of the new Turkey. The 
state and intellectuals produce and reproduce the concepts which lead one to think only 
in favor of the power itself. After 2014, new definitions were added to the “new Turkey” 
approaches. This does not mean that the AKP stepped back from the claims of the new 
Turkey; on the contrary, representation of the new Turkey simply became differentiated. 
With the influence of the presidential election, in 2014, the concept of the new Turkey 
shifted to that of the organic Turkey (Bulut, 2014g), to the leader and pioneer Turkey 
(Karagül, 2014a), to the modern conquest (Karahan, 2014), to the world state (Er, 
2014;Karagül, 2014b), and to the restoration (Duran, 2014b); whereas in 2015, under the 
influence of general elections, the new Turkey was redefined as leadership (Bulut, 2015b, 
2015d) and as the new great powerful Turkey (Bulut, 2015a, 2015b).   
 
The shift in the symbolic redefinition of the state from the “new Turkey Republic” to the 
“great world state” implies the change of instruments of thought regarding the AKP’s 
perception of the state. This can make sense by referring to what Bourdieu argues about 
the thinking on the state itself in his lectures at the Collège de France: “I noted that we 
risked applying to the state a ‘state thinking’, and I insisted on the fact that our thinking, 
the very structures of consciousness by which we construct the social world and the 
particular object that is the state, are very likely the product of the state itself” (Bourdieu, 
2014, p. 3). In this case, of course, I am talking about forms of political perception rather 
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than the constructed perception of social reality. In effect, former is an instance of the 
latter. The shift from the new to the “great” is not just a matter of wording. Instead, it 
goes parallel with the change of political perception towards imperial claims. Whereas 
democratization discourse was established based on the perception of newness, the 
presidential system was justified through “greatness”. Bourdieu gives an example from 
Kafka’s “The Trial” which perfectly fit in this case of greatness. He claims that “the state, 
which produces the official classifications, is in a sense the supreme tribunal to which 
Kafka refers in The Trial when he has Block say of the advocate and his claim to be one 
of the ‘great advocates’”: ‘Any man can call himself “great”, of course, if he pleases, but 
in this matter the Court tradition must decide’ (Bourdieu, 1985, p.732). Similarly, in the 
case of the “great Turkey”, anyone may call himself great but who produces such 
representation is nothing other than the state itself through its agents in the fields. Here, 
one can oppose by claiming that particularly AKP government cannot be replaced by the 
state itself. Yet the state and AKP government can be perceived as interchangeable, since 
AKP leaders have declared many times that they blamed and removed the conflictual 
distinction between the state and governments in Turkish political history, which can be 
traced also in the newspaper columns I analyzed. 
 
5.3. Relations in the Journalistic Field 
In this research, what shows up in terms of the field dynamics is the fact that journalistic 
field hosts actors coming from different fields such as the academic, think-tank, and 
bureaucratic/political field. Furthermore, even though it is not quite common, there can 
be seen a transition between these fields, more specifically a transition towards the 
political field.  
 
Printed media occupies an important place in the journalistic field, since it reaches to the 
mass people as well as television does. Interestingly, those who participate in TV 
programs also write in newspapers as columnists, which multiplies their visibility in the 
media. Journalists can be considered the dominant actors in the media, for they are 
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already equipped with the pertinent logic of the journalistic field. Moreover, since the 
journalistic field is placed in the field of cultural production, actors such as writers, artists, 
scientists, and musicians also participate in symbolic production (Benson, 1999, p. 465). 
In this sense, it is very likely for cultural producers to pass between different fields. As 
Bourdieu points out, “culture producers hold a specific power, the properly symbolic 
power of showing things and making people believe in them, of revealing, in an explicit, 
objectified way the more or less confused, vague, unformulated, even unformulable 
experiences of the natural world and the social world, and of thereby bringing them into 
existence” (Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 146). For this reason, they tend to engage in power 
relations in order to utilize their symbolic power to intervene in the social world. While 
doing so, they also position themselves, which provides recognized capital in the field of 
cultural production.  
 
In the case of the new Turkey, my study reveals an intensive participation of the 
academic and think-tank fields in the journalistic field. In fact, among 40 different 
columnists, all 24 academic columnists are at the same time think-tank researchers. Also, 
interestingly enough, all of them are engaged in SETA (Foundation for Political, Economic 
and Social Research) which is a think-tank founded in 2006 and known as very close to 
the AKP government. Either writing in the op-ed pages or in the columns regularly, it 
seems that they are very active producers and reproducers of the new Turkey discourse. 
Also, compared with the regular columnists who can be called journalists, think-tank 
researchers have a chance to write in several newspapers, which enables them to reach 
different kinds of recipients. Hatem Ete, for instance, found a chance to write in Star Açık 
Görüş, Sabah, Sabah Perspektif, and Akşam between 2010 and 2016. This sort of 
flexibility increases the mobilization of the think-tank field towards the journalistic field. 
In fact, even though the think-tank field shows characteristics of the concept of field in 
the Bourdieusian sense, its diverse actors, such as academics, researchers, and 
specialists deserve a more hybrid definition. Therefore, Thomas Medvetz portrays the 
think-tanks as a “boundary organization” (Medvetz, 2015, p.230) and “field-like social 
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universe” (Medvetz, 2007, p. 9) by referring to Gil Eyal’s conceptualization of “space 
between fields” (Eyal, 2013). Medvetz argues that think-tank space is the boundary itself 
between different fields, which indeed can be fruitful for my analysis here. Since they 
are located in the frontier, their strategic struggles take place in those spaces where they 
do not belong to any field. Whereas those think-tank actors such as researchers, 
academics, and specialists perform as columnist in newspapers engaged to the AKP 
government, they also can get into parliament through being deputies of the AKP or they 
have possibility to become state bureaucrats. In another text, Medvetz indicates that 
policy experts in think-tanks may function as the academic scholar, the policymaker, the 
business entrepreneur, and the journalist, depending on the institutional domains in 
which they are engaged (Medvetz, 2007, p. 3). 
 
Of course, such preferences are shaped by the individual strategies and demands of the 
field of power. Among the ones who write about the new Turkey in their columns, while 
Hüseyin Yayman, Taha Özhan, Talip Küçükcan and Yasin Aktay became deputies from the 
AKP in 2015, Nuh Yılmaz, Cemal Haşimi, Mücahit Küçükyılmaz and Erdal Tanas Karagöl 
became bureaucrats and consultants. These cases are the proper examples of upward 
mobilization in the field depending on the recognized political capitals of the agents, 
which are primarily based on discursive strategies. As Medvetz asserts, “it is also possible 
to consider think-tanks as organizations that span multiple fields in the context of a 
strategy for mediating the relations among holders of different forms of power. In this 
case, their power rests on their ability to accumulate multiple forms of capital and 
thereby play a crucial mediating or brokering role in the social structure” (Medvetz, 2015, 
p. 234). Their transition to the political field and bureaucratic field has to do with their 
intellectual performance, or which type of capital they employ in the critical instances. 
This is also what Bourdieu calls illusio. Actors find themselves in a game and if they realize 
the game is worth playing, they invest their capitals in the struggles which take place in 
the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 98). In this sense, new Turkey discourse turns 
out to be a sort of game itself, since columnists, with a doxic acceptance, tend to produce 
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and reproduce the discourse even in contradictory political settings. As can be traced in 
the analysis chapter, efforts to adapt the new Turkey discourse to the contradictory 
conditions, wordings, identifications, categories of perceptions, classifications, self-
representation, and representation of the constitutive other are a kind of symbolic 
investment which can be rewarded according to the recognizability of their impositions. 
  
On the other hand, the struggle in the journalistic field also results in the positioning of 
the regular columnists who are not actively engaged in academia or think-tank space. 
Among 16 columnists, whereas Markar Esayan became an AKP deputy in 2015, Etyen 
Mahçupyan and Yiğit Bulut became the consultants. Also, Rasim Ozan Kütahyalı, who 
wrote the most articles about the new Turkey (35 articles), occupies a relatively 
autonomous space in the field like think-tank researchers, since he also found a chance 
to write in 3 different newspapers: Taraf, Sabah, and Akşam. In this sense, the specific 
weight of particular actors may have a stronger influence than others. Yiğit Bulut, for 
instance, contributed to the transformation of the definition of the new and the old 
Turkey by employing discursive strategies based on conspiratorial thought. His phrases 
such as “interest rate lobby” dominated the perception of politics and also circulated in 
the media for a long time. In this sense, his “success” comes from what Bourdieu points 
out as the harmony between subjective dispositions and objective structures. To put it 
differently, as the dominant political perception became nationalized, Bulut’s 
conspiratorial way of thinking also became legitimate in the journalistic field, since he 
usually appeals in his articles to the dichotomy between national power and global 
threats.       
 
Even though the journalistic field seems as if it is losing its autonomy as it approaches 
the field of power through the transitions of its actors, it at the same time strengthens 
its field structure. As Bourdieu detected, the journalistic field becomes dominant over 
other fields of cultural production because it inculcates its logic of the field to the other 
fields (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 41). For actors from other fields, for instance the academic field, 
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the journalistic field plays a role of mediation. The variety of mediums in the media 
provides significant visibility for those who wants to impose their vision and categories 
of perception. Whereas Bourdieu identifies those intellectuals as doxosophists who are 
political journalists, media intellectuals and other essayists (Poupeu and Discepolo, 2008, 
p. XV), Fairclough perceives the emergent journalistic order of discourse as an 
articulation of different discourses which can also be called the “conversationalization” 
of the discourse (Chouliaraki and Fairclough, 1999, p. 115). Although both approaches 
seem similar, while Bourdieu employs a normative perspective and thereby criticizes the 
mediatization of the academic field, on the other hand, Fairclough treats this 
phenomenon as a new formation derived from the articulation. One way or the other, 
what we confront is the fact that actors from different field leave aside the logic of fields 
they essentially belong to and adapt to the dynamics of the journalistic field. Think-tanks 
function here as a facilitators for those who pass from the academic field, since, as I 
discussed earlier, think-tanks operate in the boundaries, which prevents them from 
having a distinct field logic. 
 
5.4. Epilogue 
In conclusion, what this research reveals is the fact that Bourdieusian framework, which 
is rarely adapted to discourse studies, can function to grasp discursive strategies in the 
journalistic field. By means of critical discourse analysis as both method and 
methodology, I tried to scrutinize how new Turkey discourse is constructed in different 
political settings. In a more general manner, I reached the conclusion that in the case of 
the new Turkey, contextual changes are reflected in newspaper columns; those 
reflections are carried out through principles of vision and division and categories of 
perception; and finally, intellectual strategies have impinged on the dynamics of the 
journalistic field and the field of power, which also reversely positions those actors in the 
field according to their relevant capitals. My research is an attempt at comprehending 
recent Turkish political history through the construction and reconstruction process of 
new Turkey discourse. Therefore, it has limitations in capturing particularities in the 
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circulation of the discourse in the media. As one of the most influential discourses of 
Turkish history, the new Turkey seems likely to be studied from different perspectives, 
which will eventually enrich the field of discursive studies. 
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Charmaz, K. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative 
Analysis. SAGE 
 
Chouliaraki, L. and Fairclough, N. 1999. Discourse in Late Modernity: Rethinking Critical 
Discourse Analysis. Edinburgh University Press 
 
Derrida, J. 1976. Of Grammatology. Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Di-Maggio, P. 1979. On Pierre Bourdieu (review). American Journal of Sociology. 84(6) 
(May, 1979) Pp. 1460-1474 
 
Eagleton, T. 1990. Saints and Scholars. Futura Publications 
 
Esgin, A. 2015. Sosyal Bilimci mi Yoksa Doksalog Teknisyenler miyiz? Türkiye’de Bazı 
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Bulut, Yiğit (2014d). “Başkan ile Yeni Bir Türkiye..”. Star, 4 August 
 
Bulut, Yiğit (2014e). “‘Üretim-Bilgi-Vizyon Temelli’ Yeni Bir Türkiye”. Star, 31 August 
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Esayan, Markar (2015b). “Barış ve Yeni Türkiye En Kritik Safhasında”. Yeni Şafak, 22 
March 
136 
 
 
Esayan, Markar (2015c). “Yeni Türkiye’nin Formülü ve Kandil’in Tercihi”. Yeni Şafak, 23 
March 
 
Esayan, Markar (2015d). “Yeni Türkiye ve Birlikte Yaşamak”. Yeni Şafak, 7 June 
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